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ABSTRACT 
Jordan Louise MacKenzie: On Knowing Yourself and Being Worth Knowing 
(Under the direction of Thomas E. Hill) 
 
Why should you know yourself?  
While philosophers have paid ample attention to the epistemological issues 
surrounding the Delphic Command to ‘Know Thyself’, they have been comparatively quiet 
on the question of why we ought to care about heeding it. When attention has been paid to 
the question of why we ought to know ourselves, the answers that it has generated have 
typically been broadly instrumentalist. Self-knowledge is instrumentally valuable in many 
ways: we are better moral agents for not being self-deceived, and we are better rational 
deliberators for knowing what we desire.  
These sorts of instrumentalist explanations, while compelling, do not fully explain the 
value that many of us place in self-knowledge. We demand the truth, even when the truth 
hurts, and we try to understand our motivations for long-ago actions that have few, if any, 
practical implications for our present-day selves. This non-instrumental commitment to self-
knowledge is not just common, but also admirable. There is, after all, something impressive 
about people who want to see themselves ‘warts and all’.  
In my dissertation, I explain why we have reasons to value self-knowledge that are 
independent of the valuable consequences that self-knowledge often helps bring about. I 
argue that, just as interpersonal love gives us non-instrumental reasons to know its objects, so 
too does self-love give us non-instrumental reasons to know ourselves. Further, while 
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interpersonal love is not something that we can owe to other people, self-love is something 
that we can owe to ourselves. This is because self-respect requires us to act in ways that 
adequately embody our values and honor our commitments. In doing so, we extend to 
ourselves the sort of partiality that is required by self-love, while at the same time making 
ourselves into people whom we can love. Thus, to see oneself as worth knowing for the sake 
of knowing is part of what it is to love oneself, which is something that self-respect demands 
that we strive to do. To pursue self-knowledge for its own sake, in turn, is to respectfully 
honor one of the commitments that self-love motivates us to make.  
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INTRODUCTION: WHAT FLORENCE DIDN’T KNOW 
 
Florence Foster Jenkins was a New York City socialite renowned for two things: her 
unflappable love of music and her complete lack of musicality. This lack of musicality was 
apparent to everyone, with the unfortunate exception of Florence. Indeed, Florence fashioned 
herself to be quite a songbird, and throughout the 1910’s, 20’s, 30’s and 40’s, was known to 
‘treat’ select audiences of friends and admirers to her tuneless warbling in private recitals.1 
These concerts were organized by her long-time romantic partner and business associate, St. 
Clair Bayfield, who took ample precautions to ensure that his dear Florence never found out 
that people only came to these recitals for a good laugh.2 Florence’s career, if you could call 
it that, culminated in a solo recital at Carnegie Hall, where her musical styling caused 
uproarious laughter and general pandemonium. The sound of her voice can be summed up in 
one pithy line from Earl Wilson’s New York Post review of her Carnegie Hall debut: “Mrs. 
Florence Foster Jenkins…can sing anything but notes.” 
 This review gave Florence a rare opportunity to inquire into the truth about her 
musical ‘talents’. Unlike at her recitals, St. Clair hadn’t been able to keep the music 
                                                     
1 Darryl W. Bullock, Florence! Foster!! Jenkins!!!: The Life of the World’s Worst Opera Singer (New York: 
The Overlook Press, 2016), 57–71, 80–85. 
2 Earl Wilson, “It Happened Last Night.” New York Post October 26, 1944, as discussed in Florence Foster 
Jenkins: A World of Her Own (Dir. Donald Collup. Video Artists International, 2007. Documentary.) 
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reviewers out of Carnegie hall, nor had he been able to bribe them into silence.3 Now, as a 
matter of fact, Florence did find out about the bad reviews, the historical record is unclear 
about whether Florence was devastated, or simply dismissive about the reviewer’s 
comments.4 But I want to pause here at the moment before Florence found out, and ask: what 
reason, if any, would she have had she have to want to discover this new information about 
herself? And what, if anything, would she have she stood to gain by learning that she’s a bad 
singer?  
 This dissertation, in essence, seeks to provide answer to these two questions. In 
providing this answer, I will argue that we ought to be committed to knowing ourselves not 
simply because self-knowledge can be instrumentally valuable, but also because it can be 
worth having for its own sake.  
Before I do this, however, I will first have to complete some philosophical ground-
clearing. While I think that Florence would have gained something from discovering the truth 
about her musical ‘talents’, this intuition has not been shared by many of the philosophers 
who have written on the value of self-knowledge. When philosophers talk about the value of 
                                                     
3 There are a few exceptions to this. Over the years, reviews of several of Florence’s recitals had appeared in 
print. These reviews were, on the whole, quite positive, albeit often tongue-in-cheek. A review of her 1935 
recital at the Ritz-Carlton, for instance, described a “wildly applauding audience” that “left no doubt of the 
enjoyment derived by the throng.” Bullock, Jenkins!!!, 90–91. 
4 St. Clair Bayfield reported that Florence was “crushed” by the reviews. Bullock, Jenkins!!!, 119–20. Francis 
Robinson, a friend of Florence who later wrote the liner notes to the first CD recording of Florence’s music, 
disputes this, and claims instead that Florence died with a “happy heart.” Francis Robinson. Liner notes to The 
Glory (????) of the Human Voice. RCA LM 2597-C. Further, as Bullock (120) notes, Florence saved the 
Carnegie Hall reviews in the same scrapbook in which she saved all of her other reviews. The nature of 
Florence’s reaction may have some bearing on the circumstances of her death. Florence suffered a heart attack 
five days after her recital, and ultimately died a month after that. It is unclear whether the heart attack was 
brought on by emotional distress, or whether her death can be attributed to the fact that she was a 76 year old 
women who had been in poor health for decades. 
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self-knowledge, they typically do so in explicitly instrumental terms. Self-knowledge can be 
a means to moral virtue,5 autonomous self-governance,6 and well-being,7 while its absence 
opens the door to viciousness,8 and frustrates our ability to get what we want.9  If self-
knowledge is only valuable for the consequences it helps us secure, I think we can intuitively 
conclude that Florence had no reason to learn about her lack of musicality. Given her age and 
circumstances, this knowledge couldn’t have led her to improve upon herself, or to choose a 
more suitable life’s project. Nor was it likely to positively impact her well-being: indeed, we 
can reasonably assume that this knowledge would have had the exact opposite effect.  
                                                     
5 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1985); Magna 
Moralia, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984); Plato, Apology, Alcibiades and Charmides, in Plato: Collected Works, ed. John M. Cooper and trans. 
G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997); Emer O’Hagan, “Self-Knowledge and Moral 
Stupidity,” Ratio 25, no. 3 (2012): 291–96. 
6 Diana T. Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) and 
Being Yourself: Essays on Identity, Action and Social Life (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Beate 
Roessler, “Autonomy, Self-Knowledge, and Oppression,” in Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression: 
Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Marina Oshana (New York: Routledge, 2015), 68–84; Marcia Baron, “What is 
Wrong with Self-Deception?” in Perspectives on Self-Deception, eds. B.P McLaughlin and A.O. Rorty (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 431–49. 
7 Quassim Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 225–26; Thomas 
Hurka, The Best Things in Life: A Guide to What Really Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
90–94.. See also Valerie Tiberius, who argues that self-awareness (which requires self-knowledge) is both an 
instrumental good and constitutive component of the good life. The Reflective Life: Living Wisely Within Our 
Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 129–33. 
8 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons (Charlottesville, VA: Lincoln-Rembrandt Publishing, 1993), 113–25; Adam 
Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, eds. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1976); W. K. Clifford, Lectures and Essays of W.K. Clifford, eds. Leslie Stephen and Frederick Pollock, 
(London: Macmillan, 1879), 2:186; Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 182–83; Elizabeth. A. Linehan, “Ignorance, Self-Deception 
and Moral Accountability,” Journal of Value Inquiry 16 (1982): 101-115. 
9 Cassam, Self-Knowledge, 225; Tiberius, Reflective Life, 131. 
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There is much to recommend the Instrumentalist View. For starters, it seems plainly 
correct: we do need self-knowledge to achieve a host of independently-valuable ends. And 
the view can also be motivated from the opposite direction, by comparing it favorably to the 
sort of non-instrumental picture of self-knowledge’s value that I will ultimately defend.  For 
some, the idea of wanting self-knowledge for self-knowledge’s sake calls to mind the image 
of Narcissus endlessly gazing at his reflection in a pool of water. Surely, the value that 
Narcissus put in knowing himself was no sign of virtue. Rather it was simply, as his name 
implies, a symptom of his self-obsession. And so we should worry that we only value 
knowing ourselves for the sake of knowing ourselves because we, like Narcissus, are prone 
to arrogance and self-obsession. Perhaps, then, we should to pay less attention to ourselves 
and more attention to everyone else.  
We might also wonder whether ascribing a non-instrumental value to self-knowledge 
commits us to the implausible position that all self-knowledge has this sort of valuable. 
Presumably, this isn’t the case: it is one thing to think that knowledge about your talents, 
values, and commitments is intrinsically worth having, but it is another thing to think that 
knowledge of the number of hairs on your head, or the number of bowls of cereal you 
consumed last year, is worth having for its own sake. While the Instrumentalist View has a 
clear way to delineate valuable self-knowledge from valueless self-knowledge, a view that 
simply ascribes a non-instrumental value to knowing oneself will have a much harder time 
explaining why not all self-knowledge is worth having for its own sake.  
A non-instrumental account of self-knowledge’s value will have to explain why ought 
to be particularly concerned with our self-knowledge, rather than with somebody else’s. If 
Florence stands to gain something non-instrumentally valuable from the discovery of her 
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unmusicality, would I also stand to gain something non-instrumentally valuable by 
discovering this fact about her? Once again, the Instrumentalist View has a ready response to 
this challenge: self-knowledge often matters to me in a way that interpersonal knowledge 
does not precisely because it, unlike most interpersonal knowledge, is instrumental in helping 
me achieve certain independently valuable ends.10 A non-instrumentalist account of self-
knowledge’s value will have to explain why our self-knowledge matters to us in a way that it 
does not (and often, should not) matter to others.  
 My project in this introductory chapter is threefold. First, I aim to get clear on what 
type of self-knowledge is worth having for its own sake. I’ve already said that knowledge 
about one’s talents, values, and commitments falls into this category, and that knowledge 
about one’s cereal consumption does not, but I aim to provide a rough set of criteria that can 
be used to distinguish what Quassim Cassam has called ‘substantial self-knowledge’ from 
                                                     
10 This is the position that Hurka, Best Things takes. He contends that there is no intrinsic value that attaches 
uniquely to self-knowledge: 
This doesn’t mean self-knowledge has no value: understanding yourself remains as good as 
understanding other people or things. And sometimes it’s hugely beneficial, as when it helps you 
choose a rewarding career or improve your character. But its effects aside, self-knowledge doesn’t 
seem so special: it has neither the generality of scientific knowledge nor the extra importance of 
knowing your place in the world. While it’s good to know your inner states, it’s no tragedy if you 
don’t, and if being wrong about them helps you achieve other important good, that’s probably on 
balance a blessing (94). 
Hurka restricts the domain of self-knowledge in a way that I do not: self-knowledge is knowledge pertaining 
specifically to oneself (and thus, one’s ‘inner states’), and not in your relation to the world. The latter form of 
knowledge, Hurka contends, does have a special value: while having correct beliefs about your relation to the 
world isn’t “a great intrinsic good”, having false beliefs “is a great evil” (90). This helps explain why there is 
something horrific about the idea that one has spent one’s life in an Experience Machine, but nothing especially 
uplifting about the knowledge that one has not. As I will explain in Chapter 3, knowledge of the relationships 
that one bears to the world can be self-knowledge: indeed, we can only explain the value we place on this 
knowledge by appeal to the intimate connection it has to our sense of self.    
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‘trivial self-knowledge’. Next, I’ll explain why we cannot account for the value of self-
knowledge in purely instrumental terms. To do this, I will survey several different kinds of 
Instrumentalist Views: the Moral Self-Improvement Account, the Authenticity Account, and 
the Wellbeing Account. Having demonstrated that substantial self-knowledge has a value that 
goes beyond the instrumental, I will dedicate the rest of this Introduction to explaining why 
we ought to resist the urge to merely attribute to it an intrinsic value. This will leave me with 
a challenge that I must meet over the next two chapters. Specifically, I will have to explain 
why self-knowledge can be valuable for its own sake while still providing a substantive 
account as to why it has this value.  
Section 1: What Type of Self-Knowledge Is (Possibly) Worth Having for its Own 
Sake? 
When I say that I endeavor to provide a non-instrumentalist defense of self-
knowledge’s value, I do not mean to imply that every fact that we can possibly know about 
ourselves is non-instrumentally worth knowing. Indeed, I think that many of the things that 
we are capable of knowing about ourselves have at most instrumental value. To know 
whether I put the left sock on my foot before the right this morning is, in a sense, to know 
something about myself, but it would be hard to argue that my life is enriched in any 
meaningful way by virtue of having that little tidbit of self-knowledge in my possession. If 
my life is enriched by that knowledge at all, it will only be enriched insofar as that 
knowledge may help me achieve some further valuable end. Nor do I think that there is 
something inherently valuable about knowing exactly how far away my house is from New 
York City, the exact length of my small intestine, or whether my forth favorite type of 
cuisine is Greek or Thai.  
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In contrast, I do think that I would be better off, all things considered, if I were able to 
have accurate beliefs about where my talents really lie, whether I actually value what I 
purport to value, and why I actually made some of the major life decisions that I have made. 
These two classes of self-knowledge correspond to the distinction that Quassim Cassam has 
drawn between ‘trivial’ and ‘substantial’ self-knowledge, and it is to his account that I will 
now turn.  
Cassam’s Characterization of Substantial Self-Knowledge 
Before explaining what exactly differentiates substantial self-knowledge from trivial 
self-knowledge, Cassam first offers a list of the types of knowledge that intuitively belong to 
the former category. Substantial self-knowledge includes knowledge of our character, 
knowledge of our values, abilities, emotions and aptitudes, knowledge pertaining to the 
reasons that we have for holding certain beliefs about the world, and knowledge of what 
makes us happy.11 These types of self-knowledge, Cassam suggest, meet most (if not all) of 
ten conditions, which he describes as follows: 
i. The Fallibility Condition: with substantial self-knowledge there is always the 
possibility of error. It’s not just a theoretical possibility that you are mistaken 
about, say, whether you are generous but an actual, real-life possibility. There 
isn’t even a presumption that you aren’t mistaken about such things because it 
might be a psychological fact about us humans that we are generally prone to 
thinking well of ourselves even if an objective view of the evidence would 
support a harsher assessment. It’s comforting to think that you are a generous 
                                                     
11 Cassam, Self-Knowledge, 30.  
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person even though your close friends can hardly fail to have noticed your 
tendency to make yourself scarce when it’s your turn to buy the next round of 
drinks. 
ii. The Obstacle Condition: the possibility of error in such cases is a reflection of the 
fact that for humans there are familiar and reasonably well-understood obstacles 
to the acquisition of substantial self-knowledge. Such obstacles include 
repression, self-deception, bias, and embarrassment. Some of us find it hard to be 
honest with ourselves about our own limitations and that can make it hard to 
acquire some types of substantial self-knowledge.  
iii. The Self-Conception Condition: the existence of such obstacles to substantial self-
knowledge is related to the fact that, as Schwitzgebel puts it, this kind of 
knowledge often ‘tangles with’ a person’s self-conception (Schwitzgebel 2012: 
191). To know that you have a particular character you have to believe you have 
that character, and it might be hard for you to believe that if your having that 
character is at odds with your self-conception.  
iv. The Challenge Condition: substantial self-knowledge can be challenged even in 
normal circumstances. For example, if you assert that you have an aptitude for 
dealing with difficult colleagues or that a charge of career would make you happy 
there is room for the question, ‘Why do you think that?’, or for the retort ‘You 
must be joking’. No doubt you have your reasons for thinking you have an 
aptitude for dealing with difficult colleagues, but your reasons are not immune to 
criticism and correction.  
9 
 
v. The Corrigibility Condition: substantial self-knowledge is corrigible, and its 
corrigibility is related to the fact that we are not necessarily authoritative about 
the matters to which such knowledge relates. You may not be in the best position 
to know about such matters and others might know better; your spouse may well 
have a much deeper insight into your character than you do.  
vi. The Non-Transparency Condition: substantial self-knowledge can’t be got by 
employing the Transparency Method (TM).12 You can’t determine whether you 
are really happy with your new apartment by determining whether you ought 
rationally to be happy with it. Maybe you ought to be really happy with it but 
aren’t.  
vii. The Evidence Condition: substantial self-knowledge is based on evidence. Many 
different kinds of evidence bear on substantial self-knowledge. If the question is 
whether you are in love with X, the evidence might include how you behave in 
the presence of X, how you feel in their presence (does your heart go pitter 
patter?) and what people who know you tell you about your state of mind. If the 
question is whether you are a racist the evidence will include how you behave 
towards, and think about, people who belong to racial groups different from your 
own.  
viii. The Cognitive Effort Condition: acquiring substantial self-knowledge requires a 
degree of cognitive effort. For example, you don’t ‘just know’ your own character 
                                                     
12 Cassam takes this condition from Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012). Moran argued that in order to know our belief about some proposition, p, we needed to 
look not at our inner selves, but at the world around us to see what evidence there is in support of p (84). The 
question “Do you believe it will rain” is, on Moran’s account, transparent to the question “Will it rain?”. 
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or aptitudes; you have to work it out by reflecting on the behavioral evidence and 
on what other people tell you about you. The level of effort may be different in 
different cases but substantial self-knowledge can’t literally be effortless. If it 
were it would scarcely be ‘substantial’.  
ix. The Indirectness Condition: in the terminology of Chapter 1, substantial self-
knowledge is neither psychologically immediate nor epistemically immediate. It 
isn’t psychologically immediate because, as the Cognitive Effort Condition 
suggests, it requires reasoning or inference. It isn’t epistemically immediate 
because it depends on your having justification for believing other, supporting 
propositions. For example, you can’t know that you are generous if you aren’t 
justified in believing a range of supporting propositions about your actions. To 
know that you are generous it isn’t enough that you act generously; you also need 
to believe, and be justified in believing, that this is how you act.  
x. The Value Condition: substantial self-knowledge matters in a practical or even a 
moral sense. If you are planning a trip to Spain it helps to know whether you can 
speak Spanish. As King Lear discovered, not knowing what will make you happy 
can result in your making bad choices, and we think some of forms of self-
ignorance not just as cognitive but also as moral defects. Being unkind is bad in 
itself but made morally worse if it combined with the belief that one is kind.13  
The items on Cassam’s list are not to be taken as necessary and sufficient conditions for 
substantial self-knowledge. Rather, they are meant to provide a rough indication of the sorts 
                                                     
13 Ibid., 31–33. The items on this list were reproduced exactly as they appeared in Cassam’s text. Note that, as 
he makes clear in Condition X, Cassam is an instrumentalist about the value of substantial self-knowledge. 
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of qualities that we associate with the self-knowledge that matters most. The difference 
between substantial and trivial self-knowledge, further, will be one of degree. “The more of 
these characteristics” that a kind of self-knowledge has, Cassam writes, “the more substantial 
it is.”14 
What Cassam has given us, in essence, is a cluster of properties that can be used as a 
rough heuristic to pick out facts about oneself that count as substantial self-knowledge. Not 
every piece of substantial self-knowledge will meet every one of these conditions. And some 
pieces of seemingly trivial self-knowledge, in contrast, will meet a startling number of these 
conditions. Consider Timothy, who believes he has an above-average tolerance for spicy 
food. Timothy doesn’t care about this, as he doesn’t have a strong opinion about the tastiness 
of spicy food. This fact about Timothy seems trivial—perhaps not as trivial as the fact that he 
is currently wearing socks, or the fact that the number of miles between him and Las Vegas is 
a prime number, but trivial nonetheless. And yet, it is a fact that meets most of Cassam’s 
conditions:  
i. The Fallibility Condition: Timothy might have arrived his belief because he was 
mistaken about how tolerant other people are of spicy food, or because he was 
mistaken about how spicy the spicy food he’s eaten really was.  
ii. The Obstacle Condition: there are obstacles to Timothy knowing this fact: even 
though he thinks that he doesn’t care about his above-average spice tolerance, he 
might be self-deceived about this fact. Perhaps he does care, but he doesn’t want 
to admit that he’s the sort of person who puts stock in such trivial things.  
                                                     
14 Ibid, 31.  
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iii. The Challenge Condition: other people, upon hearing Timothy’s claim that he has 
an above-average tolerance for spiciness, could reasonably challenge the veracity 
of his claim.  
iv. The Corrigibility Condition: other people watching Timothy eat spicy food might 
note, for instance, that he appears to be in more pain when eating spicy food than 
the average person.  
v. The Non-Transparency Condition: Timothy, of course, can’t reason to the 
conclusion that he has an above-average tolerance for spicy food.  
vi. The Evidence Condition: presumably, Timothy couldn’t reasonably draw a 
conclusion about his spice tolerance if he has only eaten spicy food once or twice, 
or if he has only eaten one type of spicy food.  
vii. The Cognitive Effort Condition: Timothy would have had to reflect on his 
tolerance for spicy food, and his observations about other peoples’ tolerances, to 
conclude that he has an above average tolerance.  
viii. The Indirectness Condition: for Timothy to have formed his belief, he must have 
reasoned from evidence to a conclusion. And he must have formed other beliefs 
along the way, such as the belief that the food he thought to be too spicy was, in 
fact, spicy.  
ix. The Value Condition: Timothy’s knowledge will, at very least, help him in his 
practical deliberations about what sorts of new foods to try, and what to order at 
restaurants. It might also save him from embarrassment when eating spicy food 
with other people.  
13 
 
Indeed, Timothy’s spice tolerance only fails to meet one of Cassam’s conditions for 
substantial self-knowledge, viz. the ‘Self-Conception Condition’. And yet contra Cassam, we 
should not conclude from this that his knowledge is substantial. This is because it fails to 
meet this condition is all that we need to appeal to in order to understand why it fails as 
substantial self-knowledge. Even if it’s epistemically indirect, fallible, valuable, the result of 
cognitive effort and so forth, if it doesn’t speak to Timothy’s sense of himself, it isn’t 
substantial self-knowledge.  
Now, the sorts of facts that do speak to our sense of self often do meet these other 
conditions. And they meet these conditions primarily because of the relation that they bear to 
our sense of self: our investment in being a certain way explains why we may be self-
deceived about substantial facts about ourselves, why other people who care less may see 
these facts with more clarity than we do, and why we find these facts valuable. Likewise, 
given that substantial self-knowledge seems most typically to consist in facts that speak to 
our sense of self, it makes sense that these facts would rarely concern particular instances of 
our behavior, but would instead most involve the overarching conclusions that we’ve drawn 
from these instances. The fact that you made a charitable donation exactly three years ago 
says nothing substantial about your moral character. The fact that I am a dedicated 
philanthropist, which is itself a fact that I can derive only by looking at a wide range of my 
behaviors over time, does speak to my character and thus my sense of self. 
An Alternative: Substantial Self-Knowledge and Identification 
The Timothy example helps to illustrate the intuitive connection between substantial 
self-knowledge and our sense of who we are as individuals. Speaking colloquially, then, we 
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might say that substantial self-knowledge is knowledge about whatever it is that makes you 
you.  
We can capture the rough contours of this category of self-knowledge by looking at it 
third-personally.  Consider all of the facts that I might be able to learn about you. 
Presumably, the number of things that I could learn about you is infinite (if we include facts 
about Cambridge properties), but most of these facts will tell me nothing in particular about 
who you actually are and what you’re actually like. I can know that you have tulips planted in 
your front garden, and that you once drove through Detroit on a Sunday without being able to 
draw any reasonable conclusions about your character or values. At most, these facts give me 
a chance to speculate: I might jump, perhaps, from the fact that you have a garden to the 
supposition that you enjoy gardening. There are facts about you that leave me with even less 
room for speculation about what you’re like as an individual. Your blood type is AB+; 
you’re a prime number of miles away from Los Angeles; your left leg currently itches. These 
propositions may all be true, they do not give me sufficient grounds for making reasonable 
suppositions about what you might be like as an individual. In contrast, if I were to learn that 
you play in a Metallica cover band for fun on the weekends, that you’d rather miss your 
office’s Christmas party than your child’s Winter Recital, and that you have a tendency to be 
modest about your accomplishments, then I can on the basis of those facts begin forming a 
picture of what you’re like.  
So far, this talk of ‘individual selves’ and ‘what makes us us’ has been vague and 
speculative. How might we distinguish facts about ourselves that speak to who we are as 
individuals from facts about ourselves that do not? For starters, I think we can say that the 
category of substantial self-knowledge, by and large, consists of facts pertaining to the ends 
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that we have set. To be a person is, according to a plausible rationalist picture of personhood 
at least, to be an end-setter.15 Who we are as individuals, in turn, is largely the result of the 
ends that we have set for ourselves; we have, over time, shaped ourselves by cultivating 
certain dispositions and ignoring others, embracing and rejecting different social identities, 
and setting particular goals and projects for ourselves. Your involvement in a Metallica cover 
band, and your commitment to your children, speak to the ends that you as an individual have 
set for yourself. In turn, it is understandable that you would care about knowing facts about 
the ends that you have set for yourself for non-instrumental reasons. After losing a Metallica 
cover band contest, for instance, you might find yourself wanting to know whether you lost 
because the judges had been bribed, or because your band isn’t actually as fantastic as you 
think it is. Likewise, you might question whether your devotion to your children isn’t in part 
a reaction to the lack of attention your own parents paid to you.  
By tying the category of substantial self-knowledge to the ends that we set for 
ourselves, we are able to explain why not all knowledge of our talents is especially important 
to us. I haven’t set any ends for myself that require me to be a good singer, and so I have no 
special reason to find out just how bad a singer I really am. But Florence Foster Jenkins, 
whose ends and entire sense of self are bound up with her identity as a singer, does have a 
special reason to find out the truth about her singing abilities: this knowledge, after all, is 
knowledge that directly pertains to one of the ends that she has set, and that speaks to her 
sense of who she is as an individual person.. Likewise, we are able to explain why biological 
facts about ourselves and facts about our Cambridge properties are not pieces of substantial 
                                                     
15 I will discuss this picture of personhood in detail in Chapter 1.  
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self-knowledge. Your blood type and the exact number of miles between you and Los 
Angeles presumably do not speak to any of the ends that you have set for yourself. You can, 
as such, find out facts about these topics without having learned anything that is especially 
relevant to who you are. 
This distinction, however, cannot get us all the way to account of what types of 
propositions belong in the category of substantial self-knowledge. We constantly set ends for 
ourselves, and not all of the ends that we set speak to who we are in any meaningful sense.  I 
chose to eat cereal rather than toast this morning, and I chose to do my laundry last Saturday. 
We can say that these behaviors reflect ends that I have set for myself: the end of eating 
cereal for breakfast, and the end of having clean clothing. But I could have easily chosen 
different ends for myself (toast for breakfast, laundry on Sunday) without being in any 
important sense a ‘different person’. The knowledge that I have about these ends, further, is 
clearly only instrumentally valuable: I care about knowing what I had for breakfast insofar as 
it informs next week’s grocery list, and I care about knowing when I last did laundry insofar 
as it helps me predict when I’ll have to do it next.  
We cannot say, then, that substantial self-knowledge is any knowledge whatsoever 
that pertains to the ends that we set for ourselves. Many of the ends that we set for ourselves, 
after all, are mundane, habitual, and largely unrelated to our identity as individuals. And so, 
we must find some way of distinguishing the sorts of ends that are relevant to substantial 
self-knowledge from the sorts of ends that are irrelevant to it.  
At this point, we might turn to Bernard Williams’ notion of ‘character’ to explain 
why not every piece of knowledge that we can have about our ends counts as substantial self-
knowledge. To have a character, according to Williams, is to identify strongly with particular 
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‘ground projects’, such that one would experience a loss of those projects as a loss of 
meaning in one’s life.16 The ends that pertain to our ground projects and thus our character, 
which we might call ‘identity-constituting ends’, matter to us in a way that our other ends do 
not. And so too do we care about knowing information related to our identity-constituting 
ends in a way that we do not care about self-knowledge more generally.     
While Williams’ discussion of the importance of ground projects might strike some as 
hyperbolic, I think he captures the intuitive idea that we most strongly with and affirm a 
specific subset of our ends. Much of the time, we set ends for ourselves out of habit, or 
uncritically. We don’t generally ask ourselves why we set these sorts of ends, both because 
we aren’t often particularly interested in the answer, and because we typically think that the 
answer is pretty obvious. Why do I do my laundry last Saturday? Because I needed to do 
laundry, and because I had time to do it on Saturday. I’m not ardently committed to doing 
laundry on Saturday, and I could have just as easily saved it until Sunday. In fact, I would 
suffer no great loss of self if I were to realize that I had actually done the laundry on Sunday, 
and not Saturday as I recall.  
In contrast, the answers to questions like ‘Why did I stop talking to my best friend 
last year?’ or ‘Why am I so bothered by the fact that I’m no longer a vegetarian?’ are often 
genuinely unclear to us. I can question why I recently began eating meat after several years 
of vegetarianism—I can wonder, for instance, whether my current dietary preferences are 
                                                     
16 Bernard Williams pursues this line of thought in various works. Examples of it can be found in “Persons, 
Character and Morality,” in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (New York: Cambridge, 1981), 1–
19; “Moral Luck,” in Moral Luck, 20–39 and “Integrity,” in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: 
For and Against (New York: Cambridge, 1973), 108–117. Similar thoughts can be found in Gabriele Taylor, 
“Integrity,” in Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (New York: Oxford, 1985), 108–41 and 
Lynn McFall, “Integrity,” Ethics 98 (1987): 5–20. 
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born out of a concern for my health, or a more basic desire to eat bacon again. Further, the 
answers to these types of questions matter to us. This is true even when we think that these 
answers are obvious. Even if I am fairly certain about why I started eating meat again, I 
would still think that the question was an important one for me to answer insofar as it 
pertains to one of the ends to which my identity was once strongly tied. If were to discover 
that I had been mistaken about my beliefs with regards to these ends, I would likely feel as 
though I’ve lost sight of who I actually am.   
If substantial self-knowledge is self-knowledge that pertains directly17 to the ends that 
matter most to us as individuals, then the specific facts count as substantial self-knowledge 
will vary from one person to another.  This is why I think that Florence has a reason to care 
about facts pertaining to her musicality in a way that I do not. Facts about her musicality are 
substantial facts about Florence precisely because they speak to one of her identity-
constituting ends. Facts about my lack of musicality are not substantial facts about me 
precisely because they do not.   
Given this, it will be difficult to make determinations about whether a specific fact 
about an individual counts as substantial absent sufficient information about the background 
circumstances of that individual’s life. To make that determination, we would need to know 
something about what ends that individual has set for herself, and how she has come to 
identify with the ends that she has set. We would need also to know how that fact relates, or 
                                                     
17 There will be some vagueness about what it means for information to pertain ‘directly’ to one of these ends. 
Certainly, there is some information about our identity-constituting ends that we don’t care about: a musician 
might want to know whether he’s actually talented at his chosen instrument, but not whether he picks up that 
instrument more often with his right or left hand. The former fact matters directly to the ends that he has set for 
himself as a musician in a way that the latter does not. A full description of what it takes for information to 
pertain directly to an identity-constituting end is beyond the scope of this project.  
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fails to relate, to her identity-constituting ends. Outside of particular cases, the most we can 
reasonably do to delineate substantial self-knowledge from trivial self-knowledge is to point 
to broad categories of facts, such as facts about our values, talents, significant life events and 
so forth, insofar as these, insofar as these categories often closely track the types of identity-
constituting ends that agents set for themselves.  
Section 2: The Instrumental Value of Substantial Self-Knowledge 
Even if it is clear why we value some types of self-knowledge over others, it is not 
yet clear why we do this or whether we ought to do this. Most typically, philosophers have 
answered questions about self-knowledge’s value by offering some iteration of what I will 
call ‘The Instrumentalist View’. The Instrumentalist View holds that self-knowledge is 
valuable insofar as it is a means to some independently valuable end. The view can be taken 
to be either a descriptive claim about how we actually value self-knowledge, or (as it is most 
typically interpreted) as a normative claim about how we should value self-knowledge.  
The Instrumentalist View comes in various flavors, depending on which 
independently valuable end it associates with self-knowledge. Before moving on to my 
critique of the view, I’ll briefly summarize three common formulations of the view: the 
Moral Self-Improvement Account, the Authenticity Account, and the Well-Being Account.  
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The Moral Self-Improvement Account 
Historically, the value of self-knowledge has been tied to with the moral disvalue of 
self-deception. For Aristotle, Plato, Kant, Butler, Smith and others, self-deception was the 
root of many (if not all) human evils.18 Self-deception, Butler warns: 
…is unfairness; it is dishonestly; it is falseness of heart: and it is therefore so far from 
extenuating guilt, that it is in itself the greatest of all guilt in proportion to the degree 
it prevails…19 
Self-deception allows us to ignore our moral failings, thus halting moral self-improvement, 
and giving us the unique power to commit immoral actions without having to bear the burden 
of a guilty conscience.20 We find an echo of Bishop Butler in Adam Smith’s condemnation of 
self-deception.  Self-deception, he writes, is the “fatal weakness of mankind” insofar as it 
allows us to “persevere in injustice.”21 Kant, meanwhile, positioned a duty of self-knowledge 
at the center of his moral framework. The ‘First Command’ of all self-regarding duties, was 
to:  
…know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself,” not in terms of your natural perfection (your 
fitness or unfitness for all sorts of discretionary or even commanded ends) but rather 
in terms of your moral perfection in relation to your duty. That is, know your heart—
whether it is good or evil, whether the source of your actions is pure or impure, and 
what can be imputed to you as belonging originally to the substance of a human being 
or as derived (acquired or developed) and belonging to your moral condition.22  
                                                     
18 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics; Butler, Sermons; Kant, Metaphysics of Morals; Smith, Moral Sentiments. 
19 Butler, Sermons, 120.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Smith, Moral Sentiments, III.I.91-92. 
22 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:441. 
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Fulfilling this duty, Kant suggested, will help to rid us of our self-conceited tendency to 
overinflate the goodness of our moral actions and characters. We cannot, in other words, 
fruitfully seek to fulfill our duties, if we are self-deceived about our inborn tendency to stray 
from the commands of morality.23   
The Authenticity Account 
 More recently, philosophers have located the value of self-knowledge in its 
connection to authenticity. There is philosophical disagreement both about what it means to 
be ‘authentic’ about what types of self-knowledge, if any, are required for authenticity, and 
about whether authenticity is itself instrumentally or non-instrumentally valuable.24 At one 
end of the ‘authenticity spectrum’, we find Jean Paul Sartre, who understood the connection 
between authenticity and self-knowledge rather negatively: to have authenticity was not so 
much to know oneself as it was to lack a certain type of self-deception, which Sartre called 
‘bad faith’.25 The person with bad faith fails to grasp something about her nature: she sees 
herself purely as an ‘objective facticity’, that is, as a being with determinate characteristics 
over which she had no control, while denying her status as a self-determining entity capable 
of transforming herself and her character. To overcome bad faith, and thus to achieve 
                                                     
23 Kant thought that we had a deep-seated propensity to be self-conceited and self-deceived. Examples of 
passages where he discussed this propensity include The Metaphysics of Morals, 6;447; 6:393; Groundwork for 
the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Arnulf Zweig and eds. Thomas E. Hill and Arnulf Zweig (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 4:407; Critique of Practical Reason, in Kant, Practical Philosophy and Religion Within 
the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in Kant: Religion and Rational Theology, trans. George di Giovanni and eds. 
Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:51. 
24 For a critique of the value of authenticity as an ideal, see Simon Feldman, Against Authenticity: Why You 
Shouldn’t Be Yourself, (Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2015). In a paper co-authored with Allan Hazlett, 
“Authenticity and Self-Knowledge,” Dialectica 67 (2013): 157–81, Feldman also criticizes the more narrow 
claim that we can appeal to authenticity to explain the value of self-.knowledge. 
25 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” in Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter 
Kaufman (Meridan Publishing Company, 1989), 345–68. 
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authenticity, is to recognize the duality of one’s nature as both an objective facticity and a 
transcendently free self-creator.26 Thus, insofar as authenticity requires self-knowledge, the 
self-knowledge that it requires is knowledge not about oneself as an individual, but rather 
about the duality of one’s fundamental nature.   
 At the other end of the spectrum, you will find more substantive accounts of the ideal 
of authenticity. For philosophers like Lionel Trilling, J. David Velleman, and Michael Lynch, 
living authentically was a matter of embodying one’s true self by living in accordance with 
one’s actual desires. What it means to have a ‘true self’ or what it means for a desire to 
‘actually’ be along to a person is subject to philosophical debate. Following, Velleman, we 
might capture this version of the ideal by looking at a paradigmatic example of an inauthentic 
person:  
This person laughs at what he thinks he is supposed to find amusing, shows concern 
for what he thinks he is supposed to care about, and in general conforms himself to 
the demands and expectations of others. The motives that his behavior is designed to 
simulate are motives that he doesn’t genuinely have.27 
Velleman’s paragon of inauthenticity, in other words, is a conformist. The authentic person, 
in contrast, lives in a way that accurately represents who and what he truly is. 28 Michael 
Lynch offers a more idealized version of this view. For him, the authentic person is someone 
                                                     
26 Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, New York: Washington Square 
Press, 1992. For a critique of the Sartrean account of self-knowledge’s value, see Feldman (2015). 
27 J. David Velleman, “Identification and Identity,” in Contours of Agency, eds. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 97. 
28 J. David Velleman, How We Get Along, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 102. Velleman 
makes clear that inauthenticity need not be conscious or deliberate, but rather can be the result of self-deception 
(90–92). 
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who identifies with the desires that guide his actions. He is, in other words, not simply being 
himself, but being a version of himself that he can reflectively endorse.29  
 Any account of self-knowledge that locates its value in its connection to authenticity 
will be subject to two potential lines of criticism.  First, if authenticity turns out to not itself 
be a valuable ideal, then we will not be able to use it to ground the value of self-knowledge. 
And second, if we could demonstrate that self-knowledge is not to be required for 
authenticity, then we will not be able use its purported connection to authenticity to explain 
its value.  
 In support of the first line of criticism, Christopher Lasch has suggested that 
authenticity is problematically narcissistic,30 Charles Taylor have both criticized the ‘culture 
of authenticity’ as unduly individualistic, relativistic, and devoid of meaning,31 and Feldman 
has argued that authenticity cannot be justified by appeal to morality, rationality, or well-
being.32  
The second criticism has been pursued most forcefully by Hazlett and Feldman, who 
argue that authenticity, however we describe it, does not require self-knowledge, and is in 
                                                     
29 Michael Lynch, True to Life: Why Truth Matters, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 125. Note that Lynch is not 
an instrumentalist, but a constitutivist about the value of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge, he argues, is a 
constitutive component of authenticity, which is in turn a constitutive part of well-being (124–26). For a 
forceful critique of Lynch’s constitutivist view, see Hazlett and Feldman, “Authenticity and Self-Knowledge.”   
30 Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations, (New 
York: Norton, 1979). 
31 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 1–12. Taylor is not 
himself critical of authenticity as an ideal, but rather about how authenticity is often understood in modern 
culture. 
32 Feldman, Against Authenticity.  
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fact sometimes inconsistent with self-knowledge.33 If we understand authenticity in Sartrean 
terms, they contend, then we end up with a circular account of self-knowledge’s value insofar 
as authenticity is essentially a species of self-knowledge. Understanding authenticity as a 
matter of ‘being true to yourself’ or ‘wholeheartedly identifying with your effective desires’34 
gets us at most a weak connection between authenticity and self-knowledge: while knowing 
ourselves may sometimes help us act authentically, it is not required for authentic action. We 
can, in other words, act upon the desires we have, or the desires we endorse, without 
knowing exactly what those desires are.35 
The Well-Being Account 
Persuaded by both Feldman and Hazlett’s arguments36, Cassam has argued that self-
knowledge is valuable insofar as it positively contributes to our well-being. The value of 
well-being, in turn, needs no argument: it is self-evidently intrinsically valuable. Although 
Cassam never fully explicates how he understands the term ‘well-being’, he seems to be 
relying on either a utilitarian or desire-satisfaction model. As he describes it,  
                                                     
33 Hazlett and Feldman, “Authenticity and Self-Knowledge.” 
34 See Lynch, True to Life for a discussion of this latter view. Lynch argues that being true to oneself consists 
not simply in acting upon one’s desires, but specifically in acting on those desires that one reflectively endorses 
(125). 
35 Hazlett and Feldman, “Authenticity and Self-Knowledge,” 4–6 and 9–13. 
36 Cassam, Self-Knowledge,. 217-220.  
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Knowing what you are like, good at, what makes you happy, what is important to 
you, or how you feel can improve your choices and thinking in ways that objectively 
make your life go better. 37 
The plausibility of Cassam’s claim cannot be denied: although there is some empirical 
evidence suggesting that minor self-deceptions can at times increase our well-being, it would 
be hard to doubt that our lives go better when we are able to accurately form beliefs about 
our desires, talents, experiences, and attitudes.38   
Section 3: Against the Explanatory Exhaustiveness of the Instrumentalist View 
At the outset, I must make clear that I do not take issue with the Instrumentalist View 
as an explanation of self-knowledge’s value. Certainly, self-knowledge is valuable as a 
means to all sorts of other instrumentally and non-instrumentally valuable ends. My issue 
with the Instrumentalist View only arises if one takes it to be an exhaustive explanation of 
self-knowledge’s value. I will grant, in essence, that the Instrumentalist View has something 
to say about self-knowledge’s value, while denying that it has the last word on the subject. 
Given this, rather than critique each account separately, I will focus on one type of the 
Instrumentalist View—Cassam’s Well-Being account—to show why it cannot fully describe 
the value many of us place, and think we ought to place, in self-knowledge.  
The Instrumentalist View, as I have said, can be taken as either a descriptive thesis 
about how we value self-knowledge, or a normative thesis about how we ought to value self-
                                                     
37 Ibid, p. 225. Additional evidence for this interpretation can be found at p. 277, when Cassam suggests that the 
precise ways in which self-knowledge contribute to well-being are a matter of empirical, rather than 
philosophical investigation.  
38 For a survey of the literature on the connection between self-knowledge and well-being, see Timothy D. 
Wilson and Elizabeth W. Dunn, “Self-Knowledge: Its Limits, Value, and Potential for Improvement,” Annual 
Review of Psychology 55 (2004): 493–518. 
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knowledge. To see where a descriptive reading of Cassam’s version of the Instrumentalist 
View falls short, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose that Cassam tells you that 
self-knowledge is instrumentally valuable only insofar as it positively contributes to your 
overall wellbeing. Two results fall out of Cassam’s claim: first, that self-knowledge will 
cease to be valuable if it turns out to be irrelevant or deleterious to wellbeing, and second, 
that the reasons that we have to seek self-knowledge will ultimately boil down to the reasons 
that we have for wanting well-being.  
 So far so good. Now, suppose that I interrupt your chat with Cassam to inform you 
that I have discovered something about you that you don’t know. If you were to find out this 
piece of information, I warn you, it would radically change your conception of who you are 
and how your life is going. This secret is, in other words, that might be revealed on an 
episode of the Jerry Springer Show. Suppose further that I know you better than anyone else 
in the world, and that I have every reason to believe that nothing good will come from you 
knowing this piece of information about yourself—it won’t guide your future deliberations, 
or lead you to a sense of inner peace, and it may even cause you emotional harm.  
 Would you want me to tell you the secret? In my experience, people part ways on 
their answer to this question. Some emphatically want to know, some empathically want not 
to know, and others are genuinely unsure of whether or not they want to know. This is 
enough to render the descriptive reading suspect. But does it leave us with any reason to 
reject the more plausible normative reading? Consider what can be said about the rationality 
of the different answers that one might give to my offer. Which answer is the right one? I 
want to suggest that these answers are all rationally on a par. That is, we wouldn’t think that 
there is anything amiss about someone who strongly prefers one alternative to the other. That 
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is, unless we assume that rationality always demands that we act in ways that aim to 
maximize utilitarian wellbeing, then I think each of these choices will appear to most people 
as intelligible and ceteris paribus reasonable.39 If this is right, then it gives us reason to doubt 
that the Instrumentalist View is capable of offering an exhaustive explanation of the value 
that we can reasonably place in self-knowledge. If self-knowledge were only valuable 
instrumentally, then it would be unreasonable to want to know something that would 
undermine the very state that gives it valuable. This is clearly the case with other 
instrumentally valuable things. If Midas had known beforehand that having the ability to turn 
everything to gold would cause him nothing but strife, it would have been unreasonable for 
him to ask Dionysus for that power.  
 Someone sympathetic to Cassam’s account might object that I have rigged this 
thought experiment in my favor. After all, the very act of telling you that I know a shocking 
secret about your life could itself negatively impact your well-being. Even if you choose not 
to find out the secret, you might still spend sleepless nights wondering about what I would 
have told you. For some, this state of knowing-that-you-don’t-know could in fact be worse 
than the psychological damages that the secret would have caused. But we can tweak the 
example, to account for this wrinkle. Suppose I promised to give you a dose of rhohypnol 
that would erase your memory of our conversation if you chose to turn down my offer. Even 
if you were able to turn down my offer without any ill effects, I think it would still be 
intelligible for you to choose either to find out or not find what I know about you.  
                                                     
39 There might be situations in which one or more of these answers is unreasonable. If you have a history of 
mental instability, and obligations to remain mentally well for the sake of your child’s welfare, then it may be 
unreasonable for you to choose a course of action that heightens your chances of being able to fulfill that 
obligation.  
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 If this hypothetical is unconvincing, consider another. Suppose that, after much 
research, psychologists found out that, while self-knowledge typically increases levels of 
well-being by 10%, there is another epistemic state—call it ‘minor self-overestimation’—that 
on average increases well-being by 15%. By ‘minor self-overestimation’, I have in mind the 
state of having beliefs about oneself that are, to a minor degree, overly positive given the 
evidence available. A person in this state would not have a radically false self-conception. 
Rather, they would conceive of themselves in a way that is just a little too good to be true.40 
If self-knowledge is only good insofar as it positively contributes to well-being, then minor 
self-overestimation would ceteris paribus be better a better epistemic than self-knowledge. If 
you could choose between the two without any ill effects, then you would have more reason 
to choose then latter than the former. Indeed, according to the expected utility account of 
rationality, it would be patently irrational for you to choose self-knowledge to minor self-
overestimation. This result, at very least, represents a significant departure from the way that 
we value these two epistemic states.  
The Instrumentalist View: Conclusion 
 Similar objections can be raised towards both the Moral Self-Improvement Account 
and the Authenticity Account. We can still intelligibly value self-knowledge that is irrelevant 
or even deleterious to our moral progress. Likewise, even if self-knowledge turns out to be 
inessential to authenticity, as Feldman and Hazlett argue, we can still cogently understand 
                                                     
40 The psychological literature in fact gives us some reason to think that having this sort of self-conception 
results, on average, in higher levels of well-being than having an accurate self-conception. See Jonathon D. 
Brown and Keith A. Dutton, “Truth and Consequences: The Costs and Benefits of Accurate Self-Knowledge” 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 21 (1995): 1288–96. 
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why someone would prefer a life that has both self-knowledge and authenticity to a life that 
has only authenticity.   
My arguments against the Instrumentalist View have, of course, involved blatant 
intuition pumping. I take it, however, that these intuitions are widely shared. People 
commonly try to uncover unpleasant truths about themselves, and it is doubtful that their 
reasons for seeking these truths are always purely instrumental, or that our judgments about 
the reasonableness of these sorts of inquiries are responsive purely to the effect these 
discoveries will have on their wellbeing. Further, we often praise people who are able to face 
themselves as they really are, and think less of people who don’t. I have not yet defended 
these practices, but I think that their prevalence places a significant burden on the 
Instrumentalist View. If we take the view to be a purely descriptive theory of how we value 
self-knowledge, then it fails in its task. As a matter of psychological fact, many of us do not 
care about self-knowledge for purely instrumental reasons. But as a normative theory, the 
view also falls short, insofar as it requires us to revise many of our pre-philosophical 
judgments about rationality, virtue, vice and the role that an accurate self-conception plays in 
a good life.  
 An instrumentalist could push back here. The aim of philosophy should not be to 
salvage everything that people happen to believe. Rather, philosophy should drive us to 
scrutinize what we believe, and reject those beliefs that do not stand up to critical inquiry. 
And so, if the Instrumentalist View requires us to revise some of our pre-philosophical 
judgments about what is reasonable and virtuous, then so much the worse for those 
judgments. This presents those of us who are unsympathetic to the Instrumentalist View with 
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a formidable task: if we think that these particular judgments are worth rescuing, then we 
must figure out some way of rescuing them.   
Section 4: The Ineffability of Intrinsic Value 
If self-knowledge’s value cannot fully be captured in instrumental terms, how else 
can it be captured? One move that could be made here is to ascribe an intrinsic value to self-
knowledge: self-knowledge would, as such, innately possess a value that ‘stands alone’ and 
that does not rely on any connections to other valuable entities or states of affairs.41  
This is the move that Eric Schwitzgebel has made in his commentary on Cassam’s 
Well-Being for Humans.42 In defense of his claim that self-knowledge is intrinsically 
valuable, Schwitzgebel provides three arguments. The first argument, which he calls “The 
Argument from Addition and Subtraction” relies on the intuitive idea that something is lost 
when we subtract self-knowledge from the world, even if everything else in the world is kept 
constant, and that something is likewise gained when we add self-knowledge to it. If we 
imagine that we lack some of the self-knowledge about our character or biases that we 
presently have, for instance, but that no negative consequences follow from this lack, we can 
still think that we’ve lost something in the subtraction. This suggestions, contra Cassam, that 
                                                     
41 A similar characterization of self-knowledge’s value can be found in James Griffin’s Well-Being: Its 
Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), when he remarks that 
“[s]imply knowing about oneself and one’s world is part of a good life. We value, not as an instrument but for 
itself, being in touch with reality, being free from muddle, ignorance, and mistake.” (67). 
42 Eric Schwitzgebel, “The Intrinsic Value of Self-Knowledge,” Paper presented at the American Philosophical 
Association Pacific Division Meeting, Vancouver BC, April 2, 2015. 
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there’s something valuable about self-knowledge that can’t be cached out in terms of the 
effects it can have on our lives.43  
Schwitzgebel’s second argument is an argument from nearby cases. If we assume that 
knowledge in general is intrinsically valuable, and more specifically that knowledge of other 
people is intrinsically valuable, and if we grant that self-knowledge is relevantly similar to 
interpersonal knowledge, then we ought to also grant that self-knowledge is intrinsically 
valuable.44 To insist otherwise would be incredibly odd: “It would,” Schwitzgebel suggests, 
“be weird if psychological knowledge of your friends and family had intrinsic value but 
psychological knowledge of yourself did not.”45 
Schwitzgebel’s third argument, “The Argument from Identity”, contends that 
knowing a psychological fact about yourself is identical to possessing a set of dispositions or 
capacities with respect to your own psychology. To know that you are an extrovert, for 
example: 
…is in part the capacity to say, truly and sincerely, ‘Yeah, I’m an extrovert’. It is in 
part the capacity to respond appropriately to party invitations, by accepting them in 
anticipation of the good time you’ll have. It is in par not to be surprised to find 
yourself smiling and laughing in the crowd.46 
                                                     
43 Ibid, 2-3.  
44 This second argument is similar to the argument that I will ultimately be endorsing in Chapter 2. 
Nevertheless, my position on the non-instrumental value of self-knowledge is importantly distinct from 
Schwitzgebel’s:  while Schwitzgebel is focused on attributing intrinsic value to self-knowledge, I’m ultimately 
making a different claim about the non-instrumental reasons we have to care about knowing ourselves. By 
paying attention to the reasons that we have to know ourselves, I suggest, we can make sense of why not all 
self-knowledge is worth having in the way that Schwitzgebel suggests.  
45 Ibid, 4. 
46 Ibid, 5.  
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These capacities, according to Schwitzgebel, are intrinsically valuable insofar as they are 
central to living a meaningful life. Without them, our lives would be impoverished, even if 
everything else were somehow to remain fixed.  
 Schwitzgebel grants that his arguments rely on intuitions, and more specifically on 
his intuitions.47 Thus, they at best can be used to reveal the fact that he regards self-
knowledge to have intrinsic value. But this limitation, Schwitzgebel contends, reflects a more 
general methodological limitation of any sort of inquiry into values: we can, at best, explain 
to others what we value, and invite them to share in those values. Still, we must ask whether 
Schwitzgebel, by appealing to a bare notion of intrinsic value, is able to provide a persuasive 
invitation. His second argument, for instance, locates self-knowledge’s intrinsic value via its 
inclusion in a broader category (the category of ‘knowledge’) that is itself assumed to be 
intrinsically valuable. But if this is so, then we might question why we ought to care in 
particular about knowing ourselves, rather than knowing about facts about other people or the 
universe at large. Our special interest in self-knowledge could not be justified via its appeal 
to intrinsic value, as its intrinsic value in no way distinguishes it from all the other 
intrinsically valuable knowledge that we could have learned in the time we spent trying to 
discover ourselves. Rather, if we grant that self-knowledge is intrinsically valuable because it 
is a type of knowledge, then it would seem that we would have to resort to some sort of 
                                                     
47 Ibid, 3. Schwitzgebel raises and responds to this concern with regards to the first argument, but it applies to 
the second and third arguments as well.  
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Instrumentalist Account to explain why we have special reasons to know ourselves that we 
don’t have to know most other things.48  
 This objection hints at a larger issue that will arise with any sort of account that 
attempts to explain why we are worth knowing for non-instrumental reasons via an appeal to 
self-knowledge’s intrinsic value. Intrinsic values are, as G. E. Moore’s Open Question 
argument demonstrates, conversation-enders.49 If you ask me why happiness was intrinsically 
valuable, I could do no more than tautologically inform you that ‘happiness makes us 
happy—and that’s just a good thing.’ This means that intrinsic values, by their very nature, 
do little to explain why we come to care about certain things non-instrumentally. Instead of 
moving the debate about self-knowledge’s value forward, an appeal to intrinsic value simply 
puts a halt to it. Further, attaching such a value to self-knowledge would leave us with 
additional questions. Why, for instance, is it the case that only certain types of self-
knowledge seem worth having for their own sake? Likewise, to echo Schwitzgebel, if there is 
something intrinsically valuable about knowing oneself, we should also think that there is 
intrinsic value in knowing other people. But generally speaking, we find ourselves with 
wanting to know ourselves in a way that we do not want to know most other people.50 You 
                                                     
48 This point has also been made by Michael Cholbi in his unpublished paper “The Value of Self-Knowledge” 
14.  
49 G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). This feature of intrinsic value 
is what prompts Cassam, Self-Knowledge to reject the possibility that substantial self-knowledge is intrinsically 
valuable. “If Y is valuable but it is impossible or inappropriate to attempt to explain what makes it valuable in 
more basic terms, then Y has intrinsic value,” Cassam observes. But since we can reasonably ask why self-
knowledge is valuable, he concludes, it must not be intrinsically valuable (212). 
50 The exception, of course, is the people with whom we share close relationships. We often value knowledge of 
our loved ones for its own sake, and not for its instrumental value. It is telling that, in presenting his Argument 
from Nearby Cases, Schwitzgebel focuses on the interpersonal knowledge that we can have of our friends, 
rather than interpersonal knowledge more generally. This suggests that what is ‘doing the work’ in this 
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may think that there is intrinsic value in knowing whether your self-perception accurately 
reflects reality, but it would be odd if you thought that it was intrinsically valuable for you to 
know this fact about the stranger standing next to you at the bus stop. Even if we grant that 
self-knowledge has intrinsic value, we cannot use it to explain why we seem to have special 
reasons to know ourselves that go far beyond the reasons that we have to know people more 
generally.  
Finally, appeals to the intrinsic value of self-knowledge cannot settle the normative 
question of whether we ought to know ourselves. Many things—pleasure, health, wisdom, 
justice, the natural world and freedom, to name a few—might be said to have intrinsic value. 
But this does not mean that we are under any sort of obligation to engage with these things. It 
is consistent to believe that the natural world is intrinsically valuable and to have no desire to 
ever go on a hike, watch the sun set, or smell a rose. At most, we might think that nature’s 
intrinsic value at most gives us a reason not to disrespect or destroy it.  
There is another move that can be made here. Instead of considering what value-
properties self-knowledge may or may not have, we can instead focus on what reasons that 
we have to value self-knowledge non-instrumentally, or for its own sake.51 By focusing on 
how we value self-knowledge, and why we value self-knowledge, rather than on what type of 
value self-knowledge does or does not have, we will be able to more fruitfully engage with 
the question of why self-knowledge matters to us in a way that knowledge more generally 
                                                     
argument is not the bare intrinsic value of interpersonal knowledge, but rather the special value that we attach to 
knowledge of our loved ones. What this special is, and where it comes from, will be discussed in Chapter 2.  
51 I will be using ‘non-instrumentally valuable’ and ‘valuable for its own sake’ interchangeably. 
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does not. While the question of what value self-knowledge has or does not have is a 
metaphysical question about one of its purported properties, the questions about how and why 
we value self-knowledge in the particular way that we do are normative questions that invite 
us to consider the reasons that we have for caring about self-knowledge in this distinctive 
way, and the role that self-knowledge plays in our broader conception of how we ought to 
treat ourselves and live our lives.   
Section 5: The Structure of This Dissertation 
In this dissertation, I will defend the practice of valuing self-knowledge for its own 
sake by locating a non-instrumental reason that we all have to know ourselves. In Chapter 1, 
I will offer a close examination of the concept of self-respect. In doing so, I will argue that, 
just as we ought to respect ourselves as practically rational agents, so too ought we respect 
ourselves as epistemically rational agents. To do this requires that we hold ourselves 
accountable to sufficiently stringent standards of belief formation, and also that we be 
especially concerned with the beliefs that we form about the ends that matter most to us. 
 Epistemic self-respect, however, only gets me part of the way towards my claim 
about the non-instrumental reasons that we have to know ourselves. While it can be used to 
explain why we ought to care about how we form beliefs, and why we should be especially 
concerned with beliefs relating to those ends with which we most identify, it cannot itself tell 
us what particular ends we ought to set for ourselves. Thus, while considerations of epistemic 
self-respect can explain why we ought to be concerned about how we pursue a project of 
knowing ourselves, it cannot provide us with an explanation as to why that project is one that 
we ought to have.  
36 
 
In Chapter 2, I argue that self-love can explain why we ought to have a non-
instrumental commitment to self-knowledge. This argument begins with a close examination 
of the normative requirements of loving relationships. To be in a loving relationship with 
another person is, in part requires a commitment to loving that person. And loving someone 
gives us a non-instrumental reason to know that person. And so, among the normative 
requirements of loving relationships is a requirement to be committed to knowing the people 
with whom we share them for the sake of knowing them.  I then argue that we are in a 
relationship with ourselves that is answerable to normative requirements of both self-love 
and self-respect. Self-love generates non-instrumental reasons to know ourselves, while self-
respect demands that we take seriously those reasons by pursuing our project of self-inquiry 
in accordance with suitably stringent epistemic standards. We are therefore morally required 
not just to think about who we are, but to think about who we are clearly and carefully 
enough so that we may come to know ourselves.   
Finally, in Chapter 3, I explain why we need not appeal to the negative consequences 
that often follow from being self-deceived in order to explain why self-deception is an 
undesirable state to be in. Rather, as I argue, self-deception is in and of itself objectionable 
insofar as it constitutes a ‘perversion of valuing’. By this, I mean that it simultaneously 
reflects what ends we most value, while also impeding our ability to ever achieve or properly 
engage with those ends. In this way, our self-deception represents not simply a failure to hold 
ourselves accountable to appropriate epistemic standards when forming beliefs, but also a 
failure to do so with regard to one of the ends that matters most to us, and that is thus most 
demanding of our epistemic attention. I will argue, however, that not all cases of self-
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deception have this feature—some, in fact, can be part of what it takes for us to engage 
appropriately the ends that we set for ourselves.
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CHAPTER 1: SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC SELF-RESPECT 
Introduction 
In her essay “On Self-Respect,” Joan Didion described how she initially came to 
respect herself: 
I had not been elected to Phi Beta Kappa. This failure could scarcely have been more 
predictable or less ambiguous (I simply did not have the grades), but I was unnerve 
by it; I had somehow thought myself a kind of academic Raskolnikov, curiously 
exempt from the cause-effect relationships which hampered. Although even the 
humorless nineteen-year-old that I was must have recognized that the situation lacked 
real tragic stature, the day that I did not make Phi Beta Kappa nonetheless the marked 
the end of something, and innocence may well have been the word for it. I lost the 
conviction that lights would always turn green for me, the pleasant certainty that 
those rather passive virtues which had won me approval as a child automatically 
guaranteed me not only Phi beta Kappa keys but happiness, honor and the love of a 
good man…To such doubtful amulets had my self-respect been pinned, and I faced 
myself that day with the nonplused apprehension of someone who has come across a 
vampire with no crucifix at hand.52  
To have self-respect, Didion suggests, is in part to see oneself clearly. But what does it mean 
to see oneself clearly in this context? And what is the nature of the relationship that obtains 
between self-respect and self-knowledge?  
This chapter seeks to answer both of these questions via an extended exploration of 
what it means to respect oneself as a person. In it, I argue that self-respect requires that we 
appreciate ourselves as both practically rational and epistemically rational beings. It is this 
                                                     
52 Joan Didion, “On Self-Respect,” in Slouching Towards Bethlehem (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 
2008), 142–43. 
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second form of self-respect, which I call ‘epistemic self-respect,’ that will ultimately help 
explain in the next chapter why we ought to be non-instrumentally invested in knowing 
ourselves.  
 The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I discuss the type of respect that I 
have in mind. This respect, which Darwall calls ‘recognition respect’, is the type of respect 
that we are commonly assumed to owe to ourselves and others simply in virtue of being 
persons. Next, I consider what parts of personhood are themselves proper objects of respect. 
Although rationalists have traditionally assumed that it is our status as practically rational 
agents that make us deserving of respect, I explain why our reasons for seeing practical 
rationality in this way apply equally well to epistemic rationality. That is, if practical 
rationality makes us deserving of respect, then so too must epistemic rationality. In Sections 
3 and 4, I consider what this means for our understanding of the interpersonal and 
intrapersonal requirements of self-respect, respectively. I argue that respecting ourselves as 
rational agents requires us to hold ourselves accountable to sufficiently stringent standards of 
epistemic reason, especially in relation to our most important life projects and ends. 
However, as I make clear in the conclusion to this chapter, we cannot simply appeal to the 
requirements of epistemic self-respect to explain why we ought to set self-knowledge as one 
of these ends.  
Section 1: Respect 
When Dr. Seuss wrote that “people are people, no matter how small,”53 he called to 
attention the common moral precept that persons are owed a type of respect simply for being 
                                                     
53 Dr. Seuss, Horton Hears a Who! (Random House, 1954). 
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persons. This form of respect, which Darwall calls “recognition respect”54 lies at the 
foundation of our moral lives. When others fail to treat us with respect, they become the 
proper objects of moral censure. When we fail to treat ourselves with respect, we open 
ourselves up to well-intentioned criticism from those around us.  
But the claim that all persons deserve respect qua persons is, by itself, as 
unilluminating as it is uncontentious.  What does it mean to respect a person? And why are 
persons, rather than chairs or rocks, afforded this unique moral standing? To begin, we’ll 
look more closely at the general phenomenon of recognition respect, and then move on to the 
specific case of recognition respect for persons.  
For Darwall, the phenomenon of recognition respect goes far beyond recognition 
respect for persons.  As he describes it, to have recognition respect for something, be it a 
person or some other recognition respect-worthy entity, “consists, most generally, in a 
disposition to weigh appropriately in one’s deliberations some features of the thing in 
question and to act accordingly.”55 We can have recognition respect for the law, for the 
Office of the President, and for nature, among other things. Some types of recognition 
respect are non-moralized: they simply consist in assigning appropriate weight to some entity 
in one’s deliberations about how to act. At other times, recognition-respect can be 
“essentially a moral attitude” such that an “inappropriate consideration or weighing of that 
                                                     
54 Stephen J. Darwall, ‘Two Kinds of Respect,’ Ethics 88 (1977): 36-49. Throughout this dissertation, I will be 
using the terms ‘respect’ and ‘recognition respect’ interchangeably. 
55 Ibid, 38.  
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fact [that something is deserving recognition respect] would result in behavior that is morally 
wrong.”56  
That these facts, whatever they may be, deserve weight in our deliberations, is not 
accidental, but rather arises out of the nature of the facts themselves. To have recognition 
respect for the law, for instance, “is to be disposed to regard to regard the fact that something 
is the law as restricting the class of actions that would be morally permissible.57 Having 
recognition respect for the law, in other words, in part requires that we appreciate that the 
law, by its very nature, restricts the range of actions available to us.58  
Further, to have recognition respect for something requires that we factor it into our 
deliberations, and be willing to moderate our actions towards it, for the right sorts of reasons:  
To have recognition respect for something is to regard the fact as itself placing 
restrictions on what is permissible for one to do. It is of course true that one can “be 
respectful” of something without having any respect for it…This will be the case if one 
behaves as one who does have respect would have behaved, but out of motives other than 
respect. For example, a person participating in a legal proceeding who in fact has no 
respect for the judge (i.e., for the position he occupies) may take great pains to be 
respectful in order to avoid a citation for contempt. Such a person will restrict his 
behavior toward the judge in ways appropriate to the role that he plays. But his reason for 
so doing is not that the mere fact of being the judge is itself deserving of consideration, 
but that the possibility of a contempt citation calls for caution.59  
 
And so too is proper regard essential to recognition respect for persons. An example can 
bring this point out. Suppose a white person acts respectfully towards every black man whom 
she meets not because she thinks that they deserve respect because they are persons, but 
                                                     
56 Ibid, 40. 
57 Ibid, 40. 
58 Ibid, 40.  
59 Ibid, 40-41.  
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instead because she believes that that African American males are prone to violence, and 
fears that they will harm her if she fails to act respectfully towards them. This woman does 
not have a deficient type of recognition respect for African American males; instead, she has 
no recognition respect for them at all.  
 We can summarize the requirements of recognition respect for persons as follows. To 
have recognition respect for some person, X, one must have: 
1. The judgment that X is worthy of recognition respect by virtue of belonging to a type, 
‘person’, that deserves recognition respect, and; 
2. A willingness to properly constrain her behavior towards X on the basis of that 
judgment, where 
a. What counts as proper constraint will be determined by facts about what it is 
to be a person.  
While Darwall leaves vague exactly how recognition respect for persons requires us to 
constrain our behavior, 60  a quick survey of the types of behaviors that we commonly deem 
‘disrespectful’ should give us some idea of what these constraints generally look like. Your 
teenage son might charge you with disrespecting him if you insist on enrolling him in karate 
instead of community theatre, while your date may call you out for being disrespectful if you 
take it upon yourself to order for her at a restaurant. And the library patrons could certainly 
complain about your disrespectful behavior if you insisted on loudly Skyping with your Aunt 
Cathy in the silent reading room.  
                                                     
60 What recognition respect requires, Darwall observes “is not a matter of general agreement, for this is just the 
question of what our moral obligations or duties to other persons consist in” (“Respect,” p. 38).  
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These cases should also give us some idea of what it is about personhood that makes 
it (and thus persons) inherently deserving of respect. When we ask why these cases are 
instances of disrespect, we are met with a familiar rationalist picture of personhood. To be a 
person is to be the sort of entity capable of making choices for itself. To respect someone as a 
person, then, often requires us to respect the choices that she makes for herself. You should 
respect your son enough to let him sing show tunes, your date enough to let her order for 
herself, and the library patrons enough to let them read in silence.  
 That respecting a person often requires that we not interfere unduly with the choices 
that other people make for themselves helps us explain why even well-intentioned 
paternalism is so often considered disrespectful. As Seana Shiffrin observes: 
Paternalistic behavior is special because it represents a positive (although often 
sometimes unconscious or sometimes caring) effort by another person to insert her 
will and have it exert control merely because of its (perhaps only alleged) superiority. 
As such, it directly expresses insufficient respect for the underlying valuable 
capacities, powers, and entitlements of the autonomous agent.61 
What else does respect require of us? Presumably, it demands that we not treat others in ways 
that undermine their very ability to act autonomously, or that are dehumanizing. 
Dehumanizing behavior, as the name suggests, often aims at destroying the very capacities of 
an agent that makes her a person. When I torture a terrorist in order to get information out of 
them, I do so with the intention of taking away their very ability to choose what information 
they do and do not share with me. Of course, not all dehumanizing actions are performed 
with some other end in mind—rather, we sometimes dehumanize others for the simple sake 
of dehumanizing them. But the very notion that there are some actions that are, in and of 
                                                     
61 Seana Shiffrin, ‘Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation,’ Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, 29 (2000),  220. 
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themselves, dehumanizing reflects the rationalist thought that there are some things to which 
no person could rationally consent.    
 Some of the behaviors that we associate with ‘respect’ have a more symbolic 
connection to personhood. In my culture, there is nothing rude about wearing shoes inside. 
To my Indian friend’s mother, however, it would be the height of disrespect to not take one’s 
shoes off at the door. When I enter her home, I make a point of following that custom, and in 
doing so I communicate that I respect her enough to obey the etiquette norms that matter to 
her. Once again, we can tell a story about the value of persons. My friend’s mother has 
chosen to adopt certain cultural norms as her own. I may not share those norms with her, but 
my respect for her and her ends requires that I abide by them when in her home.62 
The requirements of self-respect are more robust than the requirements of 
interpersonal respect. First, self-respect requires that we not degrade ourselves, or allow 
others to have undue control over our lives. But whereas interpersonal respect largely 
requires that we not interfere in the lives of others, this noninterference would be sorely out 
of place as a requirement for self-respect. Self-respect, in fact, often demands strong 
interference; to respect myself I ought to scrutinize my decisions, and hold myself to 
appropriately stringent behavioral standards.63 We can explain this asymmetry by 
considering what it takes to respect a person as a rational agent. It would be disrespectful of 
me to coerce you into making the decisions that I want you to make, as doing so would 
undermine your ability to exercise your rational agency. But there is no self-regarding 
                                                     
62 For more on symbolic acts of respect, see Joseph Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 172-175. 
63 For more on this point, see Robin Dillon, ‘How to Lose Your Self-Respect,’ American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 29 (1992), 133-134. 
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parallel to this sort of paternalism: I might be able to force myself into doing something I do 
not want to do (say, by setting a noisy alarm to get myself out of bed earlier than I would 
like), but this self-interference is just another expression of the rational agency that I am 
meant to be respecting. 
Section 2: Respect, Practical and Epistemic 
Let us now take a closer look at the sort of rationality that lies at the center of the 
rationalist account of respect. No discussion of respect for persons would be complete 
without a mention of Kant, and so it is with him that we will start our investigation: 
The sole object of respect is the [moral] law—that law which we impose on ourselves 
and yet recognize as necessary in itself...All respect for a person is actually only 
respect for the law (of righteousness, etc.,) that that person exemplifies.64 
For Kant, it is the supreme law of our practical, rather than theoretical, reason that inspires 
within us a feeling of respect. And so, respecting persons is a matter of respecting their status 
as practically rational agents capable of willing the moral law.  
In many regards, modern philosophers have moved away from the Kantian account of 
respect. While Kant spoke of it as a feeling or inclination, Darwall and others have 
emphasized the role that proper judgment and behavior play in respect. And yet, the Kantian 
conflation between rationality and practical rationality persists throughout the literature. 
According to Thomas E. Hill, respecting someone as an autonomous being (and thus, as a 
person), requires us “to acknowledge that certain decisions are up to him or her and thus to 
refrain from efforts to control those decisions.”65 Likewise, to respect oneself on Darwall’s 
                                                     
64 Kant, Groundwork, 4:402n. 
65 Thomas E. Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 47-48. 
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account requires the recognition of oneself as “a person, a being with a will who acts for 
reasons.”66 Elizabeth Telfer characterizes disrespectful behavior as that which makes us look 
“less than human, in the sense that a human being is characteristically an autonomous 
being”67 and Joseph Raz understands respect as a special type of valuing that we extend 
towards valuers, where to be a valuer is to have the capacity to “one’s conduct and one’s life, 
in light of one’s understanding of those features of the world which are reasons, rather than 
merely responses to factors which are in fact reasons’’.68 Even philosophers skeptical of 
Kant’s abstract and individualistic notion of autonomy are still loath to abandon the 
rationalist picture entirely. While Margaret Farley stresses that rationality “was never as pure 
and impartial as [Kant] claimed it to be,” she remains committed to the idea that autonomy 
(albeit, a type of autonomy that emphasizes the extent to which people are interdependent) is 
the feature of personhood that makes us deserving of respect.69 
And yet, practical rationality is not the only kind of rationality. In addition to being 
practically rational agents, we are also epistemically rational agents capable of weighing 
evidence, making inferences and drawing conclusions. As is the case with our practical 
rationality, our epistemic capacities are such that we can better or worse at exercising them. I 
can make bad decisions about how to spend my time, and I can also make bad inferences 
                                                     
66 Darwall, Respect, 49. 
67 Elizabeth Telfer, ‘Self-Respect,’ The Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1968): 117. 
68 Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment, 153. 
69 See Margaret A. Farley, “A Feminist Version of Respect for Persons,” Journal of Feminist Studies in 
Religion 9 (1993): 198. Farley’s project in that paper is to retain the basic commitment to autonomy as the 
feature of personhood that makes us deserving of respect, while at the same time emphasizing the extent to 
which we are beings situated within a web of unique relationships and experiences. 
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towards unsupported epistemic conclusions. Here, we must ask: if a person’s status as a 
practically rational agent commands respect, why doesn’t their status as an epistemic rational 
agent? 
To answer this question, a rationalist might point to an instrumental relationship that 
obtains between practical and epistemic rationality.70 Epistemic rationality is essential to 
practical deliberation; I could not make even the simplest of decisions without some 
understanding of how causation works. And so, since respecting you requires me not to 
impinge upon your ability to practically deliberate, it will by extension require me not to 
impinge upon your ability to make inferences and draw conclusions. This means that there is 
no point in talking about the respect-worthiness of a person’s epistemic rationality apart from 
the respect-worthiness of their practical rationality. Whatever reasons we have to respect 
them as epistemically rational agents will ultimately bottom out in the reasons that we have 
to respect them as practically rational agents. 
                                                     
70 The answers that Kant could give for the conflation are not available to the modern rationalist. First, Kant 
could give a phenomenological reason for denying that epistemic rationality ‘commands’ respect. Recall that 
Kant often treats respect as a non-empirical ‘feeling’ given to us a priori in our cognition of pure practical 
reason. Groundwork, 5:73, 5:76. Theoretical reason, simply as a matter of phenomenological fact, fails to 
inspire within us any similar non-empirical feelings. But this sort of explanation is lacking. Consider the feeling 
that one often gets when reading about a new discovery about the cosmos or solves a particularly challenging 
logic puzzle. The feeling of ‘exercising’ one’s epistemic capacities can come, I think, very close to the 
exhilarating awe that Kant sees as accompanying cognition of the Moral Law within.   
 
But perhaps epistemic rationality simply does not need to ‘command’ respect. Respect, for Kant, was 
sometimes understood as an incentive that moves us to act in accordance with the demands of the Moral Law. 
And it makes sense why moral agents such as ourselves would need such an incentive. We are, after all, morally 
fallible agents capable of being moved by self-love as well as reason. And so if reason is to stand a fighting 
chance against desire, it will need to be able to pack a motivational punch. Theoretical reason, by contrast, 
requires no such incentive; there are no secret impulses of self-love lurking in Kant’s theoretical domain. We 
have, as Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment 134–35 has noted, reason to be skeptical about this explanation. 
Self-love, wishful thinking, and vanity, after all, can and do pervert our theoretical judgments. Anyone who has 
ever had to begrudgingly acknowledge a flaw in their favorite argument can attest to how difficult it can be for 
theoretical reason to overcome self-love. 
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To see an example of this sort of ‘instrumentalist’ account, consider Hill’s classic 
explanation of the wrongness of benevolent lies in ‘Autonomy and Benevolent Lies.’71 
 Some lies are clearly wrong because they’re vicious or self-serving. But not all lies have 
these traits. Instead, some lies are told out of a sincere concern for their hearer’s wellbeing. 
What is so wrong about these sorts of lies? Benevolent lies, Hill contends, are morally wrong 
because they “deprive people of a realistic picture of their situation”72 in a way that frustrates 
their ability to make fully informed life choices. The son who lies to his elderly, terminally ill 
mother about her prognosis, for instance, denies her the chance to make decisions about 
whether or not to pray, and about how to approach her impending demise.73 
                                                     
71 Thomas E. Hill, “Autonomy and Benevolent Lies,” Journal of Value Inquiry 18 (1984): 251–67. 
‘Instrumentalist’ accounts appear throughout the value theory literature. Julie Kirsch, in “What’s So Great 
About Reality?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2005), 407–427), argues that self-deception is morally 
objectionable because it undermines our capacity for autonomous self-governance (p. 421). Barbara Herman, 
meanwhile, notes that effective deceit “causes the victim to have the beliefs necessary for her to adopt ends and 
choose actions that serve the deceiver’s purposes.” The Practice of Moral Judgment, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), 228. Sarah Buss takes a different, albeit still instrumentalist, approach in “Valuing 
Autonomy and Respecting Persons,” Ethics 115 (2005): 195–235). While she denies that manipulation and 
coercion are wrong because they frustrate an agent’s capacity for autonomous choice, she nevertheless claims 
that they are wrong because they can negatively impact an agent’s welfare, prevent her from standing on equal 
ground with her manipulator and impede her ability to govern herself with an accurate understanding of her 
situation (226–27). Shiffrin’s recent Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2014) offers a particularly nuanced instrumentalist explanation of why lying is wrong. Sincere 
communication enables us to “form and execute complex cooperative plans, to understand one another, to 
appreciate and negotiate around our differences, and to gauge, somewhat, the extent of our mutual ineffability’’ 
(1), which in turn help us fulfill our moral duties and grow as moral agents. When we lie, we frustrate 
humanity’s collective interest in maintaining reliable interpersonal channels of communication (23–24). 
 
Miranda Fricker is a notable exception within this literature. In Epistemic Injustice: Power and the 
Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), she contends that we have both instrumental and 
non-instrumental reasons to see testimonial injustice (i.e. the undervaluing of an agent’s testimony as a result of 
prejudicial beliefs about her) as morally wrong. Testimonial injustice can cause its victims to lose confidence in 
their epistemic capacities and suffer psychological anguish, both of which frustrate their ability to get ahead in 
life. But testimonial injustice also wrongs agents in their capacity as knowers, which is “a capacity essential to 
human value” (44). Fricker does not, however, explain why this capacity gives rise to moral requirements, or 
whether respecting an agent as a “knower” involves more than according their testimony the value it is due. 
72 Hill, “Autonomy and Benevolent Lies,” 264. 
73 Ibid, 262. 
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I find Hill’s picture both compelling and incomplete. It is compelling because it 
highlights the extent to which respecting an agent’s practical agency may require us to 
privilege that agency over their happiness or comfort. But, for reasons that I will make clear 
in this section, I think that Hill’s account overlooks a more basic reason that we have to be 
morally concerned about telling even the most benevolent of lies. Lying is wrong, on my 
account, because it frustrates our ability to exercise our epistemic rationality. And this 
frustration is wrong in and of itself, and not simply because we need our epistemic capacities 
to be in working order for practical deliberation. It is, in other words, morally wrong to 
frustrate an agent’s ability to understand the world around her in the same way that it is 
morally wrong to frustrate her ability to make decisions about her life. In both cases, the 
‘wrongness’ can be located in the simple fact that she is a rational agent whose reasoning 
capacities deserve respect.  
To see exactly where I depart from the ‘instrumentalist,’ consider what reasons 
someone would have to feel anger upon finding out that she has been told a benevolent lie. 
An example will help clarify the situation:  
Hank discovers that his daughter, Gracie, has been rejected from her dream 
university. He discovers this before she does, and so he decides to lie to her and tell 
her that she was, in fact, accepted. Hank lies to Gracie with full knowledge that 
Gracie has already accepted a spot at a local college. He knows, in other words, that 
even if Gracie had been accepted at her dream school, she would have turned down 
the offer. Further, he lies with only the best of intentions—he hopes that his lie will 
give her a much-needed confidence boost heading into her freshman year.  
Suppose that Gracie finds out about Hank’s lie several years down the road. There would be 
nothing unreasonable about Gracie if she were to react with anger towards Hank at this new 
discovery. But what justifies this anger? Hill is right to note that many of the ‘usual’ reasons 
that we have to be angry at people who lie to us do not apply in cases of benevolent lies. 
Gracie cannot be angry at Hank for acting maliciously or for causing her harm, because he 
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did neither of these things when he lied to her. But we also cannot appeal to Hill’s account to 
explain why Gracie would be justified in feeling angry at Hank. After all, Hank’s lie could 
not have impacted Gracie’s decision about what college to attend, as that decision had 
already been made at the time that he told the lie. And yet, I think that Gracie could still be 
justifiably angry at Hank for the simple reason that he made her believe something false 
about her life.   
The instrumentalist could push back here: what matters is not that a lie will impinge 
upon an agent’s ability to exercise her practical reason. Rather, what is at issue is the fact that 
a lie could, however improbably, impinge upon an agent’s ability to make decisions for 
herself.74 Hank may end up being right in thinking that his lie will not impact Gracie’s 
decision-making process in the slightest, but there is no way that he can know this with 
absolute certainty. But we can tweak the case, albeit in a fantastical way, to get around this 
objection. Suppose that Hank is clairvoyant, and that Gracie has already put down a large, 
non-refundable deposit at her local college. Even if Hank knows that the rejection letter 
would never have impacted Gracie’s deliberation, and even if he also knows that telling her 
the truth about it would only cause her anguish, I still have the intuition that he should not 
hide it from her. His daughter deserves to know the truth about her university application 
results, even if this knowledge will not factor into her practical deliberations, and will only 
cause her distress.  
This conclusion reflects what I take to be a deeply ingrained human commitment to 
knowing the truth for its own sake, and not simply for the role that it plays in our practical 
                                                     
74 This is in fact, precisely the move that Hill makes. Benevolent lies, Hill warns, “do not necessarily or always 
violate the right of autonomy, but we should not be hasty in concluding that a particular lie does not concern 
any significant decisions’’ (“Autonomy and Benevolent Lies,” 262). 
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deliberations. Consider the value that we often place on scientific discovery. Whether the 
earth is flat or round has no impact on the decisions I make about my life. I’d hope, however, 
that you would take the time to correct me if you found out that I mistakenly believed the 
earth to be flat. In the same spirit, there isn’t much difference between the moral decisions 
that I, a Kantian, actually make, and the moral decisions that my virtue ethicist friend makes. 
We both come out against police brutality and unfair voter ID laws. We both lie (sometimes), 
choose the expedient over the right (frequently) and stand up for what we believe in (not 
often enough). Perhaps we occasionally appeal to different standards when puzzling through 
a moral dilemma, but most of the time we make moral decisions by some combination of 
intuition, habit and convention. Nevertheless, I still care about having the right higher-order 
moral commitments. My desires to ‘be right’ about morality here do not reflect a deeper 
commitment to being a practically efficacious agent. Rather, it reflects a deep commitment to 
being able to know how things really stand.   
We care about epistemic discovery in very much the same way that we care about 
practical deliberation. When I make choices for myself, I certainly want those choices to be 
good ones. But I want you to respect my choices not because they’re good ones, but because 
they’re mine.75 In fact, I hope that you would respect them even if you thought that they were 
bad choices. This is because, as Sinatra aptly put it, I attach non-instrumental value to being 
                                                     
75 This does not, of course, mean that you must wholeheartedly endorse every foolish decision I make. You can 
certainly argue with me about joining a cult or giving all of my money to that Nigerian prince. But it would be 
wrong of you to lock me in your basement to prevent me from doing either of these things. Indeed, the cases 
where paternalistic interference seem most conscionable are typically those that involve non-rational agents 
(infants, the severely mentally disabled), very mild restrictions on autonomy (seatbelt laws), or paternalistic 
actions that are undertaken in the service of preserving an agent’s future rational agency (involuntary 
psychiatric holds for the severely mentally ill). 
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able to do things “my way.”76 In much the same way, when it comes to the epistemic 
domains that matter most to us, we want not only to have justified true beliefs, but also for 
those beliefs to be a product of our own reasoning power. Most theists and atheists alike, for 
instance, want their theological commitments to be the product of introspection and 
deliberation, rather than cultural indoctrination.  
Epistemic Rationality and Moral Demandingness 
So far, I have highlighted one of the parallels between practical and epistemic 
rationality, viz. that we value both non-instrumentally. But I cannot jump from this result to 
the further conclusion that an agent’s epistemic rationality, like her practical rationality, gives 
me moral reason to respect her. One might worry here that making such a leap would have 
the effect of stretching the term ‘respect’ past meaningfulness. We can be said to value all 
sorts of different things for their own sake—art, the natural world and dead language-
learning might all been considered non-instrumentally valuable. But I can think that there is 
something non-instrumentally valuable about learning Ancient Greek without committing 
myself to the idea that I am disrespecting myself if I never get around to learning it.  
Does our epistemic rationality deserve respect in the way that our practically 
rationality does? Or is it more like learning Ancient Greek, in the sense that we can value it 
for its own sake while still denying that its value generates any moral requirements? To 
answer this question, let us first identify a salient difference between dead languages and 
practical rationality. . One way to locate this difference is by first considering how we might 
motivate a rationalist account of respect for persons. We might do this is by employing a sort 
                                                     
76 Frank Sinatra, ‘My Way’ (My Way, 1969). 
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of conceptual ‘opt-out’ test. One way to motivate the rationalist account of respect is by 
employing a sort of conceptual ‘opt-out’ test. If we’re trying to figure out whether some 
attribute is central to the concept of respect for persons, we can ask ourselves whether it 
would be possible to have respect for persons while denying the value of that attribute. Take 
practical rationality. Were a dictator to say “I respect the people, but I see no reason to allow 
them to make decisions for themselves,” you would be right to wonder whether he actually 
understood the meaning of ‘respect’ and ‘people’. The incoherence is even more obvious in 
the case of self-respect. Hill’s deferential housewife who, as the name implies, defers to her 
husband on practical matters, might be able to have all sorts of positive attitudes towards 
herself, but she cannot have self-respect.77 But ‘opting out’ of learning Ancient Greek gives 
rise to no similar incoherence. Rather, I can respect myself as a person without ever trying to 
read Homer in the original or memorizing the forms of an irregular Greek verb.  
Does epistemic rationality look more like practical rationality or Ancient Greek in 
this regard? To answer this question, let us imagine what an epistemic parallel to Hill’s 
deferential housewife would look like. In Hill’s original example, the deferential housewife 
allows her husband to tell her what to do with her time, whom to befriend and what to wear. 
In the epistemic parallel, our deferential housewife—let us call her Allison—retains her 
ability to make decisions about how to spend her time and how to dress, but decides that she 
would be much better off to allow her husband to tell her what to believe. If Allison believes 
in evolution, it is only because he told her to that she ought to. On those rare occasions when 
                                                     
77.Hill, ‘Servility and Self-Respect,’ The Monist, 51 (1973): 89. 
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she draws her own epistemic conclusion on some matter, she always regards it as tentative: 
she will believe it, but only until her husband tells her otherwise.  
Why is Allison so deferential? There are a few possible explanations. On the one 
hand, there is nothing inherently wrong with ‘giving up’ on drawing epistemic conclusions 
within a given domain because you rightly believe yourself to lack the ability to successfully 
reason within that domain. I am happy to defer to the scientists on matters about climate 
change, but I do not think that my epistemic deference denotes a lack of self-respect. Rather, 
my epistemic deference is much like my practical decision to let my accountant tell me how 
to do my taxes. Respecting myself as a practical agent, after all, does not require that I 
exercise my practical agency within every possible domain. For the same reason, respecting 
myself as an epistemic agent should not require me to spend hours reading biology textbooks 
in the hopes of someday being able to decipher the scientific literature on climate change. At 
most, it requires me to carefully scrutinize my decisions to opt out of certain epistemic 
domains.  
If I can respectfully defer to the scientists on matters of climate change, why can’t 
Allison respectfully defer to her husband on epistemic matters more generally? Let us 
consider what it would take for Allison to carefully scrutinize her decision to 
indiscriminately opt out of epistemic domains. Suppose Allison decides to opt out of forming 
her own opinions after a great deal of personal reflection and deliberation. She has looked at 
the opinions that she has held in the past, and found them all to be the product of knee-jerk 
reactions and sloppy reasoning. After all this, she concludes that she is not good at this 
theoretical reasoning business, and that she is better off letting her husband tell her what to 
think.   
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But note that in performing the appropriate due diligence, Allison has inadvertently 
affirmed the very capacity within herself that she has intended to deny, viz. that she is an 
epistemically rational agent capable of critically assessing evidence and drawing reasonable 
conclusions based on that evidence. She may not have shown herself to be a particularly 
good epistemic agent—she could still be absolutely correct in her assessment of her previous 
epistemic judgments. Nevertheless, she has proven herself capable of independent thought. 
She has, in other words, demonstrated herself to be a proper object of epistemic self-respect. 
Suppose Allison does not do her due diligence.  Suppose her decision to opt out was 
made hastily and without much thought. Perhaps she opts out because she cannot be bothered 
to form her own opinions, or because she has internalized some deeply sexist beliefs about 
the rationality of women. Here is a situation where Allison’s decision to opt out is itself an 
act of disrespect. The capacity for independent thought is a valuable human ability, and 
Allison has tossed it away carelessly or out of a deeply internalized, but also deeply 
mistaken, sense of her epistemic worth. Were we to meet Allison, we might be tempted to 
implore her to have some self-respect and stop letting her husband do her thinking for her. 
But there is another way that one might opt out of epistemic rationality. In both of the 
above scenarios, Allison still cares about epistemic rationality in some sense. She wants 
someone to be in the business of forming good opinions on her behalf, but does not want it to 
be her. What if Allison simply denied that epistemic reasoning and the pursuit of truth have 
the value that I purport them to have? Could she then opt out of caring about epistemic 
rationality while still respecting herself? Consider a variation on the original case: 
Allison has left her husband and joined a clique of radical epistemic nihilists. There is 
no point, Allison thinks, in learning about the world or trying to arrive at true beliefs, 
because the world is what you make of it and truth is an illusion.  
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What would take for Allison to perform ‘due diligence’ in this scenario? In one version of the 
story, she formulates arguments against an objective external world and comes up with 
evidence in support of the claim that truth is a ‘matter of opinion’. Here, Allison will have, 
by due diligence, inadvertently affirmed that she holds herself to the very sorts of objective 
epistemic standards that she, as an epistemic nihilist, claims not to exist. So long as she 
makes that affirmation, and so long as she continues to see herself as an agent capable of 
reasoning in accordance with those standards, Allison will be unable to coherently and 
respectfully opt out of valuing her epistemic rationality.  
But imagine that Allison’s epistemic nihilism comes from some source other than 
philosophical argumentation. Perhaps she is depressed after her divorce, or perhaps she 
enjoys being a contrarian. Allison can choose not to respect herself as an epistemic agent—
but so long as she remains epistemically rational, her choice will constitute a failure of self-
respect.  
To try to respect oneself without respecting one’s ability to make epistemic 
judgments is either hypocritical or self-defeating. Thus, just as respecting a person requires 
me to respect them as a practical agent, so too does it require me to respect them as an 
epistemic agent. And, just practical rationality is worth respecting for its own sake, so too is 
epistemic rationality worth respecting for its own sake.  
Section 3: The Requirements of Epistemic Respect 
My ultimate aims in this chapter are to develop an account of epistemic self-respect, 
and to consider what relation, if any, obtains between epistemic self-respect and self-
knowledge. Before I do this, however, I will first say something about what it would look 
like to treat another person with epistemic respect. For the rationalist, “practical rationality” 
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has historically been the answer to both the question “why should I respect a person qua 
person?” and the question “what is it that determines whether an action is respectful or 
disrespectful?” But practical rationality is not the only sort of rationality that gives us reasons 
to respect persons. . This raises a question: if I owe epistemic respect to myself and others, 
what exactly does this obligation look like?  
First, a word about recognition respect more generally. Recall that, for Darwall, 
recognition respect requires both proper judgment and proper self-constraint.78 Darwall 
discusses these requirements as they relate to practical rationality, but I believe that they are 
equally applicable to the case of interpersonal epistemic respect. As with practical respect, 
epistemic respect requires not only that I be willing to factor your status as an epistemically 
rational agents into my deliberations, and restrict my actions towards you accordingly, but 
also that I do so for the right reasons.  I should judge you to be deserving of epistemic respect 
simply by virtue of your status as a person, and not by virtue of your membership in a certain 
race, sex or social class. 
As in the case of practical respect, the importance of proper judgment can be made 
clear with an example. Suppose that Alistair is an incorrigibly sexist physics professor who 
ardently believes that women lack the capacity to understand high-level physics. Now, 
suppose that one day, Alistair makes a bet with his colleague about a female undergraduate 
named Susan. His colleague bets Alistair that, if he were to hold Susan to appropriately 
stringent epistemic standards, he would find her to be as capable of understanding the 
                                                     
78 Darwall, Respect, 36-49. Darwall thought that we could also have recognition respect for laws, institutions 
and people by virtue of the roles that they occupy. If I ought to have recognition respect for Beverley 
McLachlin because she is a Canadian Supreme Court Justice, then I should also have recognition respect for 
Russell Brown.  
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material as his male students. Alistair takes the bet and proceeds to treat her like ‘one of the 
boys’. Susan may not be able to complain about how Alistair has treated her as part of the 
bet, but, were she ever to find out about Alistair’s opinion about female rationality, she could 
justifiably object that he has failed to respect her as an epistemically rational agent.  
Second, epistemic respect requires that we behave in a way that assumes persons to 
be, absent extenuating circumstances, capable of ‘handling,’ and invested in knowing the 
truth about their lives and the world around them.79 At a minimum, then, we ought to view 
lying and deception as things that ought, generally, to be avoided. This is true even when it 
comes to cases of benevolent lies and well-intentioned deceptions. I may tell my younger 
sister that our parents really did take Fido to a farm upstate to save her some grief, but in 
doing so, I fail to respect her an epistemic agent. When we protect people from hurtful truths, 
we place something—that is, their feelings—above their status as epistemic reasoners. This 
sort of prioritizing may be consistent with caring deeply about someone, but it is rarely 
consistent with respecting them.  
Epistemic respect will thus sometimes require us to hold people to sufficiently 
stringent epistemic standards. That respecting persons involves more than self-constraint a 
point that Darwall’s original account of recognition respect misses. 80  Nevertheless, in both 
the practical and epistemic realms, respecting persons will sometimes require us to be willing 
                                                     
79 As Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 86–108, notes, this will often require us to reflexively assess our own 
epistemic shortcomings. We occupy various social roles that can have a distorting effect on our perception of 
other agents’ epistemic capacities, and epistemic justice, on her account, demands that we take stock of, and 
make efforts to correct for, these distortions. 
80 This ‘positive’ requirement of respect could be re-translated into a constraint: one ought to constrain oneself 
from holding persons accountable to inappropriately low standards. Nevertheless, it seems more natural to 
speak of respect for persons as requiring us to both act and refrain from acting in certain ways towards them.   
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to make suitably stringent demands of them, and to hold them accountable for meeting or 
failing to meet those demands. To see this feature of respect as it relates to practical agency, 
consider the following case: 
Bill has hired Cynthia to work as the receptionist at his law office. He has a generally 
low opinion of women. While there might be some exceptions, Bill thinks that, as a 
rule, women aren’t capable of very much. As such, he normally makes an effort to 
hire male receptionists. This time around, all the candidates were women, and 
Cynthia seemed, in Bill’s eyes, to be the best of the bad bunch. As it turns out, 
Cynthia really is awful at her job. She isn’t incompetent—she’d be a perfectly fine 
receptionist if she just tried. But Cynthia doesn’t care to be a fine receptionist, and 
she lets this fact be known. She is rude to clients, she misfiles important paperwork, 
she takes suspiciously long lunch breaks and she shows up to Bill’s very formal office 
in ripped t-shirts and party dresses. If Cynthia were a man, Bill would have fired her. 
But Cynthia is not a man, and in Bill’s eyes, she’s doing the best a woman can be 
expected to do. So he keeps her employed, and gets his legal assistant to pick up some 
of Cynthia’s slack.  
Bill has disrespected Cynthia twice over, and I don’t think either instance of disrespect is a 
matter of a failure to properly constrain his behavior. First, his views about women are 
themselves disrespectful to Cynthia. She’s a person, and he ought to recognize that her status 
as a person makes her the proper object of recognition respect. Second, Bill has held her to 
standards that are inappropriately low for the sort of entity that she is. Cynthia is a rational 
agent in control of behavior, and this means that she ought to be held accountable for the 
decisions that she makes. This second form of disrespect is, in this case, an offshoot of the 
first: if Bill respected Cynthia as a person, he would be willing to hold her to accountable for 
her poor performance. Nevertheless, the two forms of disrespect can come apart from each 
other. Were Bill to hold Cynthia to appropriately stringent standards simply because he 
wanted to prove that women weren’t capable of being good employees, he would still be 
guilty of the first type of disrespect. Likewise, had Bill’s lenience been born out of a personal 
aversion to hurting others, rather than a misogynistic worldview, his failure to hold Cynthia 
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to appropriately high standards would still have been disrespectful.81 For this reason, I think 
it is best to amend the definition of recognition respect once again.  
 And so to when it comes to respecting people as epistemic agents are we often 
required to hold them accountable to suitably stringent epistemic standards. To truly respect 
his students, for instance, a professor must be willing to penalize them for sub-par work. To 
do otherwise—to indiscriminatingly assign high grades to one’s students out of the belief that 
they couldn’t possibly produce work actually deserving of those grades, coupled with the 
desire to be a nice professor—demonstrates an unwillingness to take them seriously as 
epistemic agents capable of exercising that agency in better and worse ways.  Likewise, when 
a doctor tells her patient that he ought to follow her instructions “because she said so” instead 
of explaining to him how her treatment plan is meant to work, she disrespectfully assumes 
him to be incapable of understanding even basic medical reasoning. Her assumption might 
turn out to be correct, but given that something as important as respect is on the line, the 
doctor has a good moral reason not to make it.  
It is for this reason that respecting people as epistemic agents often requires us to take 
seriously their intellectual claims and opinions. To tune out your friend when she tells you all 
about how vaccinations cause autism is to write her off as a person whose opinions and 
beliefs do not matter. To try to intellectually engage with her, in contrast, is to hold her to 
                                                     
81 Here, one can’t help but think of the modern-day ‘helicopter parents’ who ardently protect their children from 
experiencing personal failure. These are the parents that complain to professors and deans whenever their 
college-age children receive bad grades or have disputes with their roommates. By offering this sort of 
‘protection’, helicopter parents treat their children as though they are incapable of settling their own disputes or 
taking responsibility for their own shortcomings. In this way, helicopter parents hold their children to 
inappropriately low, and thus disrespectful, standards.  
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epistemic standards appropriate to her status as a rational agent, and to affirm that it matters 
that her opinions be reflective of that status.    
This is not to say that respecting others requires us to constantly scrutinize their 
beliefs and opinions. Conversational norms are complicated, and sometimes when we have 
discussions, we do so with the presumption that our interlocutors are not holding their claims 
up for debate.82 When my aunt tells me at her husband’s funeral that “he’s with Jesus now,” 
she is not inviting me into a theological argument. In fact, respecting people may often 
require that we respect their opinions simply because they hold them by biting our tongues 
and nodding politely. By holding our tongues, we affirm that people are capable of, and 
deserve the opportunity, to form their own beliefs about the world around them.83  
 Epistemic respect, like its practical analogue, will thus often involve a precarious 
balancing act between active engagement and polite restraint. When we strive to be honest to 
others, and to intellectually engage with the claims that they make, we affirm that they are 
the sorts of being who deserve to have rationally defensible opinions and true beliefs, and 
who are epistemically sensitive to argument and evidence. When we appropriately restrain 
ourselves from this sort of engagement, in turn, we acknowledge that people deserve the 
                                                     
82 Shiffrin, Speech Matters, 16 calls these situations ‘suspended contexts’. We are justified in temporarily 
suspending our regular presumption of truthfulness in discourse, on her view, when doing so would “serve other 
valuable purposes whose achievement depends upon the presumption’s suspension” and when “the fact and 
justification of suspension is publicly available.” For example, the question ‘How are you doing?’ is not one 
that typically is asked with the expectation of a truthful answer. Instead, it is a mere formality that people use to 
acknowledge one another (33). 
83Jason N. Joh makes a similar point in “Respect for Persons,” Theory into Practice 14 (1975): 271–78. To 
respect a person requires that we recognize their opinions to be “personal, coming from him or her as a distinct 
center of consciousness, and taking them as results of distinct ways of experiencing the world and as such to be 
important” (273). Sometimes this will require us to critically engage with those opinions, and sometimes it will 
require us to refrain from engagement. 
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opportunity to make up their own minds about what to believe, even when they do so in a 
way that departs from our own understanding of the world.  
Section 4: The Requirements of Epistemic Self-Respect 
What does it mean to respect oneself as an epistemically rational agent? To answer 
this, let us take a closer look at the requirements of recognition self-respect more generally. 
First, recognition self-respect requires one to have made the right judgments about why one 
is deserving of respect. If I only see myself as worthy of respect because I am popular or 
wealthy, then I have not simply located an unstable attribute upon which to hang my sense of 
worth. Rather, there is an important sense in which I have failed to have respect for myself.  
What else does recognition self-respect require? To see oneself as deserving of 
respect is, first, to have a certain self-understanding. The self-respecting agent knows that she 
deserves not to be treated in ways that are commonly considered dehumanizing. She also 
recognizes that she is entitled to make moral demands of others.84 Further, self-respect 
requires us to avoid treating ourselves in certain ways. Interpersonal respect may require me 
to respect your decision to spend your life engaged in a project that I consider trivial, but 
intrapersonal respect carries with it the exact opposite demand. The decisions that I make are 
the products of my rational agency and, as such, self-respect requires me to be invested in 
ensuring that they properly reflect the value of that agency. In both the practical and 
epistemic domain, there are standards that our decisions must meet in order to be considered 
                                                     
84 It is because of this sense of entitlement that self-respect has often been associated with reactive emotions like 
anger and resentment. I can only be resentful about your paternalistic treatment of me if I have a sense that my 
autonomy deserves respect. By the same token, I will only feel angry at you when you refuse to even entertain 
what I have to say on a subject if I have a sense that people ought to respect me enough to at least consider my 
opinions. For more on this point, see Dillon, “Self-Respect: Moral, Emotional, Political,” Ethics 107 (1997): 
230, and Macalester Bell, “A Woman’s Scorn: Toward a Feminist Defense of Contempt as a Moral Emotion,” 
Hypatia 20 (2000): 84–85. 
63 
 
rationally defensible.85 Self-respect, I believe, requires a commitment to making choices and 
forming beliefs in a way that accords with these standards.  
In one sense, this requirement of accountability is not unique to recognition self-
respect. As I noted in the previous section, respecting other people can involve holding them 
accountable to sufficiently stringent epistemic standards. But our reasons for doing this in the 
two cases are subtly, but importantly, different. In the interpersonal case, I need not be 
invested in whether or not you actually meet these standards. Rather, I need to hold you 
accountable for your beliefs only insofar as failing to do so would be tantamount to denying 
your status as an epistemic agent capable of better and worse forms of reasoning.86 The 
intrapersonal case is different than this. I have control over my beliefs and actions, and I bear 
a relationship to them that I do not bear to other people’s beliefs and actions. I am, as I will 
elaborate on in the next chapter, simply too close to myself to remain neutral on the subject. 
And so, returning to Darwall’s original distinction between recognition respect and appraisal 
respect, we might say that while these two types of respect remain distinct in the 
interpersonal case, the boundaries between them become blurry in the intrapersonal case. To 
have recognition respect for myself as a person requires that I strive be the type of person for 
whom I could reasonably have appraisal respect.87 To do less than this, and to live my life in 
                                                     
85 I do not aim to give an account of what these standards are. Nevertheless, a few commonsense candidates 
immediately come to mind: I shouldn’t believe p and ~p, and if I discover that I do believe p and ~p, I ought to 
endeavor to determine which proposition I ought to reject; I should revise my beliefs in light of new, relevant 
evidence, I shouldn’t believe p simply because I desire p to be true, and so forth.  
86 There are exceptions here. If I am holding my child or friend accountable to these standards, I can be doing so 
not simply because I ought to, but also because I am invested in helping them improve as rational agents.  
87 I owe this point to Michael Cholbi.  
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a way that is undeserving of positive appraisal, is to show a disrespectful indifference to the 
very rational agency that makes me deserving of recognition respect in the first place.  
This is not to say that self-respect requires that we care equally about every choice we 
make and opinion we form. Just as we don’t lose our self-respect every time we make a 
subpar practical decision, so too is epistemic self-respect consistent with a certain amount of 
epistemic negligence. I can’t possibly scrutinize every belief that I have, and often 
considerations about expediency will move me to form beliefs based on evidence that I 
recognize to be somewhat insufficient. Further, I can’t be expected to care equally about 
every one of my beliefs: to explain why I am not at all motivated to double-check whether 
I’m right in my belief that Alan Jackson is Canadian, I need only point to my indifference to 
country music, and to the complete irrelevance of Alan Jackson-related facts to my life.88 
Rather, as Dillon describes it, for an agent to have respect for herself as a person, she must 
endeavor to live a life governed by the “the ideals, aspirations, commitments and “points of 
no return” that define her as the particular person she is.”89 Self-respect involves a sensitivity 
to one’s status not simply as a generic rational agent, but also to one’s status as a unique 
individual with specific commitments, abilities and ends. These commitments, abilities and 
ends are, in large part, manifestations of my rational agency; they are the result of choices 
that I have made or failed to make, propensities that I have cultivated or failed to cultivate 
and so forth. Given this, I think that self-respect requires that we be appropriately invested in 
the ends that we, as particular individuals, set for ourselves.  
                                                     
88 Of course, after writing this sentence, I felt the urge to double-check Alan Jackson’s birthplace. As I 
discovered, he is actually American.  
89 Dillon, “How to Lose Your Self-Respect,” 134. 
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Before I discuss this last requirement in greater detail, I must say something about 
what I mean by an ‘end.’ Typically, when philosophers talk about ends, they have in mind 
practical ends. I can choose to play a sport, cultivate a new friendship, or plan a trip to 
France. But we can also set epistemic ends for ourselves. We can choose to direct our 
attention towards certain epistemic domains and away from others. Often, our reasons for 
choosing one subject of epistemic inquiry over another is pragmatic. If I want to get into law 
school, I better learn how to do those pesky LSAT logic games. In other cases, our practical 
aims can only be fully explained with reference to our epistemic interests. There would be 
something sad about the person who dedicated his twenties to learning philosophy simply 
because he desperately wanted all of the lifestyle perks that come with being a philosopher 
professor. Instead, one would hope that the practical end that he has set for himself 
(‘becoming a philosophy professor’) is to be explained by his epistemic interest in doing 
philosophy. Although we can set all sorts of ends for ourselves, I will be especially 
concerned in this discussion with the ends that I have called ‘identity-constituting ends’. 
These are the ends that speak to our sense of who we are as individuals; they often relate to 
our values, social identities, personal projects, and most meaningful relationships. Why does 
self-respect require that I invest myself in realizing my ends? Consider what it means to fail 
to be invested in one’s ends. We might imagine someone who is always willing to give up 
her personal projects when they conflict with those of her husband. She may plan to join a 
book club, but if the club meetings are on the same night as her husband’s intramural hockey 
games, she will put down Atonement and head to the rink.  By constantly giving up on her 
own projects, the woman expresses something about how she sees them (as less important 
than her husband’s), and also about how she sees herself (as less important than her 
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husband). But this sort of self-image is antithetical to recognition self-respect; to respect 
herself as a rational agent requires that she see herself as having the same worth as every 
other rational agent. Just as I would be disrespecting someone if I forced them to give up 
their own personal projects simply because they conflicted with my own, so too would I be 
disrespecting myself if I perpetually subordinated my own ends to those of another. And 
likewise, just as self-respect often requires that we demand of others that they take our ends 
seriously, so too does it require that we demand of ourselves that we take those ends 
seriously. 
As the above example illustrates, proper self-investment will require that we not give 
up our ends too quickly. They are, after all, our ends, and this fact gives us the same reasons 
to respect them as it does everybody else. But investing in one’s ends involves more than just 
a willingness to pursue them. Specifically, self-respect will often require that we be willing to 
hold ourselves to appropriately stringent standards with regard to our ends. Massey captures 
this point vividly when he considers the case of a professor deliberating about whether to 
appear as a guest on a television quiz show: 
Consider Professor Andersen, who has spent her life studying and teaching 
Elizabethan literature, and is proud of her scholarship and the love of literature she 
has engendered in her students. The producers of “Whiz-Bang” quiz show, a midday 
extravaganza, make Professor Andersen a lucrative offer to appear as a guest, for they 
think that she will help to establish that their show is superior to its competitors. Out 
of respect for herself (and her profession), Professor Andersen refuses the offer. She 
is not averse to money. Rather, she believes that the use of a reputation based on the 
pursuit and dissemination of learning to legitimate a television quiz show could 
demean herself and prostitute her values.90 
                                                     
90 Stephen Massey, “Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?’’ Ethics 93 (1982), 248. 
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Whether or not profiting from a quiz show really does constitute a prostitution of one’s 
professorial powers is up for the debate.91 But what is not up for debate is the fact that there 
are better and worse ways to pursue one’s individual ends. Since respecting myself requires 
proper investment in my ends, I have moral reason to care that I be pursuing those ends in 
accordance with sufficiently stringent standards of behavior and reason.  
In order to demonstrate how epistemic self-respect can require us to be invested in 
holding ourselves to stringent standards when it comes to our epistemic ends, I will consider 
at length what it means to respect oneself in the context of one’s philosophical ends. I will 
suggest that, insofar as epistemic rationality is itself worthy of respect, and insofar as 
philosophy is an epistemic end that we can set for ourselves, then proper philosophical 
engagement can be a requirement of self-respect.  
Two Philosophers 
Consider the following two fictional, but perhaps familiar, philosophers. Felix is 
senior philosopher at a ‘Leiteriffic’ department. He has published dozens of highly-regarded 
papers and has earned a reputation as an inventive and rigorous thinker. Unfortunately, in the 
last five years, Felix’s reputation has gone to his head, and his work has suffered accordingly. 
Simply put, Felix has become so sure of his philosophical prowess that he no longer pays 
attention to the quality of his work. He publishes too quickly and too often, churning out 
papers that contain fallacious arguments and under-explored philosophical commitments.   
                                                     
91 Massey (ibid, 248–49) himself takes those standards as proof that the requirements of self-respect cannot be 
wholly objective. I do not think this is a bullet that ‘objectivists’ about self-respect have to bite. One can still 
say that there are objective standards that a behavior must meet in order for it to qualify as a requirement of a 
self-respect, while allowing that individuals have a great deal of latitude as to what sorts of behaviors they come 
to see as requirements of self-respect. 
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Now consider Felix’s colleague, Sarah. Sarah is an early-career philosopher who, like 
Felix, enjoys a reputation as an inventive and rigorous thinker. She has only published a few 
papers, but she is already well-regarded by her peers. Unlike Felix, however, Sarah suffers 
from crippling self-doubt about her philosophical abilities. She sees herself as a charlatan, 
entirely undeserving of the professional success that she has enjoyed. This has a tangible 
impact on her work. Sarah frequently finds herself abandoning philosophical commitments 
when she discovers that they are not shared by others in her field, and when someone raises 
an objection to one of her arguments during a conference talk, Sarah simply admits defeat.     
There is something unfortunate about both Felix and Sarah, but what is it? In this chapter, I 
argue that Felix and Sarah are both failing themselves in a similar way, and that these failures 
are distinctly moral failures. Specifically, both philosophers are failing to respect themselves 
as epistemic agents. 
These cases were chosen quite intentionally. First, they should strike the reader as 
familiar. Even if we have not personally been Felix or Sarah, we all know people like them. 
Second, these cases are both ‘non-moralized.’ By this, I mean that no great harms or rights-
violations are going to result from these agents’ epistemic failures. The worst that will likely 
happen as a result of Felix’s philosophical lackadaisicalness, for instance, is that some other 
philosophers will be stuck reading subpar articles. Presumably, whatever grievance one can 
justifiably have towards the author of a subpar philosophy article does not rise to the level of 
a rights violation.  Likewise, while it is certainly unpleasant to admit to the failings of one’s 
argument mid-way through a conference Q&A, it is hard to see how doing so could be 
considered morally wrong. I hope to show that these cases both involve agents who have 
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failed to respect themselves epistemically. To begin this task, I will take a closer look at each 
case. 
Felix 
Let us start with Felix. I think most philosophers would agree that there is something 
problematic about being indifferent to the quality of one’s philosophical work. And indeed, 
there are many different places where one might locate this wrong. Felix’s philosophical 
peers could legitimately complain about his philosophical carelessness. He has, after all, 
added to the glut of bad philosophy papers that other people have to read.  
But these considerations do not exhaust what is wrong with Felix. The problem with 
Felix, after all, is not simply that he has produced bad work. To say that a philosopher 
disrespects his epistemic rationality whenever he produces a sub-par argument would be to 
hold him to an epistemic standard that is far too stringent. Even good philosophers make bad 
arguments once in a while.  
Or we might be tempted to say that Felix has disrespected philosophy itself. 
Philosophy aspires to truth and rigor, and Felix’s work falls short of both of these aspirations. 
But this, once again, does not quite capture the case. The freshman student who hands in a 
poorly reasoned, sloppily written paper purely for the purposes of passing the course and 
fulfilling his philosophy distribution requirement has also failed to respect the philosophical 
pursuit of truth. But while the freshman’s paper, like Felix’s, lack philosophical rigor, I think 
our reactions in the two cases will be quite different. The freshman’s lack of philosophical 
engagement is regrettable, but understandable; we have all had that university course that just 
did not capture our attention. Felix, in contrast, is a professional philosopher. He has chosen 
to dedicate himself to philosophy, and he has proven himself to be philosophically capable in 
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the past. The main problem with Felix, then, is not that he is disrespecting philosophy, but 
that he is disrespecting himself as a philosopher.  
What does it mean to respect oneself as a philosopher? For starters, it requires an 
investment in philosophy as a worthwhile epistemic project. But on top of this, respecting 
oneself as a philosopher requires one to care about how well their own work is contributing 
to that project. If a philosopher really wants to produce an argument that’s worth accepting, 
for instance, she should be willing to subject it to the same level of scrutiny that she would an 
opponent’s argument, and she should be open to abandoning it if it proves to be indefensible. 
She should, in other words, commit herself to producing arguments that are, by her own 
lights, worth endorsing.  
Felix’s philosophical carelessness is problematic, then, not simply because it conveys 
a lack of respect for philosophy as a whole, but also because it conveys a lack of respect for 
himself as a philosopher. He is, after all, philosophically talented. He has produced good 
work in the past, and he ought to care about whether his recent work is meeting those same 
high standards. But Felix’s ego gets in the way of this. And in the process of continuing to 
feed it, he has stopped taking his work as seriously as he ought to.  
Of course, there may be situations wherein setting philosophically low standards for 
oneself is consistent with respecting oneself as a philosopher. Consider the case of Cosima. 
Like Felix, Cosima routinely sends in sloppy philosophical articles for publication. But 
unlike Felix, Cosima is still on the tenure clock. Her department has informed her that they 
love her work and want to keep her permanently, but that a university-wide policy requires 
her to have a few more articles before she can be granted tenure. So she makes a deal with 
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herself: she will temporarily allow her scholastic standards to slip in order to meet her 
university’s requirement.   
Cosima has set epistemic standards for herself that are not properly reflective of her 
status as a professional philosopher. But unlike in Felix’s case, I do not have the intuition that 
Cosima is disrespecting herself by adopting these standards. She is, after all, making a 
decision that will greatly impact her life. If she fails to get tenure at her institution, she may 
very well find herself permanently out of the philosophical profession. Her decision to 
temporarily set a lower epistemic standard for herself was not made lightly or in the service 
of some trivial end, but rather, was made in the service of accomplishing one of her life’s 
ambitions. To expect Cosima to maintain suitably high epistemic standards at the expense of 
one of her life goals is, I think, to unreasonably privilege her status as an epistemically 
rational agent capable of producing good philosophical arguments over her status as a 
practically rational agent capable of making decisions about how she wants her life to go.  
Note that I can say all this about Cosima’s decision while maintaining that epistemic 
rationality is, in some sense, worth having for its own sake. To say that epistemic rationality 
is worth respecting for its own sake is not to imply that it has an endless value that can never 
be sacrificed in the pursuit of other values. Rather, to say that epistemic rationality is worth 
respecting for its own sake is to say that we have reasons to respect it that are independent of 
the reasons that we have to respect our practical rationality. Cosima’s epistemic rationality is 
something that is worth respecting for its own sake, but it is not something that is worth 
privileging above everything else regardless of cost.  
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Sarah 
What about Sarah? Unlike Felix, Sarah actually holds her work to very high 
standards. She is cautious about the philosophical conclusions that she draws and she is open 
(in fact, too open) to criticism. She is, in other words, thoroughly invested in producing good 
work. And yet, I still think that Sarah lacks respect for herself. If I were to watch her give up 
on her own argument during a Q&A period, I might find myself inwardly cringing and 
wishing that she was a bit more self-confident. 
Sarah is, in this way, the epistemic equivalent of the wife who is too willing to give 
up on her life projects in the service of her husband. The wife in this example might have 
very good personal aims—she might, in other words, be adept at setting good ends for 
herself—but her inability to invest in those ends reveals a lack of self-respect. She simply 
does not take her own ends, and by extension, herself, as seriously as she ought to.  
To see this lack of seriousness in Sarah’s case, consider what it would take to respect 
another philosopher as an epistemic agent. To respect another philosopher, I must extend to 
her a measure of ‘epistemic good faith’—when this other philosopher makes an argument, 
for instance, it would behoove me to take that argument seriously and make a good faith 
effort to understand why she endorses it.92 If Sarah respects her colleagues, then she will 
extend just this sort of epistemic good faith to them. And indeed, her behavior during her 
conference talks suggests just this. By conceding the points that her interlocutors make, 
                                                     
92 Cynthia Townley makes a similar point in “Toward a Revaluation of Ignorance,” Hypatia 21 (2003): 37–55. 
There, she argues that epistemic responsibility requires us to see others as epistemic agents with unique 
perspectives that we ought to strive to appreciate (44). While she acknowledges that the requirements of 
epistemic responsibility might intersect with our moral and political requirements, she ultimately sees them as 
distinct (37; 45). On my view, our epistemic requirements of respect are themselves moral requirements insofar 
as they concern the proper acknowledgment of a person’s status as a rational agent. 
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Sarah is acknowledging that she sees them as philosophers capable of formulating incisive 
objections. But by ‘giving up’ on her epistemic conclusions too easily, Sarah fails to treat 
herself with the very sort of epistemic respect that she willingly extends to her peers. 
It is probably significant that Sarah is a woman in this example. As Borgwald has 
noted, systemic inequality can make it difficult or impossible for members of 
underrepresented groups to take their own ideas seriously. Borgwald describes the sorts of 
subtle social ‘corrections’ that can contribute to this systemic self-discounting: 
As girls they are taught cognitive deference, trained to discount their own judgments 
and rely on those of their parents/elders (Nelson 1996). A young woman may be told 
“you don’t want to be a doctor dear, you want to be a nurse.” This is a way of 
denying that she has the desires she thinks she has, and so makes her doubt herself.93   
A lifetime of these sorts of ‘corrections,’ Borgwald contends, can frustrate a woman’s ability 
to “think autonomously, reflect on and evaluate [her] emotions, beliefs and desires, and to 
trust those judgments rather than deferring to others.”94 For Borgwald, this loss of epistemic 
personhood is consequentially bad. To lack epistemic personhood is also to lack the ability to 
care about one’s wellbeing. But on my view, a loss of epistemic personhood is bad in itself 
precisely because it constitutes a failure to respect a feature of one’s personhood that ought to 
be respected. 
Conclusion: Epistemic Self-Respect and Self-Knowledge 
At this point, I have shown that our reasons for respecting ourselves as epistemic 
agents are of the same kind as the reasons we have for respecting ourselves as practical 
                                                     
93  Kristen Borgwald, “Women’s Anger, Epistemic Personhood, and Self-Respect: An Application of Lehrer’s 
Work on Self-Trust,’’ Philosophical Studies 161 (2012), 71-72. 
94 Ibid, 73.  
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agents.95. In this way, epistemic respect is something that we can owe both ourselves and 
others. I have also demonstrated that, among the requirements of epistemic self-respect, is a 
requirement to take one’s epistemic ends seriously by holding oneself accountable to 
appropriate epistemic standards.  
Let us now return to Didion to consider the relationship between self-respect and self-
knowledge. For Didion, it was the discovery that she was not as exceptional as she believed 
herself to be that constituted the beginnings of genuine self-respect. How should we explain 
this transformation? Of course, we can grant that the very fact that Didion is willing to 
entertain beliefs about herself that she finds uncomfortable and undesirable evinces the 
respect she has for herself as an epistemic agent. Had she clung to her misguided sense of 
superiority even in the face of reasonable evidence to the contrary, we could rightly say that 
she was going too easy on herself as a thinker, and privileging her own comfort over the 
truth.  
More fundamentally, we can note that recognition self-respect, in both its practical 
and epistemic form, requires that we act in the right sort of ways for the right sort of reasons. 
It is not enough for me to simply act respectfully towards you; rather, I ought to do so 
because I understand you to be deserving of respect as a person. While Didion may have 
treated herself with respect before the revelation, she did so out of a sense of her own 
exceptionality, rather than an appreciation of her personhood. What her self-revelation gave 
                                                     
95 I have assumed throughout this chapter that epistemic rationality and practical rationality are distinct forms of 
rationality. This may not be the case. Rather, it may be the case that there is only one kind of rationality which 
we can direct towards both practical and epistemic ends. If this is right, then the problem with the traditional 
rationalist picture of respect is not that it focuses too narrowly on the respect-worthiness of practical rationality, 
but that it focuses too narrowly on the respect-worthiness of persons as practical end-setters.  
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her was the ability to see that her respect-worthiness did not disappear along with her sense 
of inherent superiority. Rather, she discovered that she still had a reason to respect herself, 
not because she was an exception to the rules that applied to other people, but precisely 
because she was not.  
We can say, then, that self-respect is incompatible with certain forms of self-
ignorance. If I treat myself with respect because I think that my wealth, beauty, or smarts 
makes me worthy of it, then I have performed the right actions for the wrong reasons, and 
thus have failed to have recognition respect for myself. Rather, to have recognition self-
respect requires that I have some appreciation of the fact that I deserve respect simply insofar 
as I am a person.  
How contentful this belief needs to be is up for debate. Do I have to grasp specifically 
that my rational agency is the quality of personhood that makes me deserving of recognition 
respect? Must I have ever explicitly thought the thought that my personhood makes me 
deserving of respect, or is it sufficient that I act respectfully towards myself out of some 
vague sense of my inherent worth or the fundamental equality of human beings? And how 
explicit and clear must my sense of the value of my personhood be in order for it to count as 
a piece of knowledge? The answers to these questions are not obvious. I imagine that, like 
Didion, we often only explicitly question what makes us deserving of self-respect when we 
are struck by the realization that we aren’t as unique and wonderful as we previously 
believed. Nevertheless, however we settle this question, it is clear that it will not lead us to a 
positive duty to know ourselves as individuals. While Didion’s example provides evidence 
for the fact that there can be a positive value to self-knowledge even when it is emotionally 
upsetting, this value is obviously instrumental in nature. Insofar as upsetting knowledge of 
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our shortcomings can give us an accurate self-perception, and insofar as an accurate self-
perception can rid us of our false sense of superiority, which in turn can make us aware of the 
proper grounds of our self-respect, then such self-knowledge is valuable.  
Further, if we grant that self-respect constitutively requires one to have a certain 
knowledge of one’s personhood, we still haven’t located a non-instrumental reason to seek 
any knowledge about who we are as individuals. The knowledge that self-respect may 
constitutively require is not knowledge pertaining to us as individuals, but rather knowledge 
pertaining to us as generic members of the human species. We cannot appeal to the non-
instrumental value of this generic self-knowledge to explain why we ought to set knowing 
our individual selves as an end.  
What this account of self-knowledge can do is shed light on how we ought to pursue 
the end of knowing ourselves, once we have set it. Specifically, it can make sense of why 
there is a moral difference between the person who seeks knowledge of herself ‘warts and 
all’ and the person who seeks self-knowledge only selectively, and with an eye to 
maintaining a positive self-conception. As I will show in the next chapter, while it may be the 
case that both of these people value substantial self-knowledge for its own sake, only one of 
them holds herself accountable to appropriately stringent epistemic standards. The difference 
between the two people, in other words, is one of epistemic self-respect: while the former 
agent clearly has it, the latter does not.   
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CHAPTER 2: SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND THE REASONS OF LOVE 
Introduction 
Self-respect can provide us with some normative guidance as to how we ought to 
pursue the project of knowing ourselves, but it cannot tell us that we ought to know 
ourselves. If we are to secure that second ‘ought’, we must do so by appealing to something 
other than the requirements of self-respect.  
This chapter, in a nutshell, aims to secure that second ‘ought’ by investigating the 
reasons that love gives us to know its objects. My argument will proceed as follows. After 
offering some clarifications about the project (Section 1), I will in Section 2 turn my attention 
away from self-knowledge and towards interpersonal knowledge. In doing so, I will consider 
the reasons that we have to know other people, and conclude that there is a class of 
relationships—which I uncreatively call ‘loving relationships’—that necessarily require a 
commitment to knowing the person with whom you share it for the sake of knowing them. 
This commitment is normatively binding: so long as we share a loving relationship with each 
other, I ought to be committed to knowing you for the sake of knowing you. I will then show 
in Sections 3 and 4 that there is a strong analogy between the reasons we have to know other 
people and the reasons that we have to know ourselves. We are in an inescapable relationship 
with ourselves that is answerable to norms of both self-love and self-respect. Self-love 
generates non-instrumental reasons to know ourselves, while self-respect demands that we 
take seriously those reasons by pursuing our project of self-inquiry in accordance with 
78 
 
suitably stringent epistemic standards. We are therefore morally required not just to think 
about who we are, but to think about who we are clearly and carefully enough so that we 
come to know ourselves.   
Section 1: Clarificatory Remarks 
Before proceeding to my positive project, I will offer two clarificatory remarks. First, 
this chapter will not take a stance on any of the epistemological debates about self-
knowledge. I will assume that we can, in fact, have knowledge of ourselves, and I will 
remain silent on the question of whether this knowledge is of a fundamentally different kind 
than other types of knowledge. Thus, I say nothing about the nature or extent of our so-called 
‘privileged access.’ The points I want to make here concern what we are morally required to 
value for its own sake and do not concern the means by which we can achieve what we are 
morally required to value.  
 Second, as I noted in the introduction, my aim is not to show that we ought to value 
all self-knowledge non-instrumentally. There are many trivial facts about ourselves—like the 
number of hairs on our head, the exact distance between us and the North Pole, or which 
sock we put on first this morning—that are at most valuable instrumentally.  Rather, this 
chapter will show that a specific kind of self-knowledge, which Quassim Cassam has called 
‘substantial self-knowledge,’ should be non-instrumentally valued.96 Substantial self-
knowledge, according to Cassam, is self-knowledge that pertains to facts about what makes 
us happy, what we value, what our characters are like, where our abilities and aptitudes lie, 
                                                     
96 Cassam, Self-Knowledge, 29. While I agree with Cassam that substantial self-knowledge is important to 
humans in a way that more trivial self-knowledge is not, I disagree with his claim that substantial self-
knowledge is still ultimately instrumentally valuable. Rather, as I will argue in Sections II and III, self-
knowledge is something that we have reason to value for its own sake.  
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how we feel emotionally, and what we believe.97 While Cassam provides criteria for 
determining whether a particular fact about oneself qualifies as self-knowledge, he does not 
explain why these criteria are the right criteria or give an account of what, if anything, 
ultimately unites substantial self-knowledge into a unified and distinctive category.98 As I 
have suggested in the Introduction, there is something that fundamentally unites all of the 
types of self-knowledge that Cassam labels ‘substantial’. Specifically, the types of self-
knowledge that count as substantial are those types that pertain most directly to our identity-
constituting ends. At the end of this chapter, I will explain how my account sheds light on 
why the category of substantial self-knowledge takes this particular form.   
Section 2: Love’s Reasons 
Before we ask what reasons we have to know ourselves, let’s first ask another 
question: what reasons do we have to know other people? Obviously, we have some purely 
pragmatic reasons. If you want a promotion at work, you will have a reason to learn whether 
your boss is a stickler about deadlines. If you want good relations with your neighbors, you 
will have a reason to find out how tolerant they are of loud parties and unkempt lawns.  .  
We also have moral reasons to know people. To treat you with respect requires me to 
know that you’re a person, insofar as it is your status as a person that largely determines what 
                                                     
97 Ibid, 30. Cassam does not include life experiences in his description of substantial self-knowledge, but for 
reasons that I will make clear in Section IV, I think that this omission is a mistake.  
98 While Cassam, Self-Knowledge, 36–40, does offer ten conditions that most, if not all, substantial self-
knowledge purportedly meets, he refrains from offering any sort of unifying justification of these conditions, 
and he is careful to note that the items on his list are not necessary and sufficient conditions for substantial self-
knowledge. 
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it means for me to act respectfully towards you.99 But knowing that someone is a person 
gives us no insight into who she is as an individual person, and it is this sort of knowledge 
that interests me presently. 
 At times, morality does give us reason to obtain this sort of individualized 
knowledge. To treat people with respect may require that we be cognizant of what systems of 
etiquette they observe, or of what their life is like. The value of this individualized 
knowledge, once again, is instrumental—a little bit of personal knowledge about the people 
with whom we regularly interact helps ensure that we treat them respectfully in accordance 
with their own values. To respect your coworker, for example, requires that you know 
whether he observes any religious or ethical dietary laws in order to avoid bringing a dish to 
his dinner party that he finds offensive.  
 We have plenty of instrumental reasons to know other people. But we have reasons in 
addition to these to know the people with whom we share close friendships, familial 
relationships and romantic partnerships. These types of relationships, which I will call 
‘loving relationships,’ are partially constituted by their participants’ love for each other. To 
have a friendship with someone, for instance, is in part to love that person as a friend. And 
love provides us with reasons that cannot all be instrumental in nature. To understand what 
these reasons are, let’s consider the distinctive mode of valuing that love involves. J. David 
Velleman describes loving people as caring for them as ends in themselves.100 We may 
appreciate the barista as the means to our morning coffee, but when we love someone, we do 
                                                     
99 Darwall, “Respect,” 36-40.  
100 J. David Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion” Ethics, Vol. 109 No. 2 (1999): 338-375. 
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so without needing to appeal to the instrumental role that he or she plays in any of our ends. 
Harry Frankfurt describes love in similarly Kantian terms:  
When we love something…We care about it not merely as a means, but as an end. It 
is in the nature of loving that we consider its objects to be valuable in themselves and 
to be important for their own sakes.101 
When we love people for their own sakes, our love for them becomes a source of reasons. As 
Bernard Williams’ famous example of the drowning wife demonstrates, our reasons for 
aiding, preferring, and supporting our loved ones need not bottom out in considerations that 
are in any way independent of the fact that you love them. Instead, love gives us the reasons 
that inspire our devotion to our loved ones.102 These reasons must be at least sometimes non-
instrumental. To illustrate, consider the reasons you have to adopt your loved one’s ends as 
your own. Perhaps you do so to make her happy or to help her live a fulfilling life. But even 
if your reasons for adopting her ends are instrumental, the reasons that you have to care about 
her happiness or self-fulfillment are not: your concern for these things can be fully explained 
by the love that you have for her.  
 To be sure, loving people typically involves more than just caring about them for 
their own sake. In particular, love typically involves specific desires, emotional experiences, 
vulnerabilities and so forth. But the particular desires and emotions that we feel towards our 
                                                     
101 Harry Frankfurt, “On Love, and Its Reasons,” in The Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 42. Velleman and Frankfurt disagree about what interpersonal love is responsive to. Velleman argues 
that interpersonal love, like interpersonal respect, is responsive to an agent’s intrinsically valuable 
personhood—the love that we have for a person’s quirks and character traits is thus a “response” to those traits 
as “an expression or symbol or reminder of his value as a person” (106). Frankfurt denies this, and instead 
argues that love need not involve an awareness of an object’s intrinsic value. It is worth noting that Frankfurt 
works with a far broader conception of love than Velleman: while Velleman focuses his attention on romantic 
love, Frankfurt is interested in the way in which we love romantic partners, friends, traditions, scientific truth 
and so forth. “On Love,” 42.   
102 It might alternatively be said that love is this devotion or that love consists in having certain types of reasons. 
For clarity’s sake in this chapter, I will talk about love as giving us particular types of reasons. 
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loved ones will vary greatly depending on the type of love that we have for them. In contrast, 
as Susan Wolf observes, caring about a person for their own sake is a feature of love that is 
common to every type of loving relationship.103 
 Much of the philosophical literature on love’s reasons focuses specifically on reasons 
for action. Williams’ example of the reason that the man has to save his drowning wife over 
another drowning person—‘Because she’s my wife’—is the paradigmatic example of this 
tendency. These non-instrumental reasons for action are commonly understood to be an 
essential part of what it is to love another person: if you don’t see yourself as having reason 
to help the object of your affection out for her own sake, you don’t love her.  
 In addition to providing us with reasons for action, love also gives us epistemic 
reasons—reasons to pay attention, to listen, and to try to know. To understand the 
pervasiveness of love’s epistemic reasons, think back to the fascination you felt towards your 
first crush or the interest you took in learning about your grandfather’s war stories. If I were 
to ask you to explain why you were interested in his war stories over those of the other 
veterans in the nursing home, it would be sufficient for you to say ‘I’m interested because I 
love him’. Loving someone makes them interesting to us, and in particular gives us a reason 
to know them over and above any pragmatic or moral reasons we may have already had.  
 One might object that, in talking about the non-instrumental reasons that love gives us 
to know others, I have stacked the deck in my favor by appealing to the beginnings of love, 
rather than its middle or end. To be sure, the fascination that we feel for our loved ones often 
dissipates as we accomplish our goal of knowing them. It is easy to listen with rapt attention 
                                                     
103 Susan Wolf, “The Importance of Love,” in The Variety of Values (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 189. 
83 
 
to everything that your first crush tells you about himself, but it is much more difficult to pay 
the same attention to a longtime friend and partner. The diminishment of interest that we 
sometimes feel towards our longtime loves is, however, simply what happens when we have 
largely accomplished the end that this particular reason of love sets for us. Seeing someone 
as worth knowing for the sake of knowing is perfectly consistent with not finding the story of 
the time she got stuck in an elevator as fascinating on the twentieth telling as it was on the 
first. Even in these long term loving relationships, however, we still have non-instrumental 
reasons to know. This becomes clear when we look at one of the hallmarks of falling out of 
love with someone: when, after a time, we lose interest in learning more about our loved one, 
our disinterest is usually a sign that our love has run its course.  
 Of course, we can love people with whom we do not share loving relationships. 
Outside of the context of loving relationships, love’s reasons can be normatively weak. The 
senior partner’s love for her junior colleague might, for instance, give her reason to learn 
about his life story, but she would owe him no explanation if she chose to privilege the 
reasons she has to maintain professional decorum over the reasons love gives her to get to 
know him. But when one is in a loving relationship with another person, love’s reasons 
become normative requirements.104 By ‘normative requirement,’ I do not mean to suggest 
that the reasons that love gives within the context of loving relationships can never be 
overruled. Even in our most intimate loving relationships, we regularly and reasonably 
privilege other considerations over the reasons that love gives us. And in most cases, we 
cease to be bound by these normative requirements by choosing to end the relationship that 
                                                     
104 The normative demands of loving relationships are not all demands of love. Marriages, friendships, and 
familiar relationships are complex social institutions, the normative requirements of which can be shaped by 
social convention and legal statute.  
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gave rise to them. What I mean to suggest by the phrase ‘normative requirement’ is that, 
when we are in a loving relationship with another person, we typically owe that person a 
justification when we choose to privilege competing interests over her, and that our 
unwillingness to act on the reasons that our love gives us can at times make us a proper 
object of censure. If I decide to go out for drinks with colleagues after work instead of 
commiserating with my newly-heartbroken best friend, then she could rightfully demand that 
I explain myself to her. In that particular case, my explanation needn’t be particularly strong 
to be sufficient—it would be enough to point out that I can’t be expected to commiserate 
with her all the time. In contrast, were I to choose to go drinking with colleagues instead of 
loitering around the coffee shop where my unrequited crush always studies, I would not owe 
him any sort of explanation for my absence. My love for my crush might give me reason to 
frequent his favorite coffee shop, but it in no way obligates me to do so.  
Among the requirements that loving relationships put on their participants, I believe, 
is a requirement to know each other. Why is this? To answer, it is helpful to examine a 
relationship whose participants are not committed to knowing each other. Consider the scene 
in Alice Munro’s The Beggar Maid in which the protagonist, Rose, considers why her soon-
to-be husband Patrick loves her: 
Patrick loved her. What did he love? Not her accent, which he was trying hard to 
alter, though she was often mutinous and unreasonable, declaring in the face of all 
evidence that she did not have a country accent, everybody talked the way she did. 
Not her jittery sexual boldness (his relief at her virginity matched hers at his 
competence). She could make him flinch at a vulgar word, a drawling tone. All the 
time, moving and speaking, she was destroying herself for him, yet he looked right 
through her, through all the distractions she was creating, and loved some obedient 
image that she herself could not see.105  
                                                     
105 Alice Munro, The Beggar Maid (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977), 85.  
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Patrick loves Rose, in a way. But what makes his love for her, and their resulting 
relationship, unideal is that he is fundamentally uninterested in discovering more about the 
person whom he loves. Since the real Rose makes Patrick uncomfortable, he opts to hide her 
behind a more palatable image of low-class gentility. When he meets Rose’s stepmother, the 
only mother Rose has ever known, Patrick takes great pains to insist that her “real parents 
can’t have been like that”:  
[Rose] saw that he was trying to provide for her a more genteel background, perhaps 
something like the homes of his poor friends: a few books about, a tea tray, and 
mended linen, worn good taste: proud, tired, educated people.106  
But Rose does no better by Patrick. So uninterested is she with the details of his life that she 
has to be told by her landlady that he comes from money. Rose marries Patrick, ultimately, 
and quickly loses the small amount of curiosity she ever extended to him. When she later 
confesses to having an affair with another man (whom she does, as a matter of fact, find 
worth knowing), Rose finds herself completely uninterested in Patrick’s reaction to the 
news.107  
 What can Patrick and Rose’s unhealthy marriage tell us about the importance of 
interpersonal knowledge to loving relationships?  First, their case highlights the fact that 
wanting to know the people with whom we share loving relationships is part of what it means 
to be in these relationships. This is why, although they had a legal marriage, Rose would not 
be speaking entirely figuratively if she were to say that there was a sense in which they were 
never truly married to each other.   
                                                     
106 Ibid, 91.  
107 Ibid, 134.  
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It is, of course, not enough that we simply want to know the people with whom we 
share loving relationships. Rather, the norms of these relationships require that we actually 
endeavor to gain knowledge of our loved ones. In this way, we are normatively required to 
try to know the people with whom we share loving relationships. More often than not, we are 
happy to fulfill this particular normative requirement. The love that we have for the people 
with whom we share these relationships, after all, makes us want to know them for the sake 
of knowing them. At other times, we may find fulfilling this commitment onerous: it can 
sometimes be frustrating, boring, or even upsetting to learn more about the people whom we 
love. And yet, when we continue to listen, we demonstrate that we see them as inherently 
worth knowing, even at the expense of our time, energy or emotional wellbeing.  
That love gives us non-instrumental reasons to know our loved ones, and that these 
reasons become normative requirements within loving relationships, helps explain why 
relationships based on projection, like Patrick’s relationship with Rose, are so far from ideal. 
We sometimes fall in love not with people, but with idealizations of people. When we do 
this, we construct our own story about who they are, and what they value. But when you start 
a relationship with someone (even if it is your idealization of her that motivates you to start 
it), you come to owe it to her to appreciate her as she truly is, and not simply as you want her 
to be.108 If you try to keep the relationship alive in the ways that Patrick did, by refusing to 
listen to your beloved when she tells you things that contradict your projection of her, or by 
‘correcting’ her when she expresses an opinion that you want her not to have, you not only 
                                                     
108 The particular type of loving relationship that we share with another person also partially determines the 
types of interpersonal knowledge that will be most interesting and important to us. I want to know both my best 
friend and my mother for the sake of knowing them, but I don’t want to know the same things about my mother 
that I want to know about my friend. My mother is, after all, my mother. Given the nature of our relationship, 
there are certain facts that I do not want to know about her. I’m sure she feels exactly the same way.  
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threaten the stability of your relationship, but you also mistreat the person with whom you 
share it. 
As an explanation of why we ought to know our loved ones, an instrumentalist story 
is clearly inadequate. A certain amount of interest in knowing your loved ones is a 
constitutive requirement of being in loving relationships with them. And a commitment to 
actually seeking knowledge of our loved ones is something that we are normatively required 
to have so long as we remain in loving relationships with them. While we may be able to 
construct a second-order account about the value of this sort of commitment—perhaps it 
could be argued that a commitment to knowing your loved ones for the sake of knowing 
them has benefits down the road that can’t be secured by a commitment to knowing them for 
instrumental reasons—this account would be motivationally inert and alien to our 
experiences of love and loving relationships.  
Section 3: Self-Love’s Reasons 
In the interpersonal case, love gives us non-instrumental reasons to know the people 
whom we love, and being in a loving relationship can obligate us to act upon those reasons. 
This means that knowledge of the people with whom we share loving relationships is 
something that we should want for its own sake.109 But how does this help show that self-
knowledge is also something that we should want for its own sake? What, in other words, do 
the duties of loving relationships have to do with the duties that we have towards ourselves? 
                                                     
109 In his second argument against Cassam’s claims about the instrumental value of self-knowledge, Eric 
Schwitzgebel also appeals to analogy between interpersonal and intrapersonal knowledge. His argument takes 
the following form: Knowledge of other people can be intrinsically valuable. Since it would be strange if 
interpersonal knowledge had intrinsic value, but intrapersonal knowledge did not, we have no good grounds for 
thinking that self-knowledge lacks intrinsic value. “Self-Knowledge,” 2. We thus have no good grounds for 
thinking that self-knowledge lacks intrinsic value. While I am sympathetic to this argument, I’m ultimately 
making a different claim about the non-instrumental reasons we have to care about knowing ourselves. 
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My answer, in short, is quite a lot. Just as we can be in better and worse interpersonal 
relationships, so too can we relate in better and worse ways to ourselves. Loving 
interpersonal relationships, I argue, provide a natural model through which to understand the 
requirements that we must meet in order to relate well to ourselves. When we understand 
what it is to relate properly to ourselves, we will be able to see why we ought to be 
committed to knowing ourselves for the sake of knowing ourselves.  
What It Means to Relate to Ourselves 
What does it mean to relate to oneself? Initially, the language of ‘intrapersonal 
relationships’ might be off-putting to some. Paradigmatically, we think of relationships as 
involving two people. If this were a necessary feature of relationships, then it would not be 
possible for us to talk about relationships with ourselves without first assuming some 
dualistic theory of selfhood. But the very fact that we understand notions like self-love, self-
hatred and self-knowledge shows that relationships need not always involve two people. 
Rather, it is a part of ordinary life that we do have a relationship with ourselves. Here, I am 
not making any metaphysical point. By a ‘relationship with ourselves, I mean merely to point 
out something that is assumed in every form of self-regard, be it cognitive or emotional: viz. 
that we are capable of simultaneously regarding ourselves and being regarded.  And the 
relationship that we have with ourselves, like the relationships that we have with others, can 
assume better and worse forms. We can loathe or love ourselves, and treat ourselves well or 
poorly.  
As such, it is worth asking what it means to be in a healthy intrapersonal relationship. 
Joel Feinberg’s discussion of self-love in Absurd Self-Fulfillment gives us the beginnings of 
an answer:  
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… self-identity can be conceived as a kind of arranged marriage (I did not select the 
self that was to be me) that in a stable person ripens into true love, but in an unstable 
one sours into rancor and self-destruction.110  
It is telling that in describing what it means to have a healthy self-identity, Feinberg draws an 
analogy not with just any interpersonal relationship, but with marriage in particular. 
Marriages, when they’re going well, are paradigmatic examples of loving relationships. Nor 
is Feinberg alone in analogizing the way in which we ought to relate to ourselves to a loving 
interpersonal relationship. This type of analogy goes back in philosophical history at least as 
far as Aristotle, who described the relationship that the properly self-loving person has with 
himself as a friendship.111 And it is also familiar in our non-philosophical discourse. Fashion 
mogul Diane Von Furstenberg, for instance, once began a speech to a class of graduating 
high school girls with the recommendation that they strive to become their best friends,112 
while playwright Oscar Wilde likened self-love to “a life-long romance.”113  
The basic thought contained in all of these descriptors is that our relationship with 
ourselves, which is necessarily intimate, must be loving in order to be healthy. Why is this? 
Certainly, most types of relationships can be healthy even if their participants feel neutral 
towards each other. I don’t have to care about my accountant as a person, for instance, to 
                                                     
110 Joel Feinberg. “Absurd Self-Fulfillment,” in The Meaning of Life: A Reader, eds. E.D. Klemke and Steven 
M. Cahn, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 178. See also 177, where Feinberg notes that loving 
one’s true nature “for better or worse” calls to mind “the wedding ceremony and its conception of marital love 
as loyalty and devotion without conditional reservation.” 
111 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1166a1-b29.  
112 Diane von Furstenberg, The Woman I Wanted to Be (Simon & Schuster, 2015).  
113 Oscar Wilde, “Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young,” The Chameleon (1894).  
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have a productive business relationship with him. And given the nature of our relationship, it 
would not be wrong of me if I never make any effort to form an attachment to him or his 
projects. But I would be doing something wrong if I was similarly neutral towards my mother 
and her projects. She has been in my life since day one, and has shaped the person I am today 
in too many ways to count. An inability to feel strongly attached to her or an unwillingness to 
take an interest in her for her own sake would not be tantamount to respectful disengagement, 
as it was in the case of my accountant. Rather, it would be a sign that I disvalue her and the 
relationship that we share.  
In much the same way, I am too close to myself to remain neutral on the subject. I 
must have some sort of attitude towards myself. Intuitively, a healthy relationship with 
myself won’t involve a negative attitude. Rather, I think that Feinberg and Aristotle are right 
to suggest that properly relating to oneself requires self-love. And so, it is to self-love that we 
will now turn.  
Why Our Relationship with Ourselves Demands Self-Love  
Self-love, like its interpersonal analogue, is a mode of non-instrumental valuing.114 
The reasons we have in virtue of loving ourselves, like the reasons we have in virtue of 
loving other people, are often non-instrumental reasons. We can see these non-instrumental 
reasons clearly when we consider why we are invested in advancing our own interests in a 
way that we are not invested in advancing other peoples’ interests. The frazzled assistant 
professor might be able to answer the question of why she cares more about her tenure file 
than her colleague’s by pointing to the instrumental connection between getting tenure and 
                                                     
114 Self-love, like interpersonal love, involves attitudes, emotions, and desires. For my present purposes, it is 
sufficient to focus on one aspect of self-love, viz. the non-instrumental reasons that self-love gives to know 
ourselves.  
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increasing her well-being. But she would be hard-pressed to answer the further question of 
why she is uniquely invested in her well-being in similarly instrumentalist terms. Rather, her 
well-being is uniquely important to her for the same type of reason that it is uniquely 
important to her brother. Just as her brother loves her, so too does she love herself, and that 
love gives both of them non-instrumental reasons to be invested in her well-being.  
 In addition to giving us reasons to be especially invested in our personal projects, 
self-love also supplies us with non-instrumental reasons to know ourselves. That we pay a 
level of attention to ourselves that would be inappropriate if directed at almost anyone else 
speaks to this fact. Our attempts at figuring out our motivations, interests and commitments 
are often both driven by, and expressions of, our self-love.   
 This explains why an absence of self-love is often accompanied by an indifference 
towards self-knowledge.115 Think about some of the people whom we would intuitively 
consider to lack self-love. On one side of the spectrum, you will find the cult member who 
has committed herself to disowning every aspect of her individuality. She is not about to try 
to puzzle out who she is, as she no longer finds that person worthy of attention. On the other 
side, you’ll find people who loathe themselves, or who have cripplingly low self-esteem. To 
see how these forms of self-regard frustrate our ability to value self-knowledge, consider the 
case of ‘Suzanne’, a woman who struggled to have a sense of self-worth after being forced as 
a teenager to give a baby up for adoption.116 When asked to share her story with Ann Fessler, 
                                                     
115 For an argument for the stronger claim that self-love is required for self-knowledge, see Jan Bransen, “Self-
Knowledge and Self-Love,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 18 (2015): 309-321 While I am convinced 
that self-hatred poses a significant obstacle to self-knowledge, I think that Bransen’s argument for why self-love 
is a precondition for self-knowledge rests on an unduly idealized picture of self-love.  
116 Ann Fessler. The Girls Who Went Away: The Hidden History of Women Who Surrendered Children for 
Adoption in the Decades Before Roe v. Wade (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2006), 7. I follow Fessler’s 
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who was writing a book on the subject of adoption in the decades before Roe v. Wade, 
‘Suzanne’ hesitated. “There’s still that voice in me that says, “Who would be interested? No 
one cared then, why would they care now?” she remarked, “I was abandoned when it was 
right in everybody’s face, so I still believe that nobody cares. My personal struggle is to get 
beyond thinking I’m not worth caring about.”117 ‘Suzanne’s’ struggle to lovingly care for 
herself is not separate from her struggle to see her own story as worth retelling. Rather, her 
inability to love herself is partially constituted by the inability to see her life story as 
deserving of attention.  
To be sure, self-loathers are sometimes prone to paying a great deal of attention to 
themselves. We can, for instance, imagine someone whose self-hatred motivates him to 
endlessly fixate on his flaws. In these cases, I think self-discovery can often function as self-
flagellation: the self-loather looks at himself not because he sees himself as worth knowing 
for the sake of knowing, but because he hates the person he sees and thus wants to punish 
that person by forcing himself to take a closer look at an image that he finds repugnant.   
 All that we need to establish the claim that self-knowledge is worth having for its 
own sake is the fact that self-love gives us the same non-instrumental reasons to know 
ourselves as interpersonal love gives us to know our loved ones. But I want to establish a 
stronger claim, viz. that we ought to seek self-knowledge for its own sake. On its own, self-
love cannot give us this claim. If we love ourselves, we will be motivated to know ourselves 
                                                     
convention of referring to ‘Suzanne’ in scare-quotes to mark the fact that her name was changed to protect her 
identity.   
117 Ibid, 7. 
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for the sake of knowing ourselves. But if we do not love ourselves, as ‘Suzanne’s’ case 
illustrated, we will not be able to see ourselves as worth knowing in this way.  
 ‘Suzanne’s’ case actually gives us the resources that we need to get out of this 
objection. To see what these resources are, we must keep in mind that, while ‘Suzanne’ may 
have internalized the message that her teenage pregnancy makes her unworthy of love, she 
nevertheless continues to want to love herself. She has the same reasons to want self-love 
that we have to want to love our family members: we’re stuck in close relationships with 
both our family and ourselves that require love from their participants if they are to be 
healthy. And so, ‘Suzanne’ will continue to have reason to love herself even if she can’t 
stand herself.  
But here a worry arises. Although most familial relationships require love in order to 
be healthy, we do not typically think that people can be required to love each other. This is 
because we have little control, if any, over interpersonal love. At most, we can try to cultivate 
our love for others by endeavoring to see them in a sympathetic light in the way that Iris 
Murdoch described.118 But if your unpleasant aunt is, even on the most sympathetic 
interpretation, truly unlovable in your eyes, then you cannot be blamed for your inability to 
love her. If love isn’t something that is under our voluntary control, how can we owe it to 
ourselves to cultivate self-love?  
To answer, consider one important difference between the control that ‘Suzanne’ has 
over herself and the control that we have over our least favorite relative. While you cannot 
choose to make your insufferable aunt more loveable, ‘Suzanne’ can choose to make herself 
                                                     
118 Iris Murdoch, “The Idea of Perfection,” in Existentialists and Mystics: Writings On Philosophy and 
Literature (New York, NY; Penguin Books, 1997), 312-313.  
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into someone whom she can love. And this is what she does when she agrees to do the 
interview. She goes out on a limb, and affirms something about her value that others have 
conditioned her to deny. In doing so, she not only treats herself with the partiality that self-
love requires, but she also acts in a way that makes her more loveable to herself.  
Insofar as we have self-control, we will be able to act in ways that either promote or 
frustrate self-love. And given the intimate nature of the relationship that we have with 
ourselves, I think we should strive to love ourselves and make ourselves loveable. Part of 
what it takes to accomplish this task, as ‘Suzanne’s’ story demonstrated, is a commitment to 
acting on the reasons that love gives us to know ourselves. This raises a question: what does 
it mean to act on these reasons? We should not expect a theory of self-love to supply us with 
an answer. This is because, while self-love can draw our attention inwards, it also has the 
power to make us blind to parts of ourselves. Shakespeare captures and admonishes the 
selective attention that self-love often promotes in one of his sonnets: 
Sin of self-love possesseth all mine eye 
 And all my soul, and all my every part;  
 And for this sin there is no remedy.  
 It is so grounded inward in my heart.  
 Methinks no face so gracious is as mine,  
 No shape so true, no truth of such account; 
 And for myself mine own worth do define,  
 As I all other in all worths surmount.119  
 
If there is something morally admirable about acting on love’s non-instrumental reasons to 
know oneself, we will not find it in Shakespeare’s narcissistic self-lover. But what exactly is 
missing from this type of self-inquiry that keeps it from being admirable? One answer that I 
will ultimately reject is that Shakespeare’s self-lover is, paradoxically, lacking self-love. This 
                                                     
119 Sonnet 62. For a discussion of this sonnet, see Simon Blackburn, Mirror, Mirror: The Uses and Abuses of 
Self-Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 33.  
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is the type of answer that comes out of some prominent modern and ancient philosophical 
accounts of self-love. Consider, for instance, why Harry Frankfurt criticizes Kant for drawing 
too close a parallel between self-love and self-indulgence:  
As I understand self-love, it is quite unlike the attitude that Kant has in mind when he 
laments that we hold the self too dear. In speaking of those who love themselves, 
Kant describes people who are motivated predominantly by an interest in satisfying 
their own inclinations and desires, and who on any particular occasion will naturally 
be moved to act by whichever of those inclinations and desires happens to be 
strongest. Those people are not being driven by what I think of as self-love. Their 
attachment to the dear self is less like self-love than it is like self-indulgence, and 
self-indulgence is something else entirely.120  
To illustrate this opposition, Frankfurt offers the example of the love that parents have for 
their children. “Parents who love their children,” he remarks, “take great care, if they are 
sensible, to avoid being indulgent.”121 While I agree with Frankfurt that sensible loving 
parents take care to avoid indulging their children, I think he’s wrong to suggest that parents 
must be sensible to be loving. Indeed, parental love can frustrate sensibility: if they didn’t 
love their children, I imagine that many parents would find it easier to avoid being indulgent. 
 For the same reason, we should be suspicious of accounts of self-love that locate its 
true form in the ideal. Just as loving another person can cause us to overlook their faults, so 
too can self-love move us to attend to only the prettiest portions of our personhood. Self-love 
thus only gets us part of the way to explaining how we owe it to ourselves to seek self-
knowledge for self-knowledge’s sake. While self-love gives us non-instrumental reasons to 
know ourselves, it does not tell us how we ought to act on those reasons.  
                                                     
120 Frankfurt, “The Dear Self,” in The Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 78.  
121 Ibid, 79. 
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Here, it is helpful to contrast the attention that Shakespeare’s self-lover pays to 
himself with a more ideal form of self-inquiry. As an example of the ideal, let us turn back to 
Rose, the protagonist in Munro’s The Beggar Maid. For all the lack of attention she paid to 
her husband Patrick, it is clear in the novel that she has the sort of self-insight that many of us 
strive towards. In one scene, Rose finds herself wondering why she dislikes a younger party 
hostess. While looking closely at the woman, Rose reveals her own self-awareness: 
On the other side of the spool bed was a large mirror, hung suspiciously high, and 
tilted. Rose tried to get a look at herself when the girl was bent over the basket. It is 
very hard to look in the mirror when there is another, and particularly a younger, 
woman in the room. Rose was wearing a flowered cotton dress, a long dress with a 
tucked bodice and puffed sleeves, which was too short in the waist and too tight in the 
bust to be comfortable. There was something wrongly youthful or theatrical about it; 
perhaps she was not slim enough to wear that style. Her reddish-brown hair was dyed 
at home. Lines ran both ways under her eyes, trapping little diamonds of darkened 
skin.122  
  
Rose knew by now that when she found people affected, as she did this girl… it was 
usually because she, Rose, hadn’t received and was afraid she wouldn’t receive the 
attention she wanted, hadn’t penetrated the party, felt that she might be doomed to 
hang around on the fringes of things, making judgments.123  
While Rose’s knowledge does not inspire any behavioral transformations—after noting her 
insecurity, she proceeds to seek out the very same type of attention that she wishes she didn’t 
crave from the other party-goers—there is nevertheless something to admire about it. Rose 
looks at herself in the mirror (quite literally) in order to see herself as she is, and not as she 
wants herself to be. In this way, she extends to herself the same careful attention that we 
hope our loved ones extend to us.  
                                                     
122 In this scene, Rose examines the hostess with the same type of ‘loving attention’ that M. directed towards D. 
in Iris Murdoch’s classic example (Beggar Maid, 312-313).  
123 Ibid, 157-158. 
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Rose’s attempts at self-scrutiny are admirable in a way that Shakespeare’s self-lover’s 
narcissistic navel-gazing is not. And the difference between Rose and the self-lover, I think, 
has to do with the seriousness with which each attends to their project of self-discovery. 
While Rose and the self-lover both love themselves and see themselves as worth knowing for 
the sake of knowing, only Rose takes seriously the task of knowing herself. And taking the 
ends we set for ourselves seriously, as demonstrated in the last chapter, is part of what it 
means to have respect for oneself as a person.   
Section 4: From Self-Love to Self-Respect 
In the last chapter, I discussed a notion of respect—which Darwall calls ‘recognition 
respect’124—that people are commonly believed to deserve simply because they are people. 
Because respect is something that we owe to people regardless of what relationships we share 
with them, it is something that we automatically owe to the people with whom we share 
loving relationships. To treat our loved ones as they deserve thus requires us to meet special 
obligations from them that stem from love’s reasons, and also to treat them with the respect 
that all persons are owed. This is why it is possible for loving relationships to be loving 
without being healthy: two spouses can love each other deeply, but their marriage will still be 
destructive if they do not treat each other with respect.125 Similarly, I cannot be said to be 
relating properly to myself if I don’t respect myself as a person. Thus, whatever else relating 
properly to oneself involves, it must necessarily involve self-respect.  
                                                     
124 I will be using ‘recognition respect’ and ‘respect’ synonymously in this section.  
125 For a similar take on the relation between the requirements of recognition respect and the requirements of 
loving relationships, see Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1998). While 
Scanlon uses different language to describe this relation, he does aptly observe that responding appropriately to 
one’s friends involves not just partiality and special affection, but also the recognition that they have “moral 
standing as persons, independent of our friendship, which also places limits on our behavior” (165).   
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In the interpersonal case, treating people with respect primarily involves non-
interference. We must, first, refrain from acting towards others in ways that are 
dehumanizing or degrading, and second, avoid unduly interfering in the decisions that they 
make for themselves about how to live.  To respect you, I shouldn’t humiliate you for my 
own entertainment, paternalistically meddle in your affairs, or force you to make the life 
choices that I think are best.   
 Interpersonal recognition respect, if anything, holds us back from knowing other 
people. It would be easier for me to get to know you if I could read your emails and diary 
entries. But the respect that I have for your privacy keeps me from hacking into your Gmail 
account or stealing your journal.126 While love can give us reasons to know other people, 
respect often prohibits us from taking the most direct route to that knowledge.  
 But while interpersonal respect can hold us back from knowing other people, self-
respect does not prevent us from knowing ourselves. It is disrespectful for me to read your 
diary without your consent because respecting you requires that I abide by your decision to 
keep certain things private from me. But there is no similar barrier when it comes to my own 
diary: I wrote it, and so I decide who gets to read it.  
Indeed, self-respect actually gives us a positive reason to strive to make sure that our 
attention to ourselves results in self-knowledge rather than empty self-flattery. This is 
because, while interpersonal respect often requires that we refrain from interfering in the 
decisions that other people make about how to live, self-respect carries with it the opposite 
                                                     
126 To be sure, love can also at times hold us back from invading our loved ones’ privacy. When we love 
someone, we are often disposed to please them and to abide by their wishes. But this is not a necessary feature 
of love; just as love can sometimes motivate us to respect our beloved’s wishes, so too can it sometimes 
motivate us to overstep our bounds and violate her privacy.  
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demand. It is a matter of self-respect, Robin Dillon notes, that we aspire to live in a way that 
that instantiates our “ideals, aspirations, commitments, and ‘points of no return’.”127 The 
rationale for this requirement of self-respect is both simple and intuitive: if I am to respect 
myself as a person, I must respect the decisions that I make about what kind of person I want 
to be, and doing that requires me to follow through with those decisions. If I fail too often to 
live in a way that instantiates the decisions that I’ve made about who I want to be, then I fail 
to respect those decisions, and by extension the person who made them.   
Respecting the decisions we make in life, of course, involves more than simply 
following through with them. Specifically, it also involves a willingness to follow through 
with them in the right sorts of ways, given the types of decisions they are. To see what I 
mean, consider why an athlete might describe her refusal to slack off during practices or her 
unwillingness to compete against opponents whom she knows she can easily beat as a matter 
of ‘self-respect’. In tying her self-respect to her athletic performance, the athlete is not 
pointing out a universal principle to which every rational agent is bound. Rather, she is 
drawing attention to the fact that there are better and worse ways to be an athlete. Given the 
importance that she places in being an athlete, she recognizes that respecting herself requires 
that she strive to live up to certain athletic ideals. When she fails to do this, she fails to take 
one of her central commitments, and by extension herself, as seriously as she ought to.  
In this regard, self-respect actually demands that we work to overcome some of the 
greatest obstacles to self-love. Consider, for instance, the spiral of self-hatred that we can fall 
                                                     
127 Dillon, “Lose Your Self-Respect,” 134. See also Dillon, “Self-Forgiveness and Self-Respect,” Ethics 112, 
no. 1 (2001): 53–83, Thomas E. Hill, “Self-Respect Reconsidered,” in Autonomy and Self-Respect (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23–4 and Bennett W. Helm, Love Friendship, & the Self (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 133. 
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into when our acts depart too radically from our values and commitments. The leftist who 
takes a job at a corporation with a history of human rights abuses in the developing world, for 
instance, may come to loathe herself for violating her political principles. And with this self-
loathing often comes a loss of self-investment: if she’s such a hypocrite, the leftist might 
think to herself, why should she care about honoring her principles or investing in her 
personal projects in the future? But self-respect demands exactly this kind of care. To treat 
ourselves with respect, we must continue to strive for the same ideals that we may have 
fallen short of in the past. In this way, self-respect demands both that we act in ways that will 
make us more loveable to ourselves, and also that we be invested in ourselves and our lives 
in the way that self-loving agents naturally are.  
It is here that we can locate the distinction between Rose and Shakespeare’s 
narcissistic self-lover. Both have been moved by self-love to commit themselves to a project 
of self-discovery.128 As with any project, there are standards that one must meet in order to 
properly pursue self-knowledge. The respectful self-discoverer shouldn’t go too easy on 
herself in her pursuit of self-awareness. She should be willing to confront harsh truths, and to 
accept that some parts of her self-conception might need to change in light of new evidence. 
And this is what Rose does. When she looks at herself with a critical eye, she takes seriously 
one of her ends. Self-love may have driven her to set self-knowledge as an end, but self-
respect propels her to pursue it in the right way. In pursuing self-knowledge in this way, Rose 
affirms that her ends (of which self-knowledge is one) are important enough to her that 
                                                     
128 It is an open question how we should characterize the end that Shakespeare’s self-lover sets for himself. He 
may have set self-knowledge as an end, which he then failed to realize. Or he may merely believe that he set 
self-knowledge as an end, when in reality have set something else—selective self-attention, the maintenance of 
a favorable self-image—as his end.  
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they’re worth doing right. Shakespeare’s self-lover, by contrast, pursues his project of self-
discovery in a way that shows no similar self-respect. That Shakespeare’s self-lover pays 
such selective and biased attention himself suggests that he doubts, on some level at least, 
that his actual self is worth the effort it would take to get to know.   
In the last chapter of The Beggar Maid, Rose recalls a moment in her childhood when 
her teacher, fed up with her unwillingness to follow instructions, asked of her “Who do you 
think you are?” That this question can be an admonishment to not get too full of oneself, 
along with an encouragement towards self-examination,129 reflects the extent to which self-
respect, self-love, and self-knowledge are intertwined in our relationship with ourselves. 
Self-love moves us to look closely at ourselves, while self-respect arrests our tendency to 
fixate on the prettiest parts of our image while ignoring our warts. To take seriously the 
project of figuring out who we are, and to see that project as worth doing for its own sake, is 
thus not a symptom of narcissistic self-obsession, but rather part of what it is to stand in a 
healthy loving relationship with oneself.    
Conclusion: The ‘Substance’ of Substantial Self-Knowledge 
We are now in a position to return to my earlier claim about the unity of the category 
of substantial self-knowledge. Recall that in the introduction to this dissertation I noted that 
not all self-knowledge is worth having for its own sake. Indeed, the person who thinks that 
there is something non-instrumentally valuable about knowing how many of his friends are 
                                                     
129 For a discussion of this passage in The Beggar Maid, see Per Seyersted, “‘Who Do You Think You Are?’ 
Alice Munro and the Place of Origin,” American Studies in Scandinavia 24 (1992), 21–2. As Seyersted points 
out, ‘Who Do You Think You Are?’ was actually the original title of the novel. Meanwhile, according to 
Munro, Rose’s greatest accomplishment in the novel is gaining the ability to answer this formerly titular 
question: while she does not get “the obvious things, the things she thinks she wants,” Munro notes, Rose does 
get “a knowledge of herself.” See “What Is” in For Openers: Conversations with 24 Canadian Writers, ed. 
Alan Twigg (Madeira Park, BC: Harbour Publishing, 1981), 19. 
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more beautiful than him, or how far away he is from the North Pole at any given moment is 
either condemnably self-absorbed or psychologically bizarre. In contrast, the type of self-
knowledge that Cassam calls ‘substantial self-knowledge’ is, I think, something that we have 
non-instrumental reason to want. We need not appeal to instrumental considerations, for 
instance, to explain why we are interested in figuring out why we made the major life 
decisions that we made, or whether we actually value what we purport to value.  
What unites these types of self-knowledge into a distinctive category, and grants them 
their special value? The parts of ourselves that are worth knowing for the sake of knowing, I 
think, are the parts that are most directly relevant to the relationship that we have with 
ourselves. And this relationship is a relationship that we have with a person. Persons are, in 
essence, in the business of setting ends for themselves. Our identity as individual persons, in 
turn, is shaped by the ends that we have set for ourselves. Given that the reasons that we have 
for wanting certain types of self-knowledge for their own sake are bound up in what it means 
to be in a healthy relationship with a person, it is no coincidence that the types of self-
knowledge that Cassam labels ‘substantial’ are those types that speak most directly to our 
personhood.   
This gives us the resources to explain why certain types of self-knowledge are not 
substantial. Just as you can learn your best friend’s blood type without feeling that you have 
learned anything about her, so too can you learn the exact size of your kidney or that you put 
our left sock on first this morning without feeling that you know yourself any better as a 
result. When we discover something about our values, talents, preferences, significant life 
events or motivations, in contrast, we do in fact learn something meaningful about the ends 
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that we have set for ourselves over the course of our lives, and thus about the person with 
whom we share our intrapersonal relationship.  
Of course, not every fact about our motivations and life story will be equally 
interesting to us. What ends we set at a particular time in our life will influence what topics 
of self-inquiry matter to us most. As an image-obsessed teenager, you were probably more 
invested in figuring out where your pop-culture loyalties truly lay than you are now. Having 
a child, meanwhile, can make facts about your own childhood fascinating to you in a new 
way. A modest person, meanwhile, simply won’t care to know exactly how beautiful she is, 
or how much her colleagues admire her.130 But whatever parts of yourself are particularly 
interesting to you given your life stage and circumstances, you will have a reason to know 
more about those parts that does not depend on the instrumental benefits that knowing them 
might bring to you. To be motivated to know yourself for the sake of knowing yourself is 
part of what it means to love yourself, which in turn is part of what it takes to properly relate 
to yourself. And properly relating to yourself, by loving yourself and respectfully acting on 
love’s reasons, is something that we should all strive to do.  
 
                                                     
130 By delineating the category of substantial self-knowledge, I am able to explain why a non-instrumental 
commitment to knowing oneself is consistent with virtues of character like modesty and humility. If we 
modesty as involving either a lack of beliefs about one’s worth or an indifference towards certain types of 
information about herself, then we can see why a person can simultaneously be modest and non-instrumentally 
committed to knowing herself. A non-instrumental commitment to knowing oneself for the sake of knowing 
oneself, after all, does not require that we be interested in knowing everything about ourselves. That being said, 
my account is inconsistent with Julia Driver’s account of modesty as involving underestimations about one’s 
self-worth. For Driver, the modest agent is not simply someone who lacks beliefs, or is uninterested in forming 
beliefs about her greatness. Rather, the modest person is someone who actually falsely believes herself to be 
less wonderful than she actually is. Driver argues for this account in “The Virtues of Ignorance,” Journal of 
Philosophy 86 (1989): 373–84 and “Modesty and Ignorance,” Ethics 109 (1999): 827–34. Driver’s 
interpretation of modesty as a virtue of ignorance has been scrutinized by philosophers such as G.F. Schueler, 
“Why Modesty is a Virtue,” Ethics 107 (1997): 467–85, Daniel Statman, “Modesty, Pride and Realistic Self-
Assessment,” Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1992): 420–38, and Owen Flanagan, “Virtue and Ignorance,” 
Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 420–28. 
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CHAPTER 3: SELF-DECEPTION AS A PERVERSION OF VALUING 
Introduction 
In Chapter 2, I developed an account of self-respect that takes into consideration the 
reasons that we have to respect ourselves as epistemically rational, and not simply practically 
rational, agents. Self-respect does not simply demand that we refrain from degrading, or 
letting others degrade, ourselves. Rather, it also demands that we be properly invested in 
ourselves as rational end-setters. We must, to start, be willing to hold ourselves accountable 
to standards of epistemic and practical reason: we shouldn’t, in other words, simply form 
beliefs, but should endeavor to form good beliefs. And we shouldn’t merely set goals for 
ourselves and act in certain ways; rather, we should care about setting good ends for 
ourselves. Finally, I argued that self-respect requires self-investment: the self-respecting 
agent is one who is properly invested in her personal projects, commitments, opinions and so 
forth. She doesn’t abandon her goals too easily, and she doesn’t go easy on herself when 
pursuing those goals.  
 In the last chapter, I located a source of non-instrumental reasons that we have to seek 
self-knowledge. These reasons are reasons of love. To love something is in part to have 
reason to want to know it for the sake of knowing it. While loving someone does not by itself 
demand that we actually act on these reasons, being in a loving relationship with someone—
be it ourselves or someone else—can require that we do so. I then explained why self-respect 
actually demands that we strive to make ourselves into people whom we can find loveable, 
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and that we extend to ourselves the sort of partiality that is in part definitive of self-love. 
Self-respect, in other words, requires that we cultivate self-love, which in turn gives us 
reasons to know ourselves for the sake of knowing ourselves. To set self-knowledge as an 
ongoing end worth pursuing for its own sake, then, is to respectfully honor one of the 
commitments that self-love moves us to make. To be invested in going about this project in 
the right sort of way, in turn, is to affirm one’s status as an epistemically rational agent 
deserving of epistemic respect from oneself as well as from others.  
 In this chapter, I consider what, if anything, is so wrong about self-deception. To 
spoil the punch-line of this chapter—I will conclude, ultimately, that self-deception is a type 
of epistemic self-disrespect that often involves our identity-constituting ends. In this regard, 
self-respect involves what I will call a ‘perversion of valuing’ insofar as it simultaneously 
relates to the ends we value most while also impeding our ability to ever achieve, or even 
properly engage with, those ends. I will argue, however, that not all cases of self-deception 
have this feature—some, in fact, can be part of what it takes for us to engage appropriately 
with the ends we have set for ourselves.  
 My chapter will proceed as follows. First, I’m going to look closer at the phenomenon 
of self-deception, and identify six desiderata that I think a successful account of the morality 
of self-deception ought to meet. Next, I will consider alternate answers to the question of 
what makes self-deception morally wrong. My aim in this section is not to dismiss any of 
these alternate accounts, but rather to make clear some of their limits and deficiencies. From 
there, I will construct my own account of self-deception—the ‘Perverse Valuing’ Account—
that meets the desiderata described in section one.   
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Section 1: The Desiderata of a Successful Account 
What does it take to successfully explain the moral dimension of self-deception? To 
answer this, let’s get a little clearer on what exactly makes self-deception morally interesting.  
Desideratum 1: Moral Relevance 
First, self-deception strikes most of us as morally relevant in a way that most other 
failures of self-knowledge are not. Most of the time, we think that there is nothing wrong 
about having a few false beliefs about what you’re like, forgetting the odd childhood 
memory, or jumping too quickly to conclusions about why you acted the way you acted. We 
are, in the end, imperfect epistemic agents with a limited amount of time and a number of 
competing practical and epistemic ends. Our inevitable failure to have a fully complete, fully 
accurate set of beliefs about ourselves simply speaks to this fact. And yet, many philosophers 
through history have often insisted that there is something deeply wrong about being self-
deceived. Self-deception, despite involving false beliefs about the self, is according to Butler, 
Smith, Kant and others, a distinctly moral failing.  
Desideratum 2: Moral Uniqueness 
Self-deception has often been considered to be a unique sort of moral failing. Pascal, 
for instance, wrote that while ‘It is no doubt an evil to be full of faults…it is a still greater 
evil to be full of them and unwilling to recognize them, since this entails the further evil of 
deliberate self-delusion’. We can generate some thought experiments to sharpen his intuition. 
Consider first Percy, the unapologetically awful person:  
Percy will do almost anything to get what he wants. He lied to his girlfriend about 
how many previous relationships he had had in order to get her into bed on the first 
date. He donates to charities, but only when his donations will improve his social 
standing. He keeps a counterfeit disability parking permit in his car so that he can be 
sure to always get the ‘choice’ parking spots. He has even repeatedly sabotaged his 
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coworkers in order to get promoted over them. Percy knows that he’s unscrupulous. 
When asked to justify his deplorable actions, he’ll tell you ‘I know I’m no saint, but if 
looking out for myself means I have to be a bad guy, I’m going to be a bad guy.’  
Now, Larry: 
Like Percy, Larry is a man with hazardously few scruples. He is quick to lie, cheat, 
steal, and sabotage to get what he wants. Despite his actions, Larry continues to 
believe that he’s a morally upright person. When faced with evidence that contradicts 
his self-assessment, he is quick to offer alternate interpretations. ‘Sure, I sabotaged 
Sally’s work,’ he says, ‘but only because I knew that she was too emotionally fragile 
to handle the additional responsibilities of a promotion. I did it for her benefit, not 
mine.’  
The difference between Larry and Percy, in short, is that Larry is self-deceived about his 
moral shortcomings, while Percy is not. Now, nobody would hold Larry or Percy up as moral 
exemplars. They are, as I have already said, both deplorable. And yet, at least some of us will 
find Larry to be morally off-putting in a way that Percy is not. Why is this? There is a sense 
in which the self-deceived are doubly morally condemnable. Percy is morally condemnable 
because he’s acted wrongly; Larry is morally condemnable both because he’s acted wrongly, 
and because he doesn’t know it.  
 Self-deception also seems morally distinguishable from other failures of self-
knowledge. Some failures, of course, seem wholly innocuous: we can forget insignificant 
events that happened to us many years ago, or we can form false beliefs about ourselves 
based on inaccurate evidence that other people have given us. Other failures seem to be the 
result of morally-assessable epistemic negligence. Sometimes we jump too quickly to 
conclusions about ourselves, or are too willing to believe what others tell us about ourselves. 
A person who routinely fails to know herself for these sorts of reasons may, as I have 
suggested in Chapter 1, be charged with having set inappropriately low epistemic standards 
for herself. But even if someone’s self-deception occurs in large part because she has set low 
epistemic standards for herself, I think it would be a mistake to suggest that her failure to 
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know herself is morally equivalent to a gullible person’s failure to know herself. At the very 
least, we typically direct a level of criticism at the former person that would be out of place if 
directed at the latter.  
Desideratum 3: Moral Content 
Third, the presence of self-deception seems itself to add moral content to non-moral 
situations. Again, consider two contrasting cases:  
When Gloria signed up three months ago to run a 10k with her friends, she was 
out of shape and undertrained. In the intervening months, she did nothing to 
rectify either of these impediments: she didn’t train, or try to improve her health. 
And so, it comes as no surprise to anyone (including Gloria), that on the day of 
the race, she finds herself huffing and puffing after only running 200 meters, and 
decides to quit before she reaches the one-kilometer mark.  
Now consider Penny,  
Like Gloria, Penny was out of shape and undertrained when she agreed to sign up 
for a 10k race with her friends. And like Gloria, she spent the three months 
leading up to the race doing nothing to increase her chances of being able to 
complete it. When the race day is finally upon her, Penny finds herself huffing 
and puffing through the 200 meters of the route, and decides to bow out before 
she finishes the first kilometer. Penny’s performance should come as a surprise to 
nobody, but in fact, it does come as a surprise to Penny. Despite having never run 
10k, and despite being generally unfit, Penny nevertheless ardently believed that 
she’d be able to cross the finish line. Indeed, after the race, she blames anything 
and anyone but herself for her poor performance. Her shoes were too loose, her 
laces too tight, she was dehydrated and under-slept, she found the other runners 
distracting, there should have been more aid stations along the course and so 
forth. Certainly, she thinks to herself, her poor performance had absolutely 
nothing to do with her.  
Morally speaking, it is hard to see what could possibly be wrong with not finishing a 10k. 
And yet, I think that Penny’s self-deception gives her failure some moral content that 
Gloria’s failure lacks. Her self-deception invites moral judgments. Many of us will likely 
think that she shouldn’t have had her head so deeply in the sand, and that she ought to 
acknowledge the real reasons that she failed to complete the race, and that her self-deception 
reflects badly on her as a person.  
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Desideratum 4: Range of Reactive Attitudes 
In addition to having a negative moral reaction towards Penny, we may also feel a 
range of non-moral reactive attitudes towards her. Her self-deception may, for instance, 
provoke feelings of pity and empathy in others. The latter two attitudes can at times be 
motivational: we may find ourselves wanting to help the self-deceiver maintain her self-
deceived beliefs, or we may find ourselves wishing that we could free her of her self-
deception. A nuanced account of self-deception’s moral dimension will, in part, involve a 
sensitivity to the range of attitudes that we can reasonably have towards self-deceivers.  
Desideratum 5: Exceptions  
Self-deception often has the power to transform morally neutral actions into morally 
bad ones, and make morally bad actions a little worse. But this is not universally true of self-
deception. Indeed, some cases of self-deception seem completely morally innocuous. A 
fledgling stand-up comedian might deceive herself about just how well her first open mic 
night really went. In reality, she bombed, but in her own mind she did alright. This self-
deception might be what she needs in order to work up the confidence to do more open mic 
nights, thus sharpening her comedic chops. While the most dogmatic amongst us might still 
see something wrong with her self-deception, I personally do not. We all, I think, 
occasionally need to inflate our egos in order to work up the courage to make valuable life 
changes and start daunting projects. And there are even cases of self-deception that seem 
morally beyond reproach. Consider the mother who, in order to maintain her psychological 
wellbeing while caring for her terminally ill child, retains a self-deceived belief that there is 
still some possibility that a cure will become available. The situation that this mother finds 
herself within is so devastating, that it would be horrendous to judge her for her failure to 
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fully face the facts. A successful account of the morality of self-deception must be nuanced 
enough to explain why not all instances of the phenomenon are morally on a par. 
Desideratum 6: Coherence with Epistemological Theories of Self-Deception 
 Finally, I think that a successful account of the morality of self-deception will either 
have a means of settling the epistemological questions that arise when we try to conceive of 
how self-deception is possible, or will be able to remain neutral between the two leading 
answers to this question. In this account, I’m aiming for neutrality. Briefly, there are two 
philosophical schools of thought about how we can come to be self-deceived. The first 
school of thought, the Intentionalist Account, models self-deception after interpersonal 
deception. To be self-deceived is to have some sort of bifurcated self, such that one part of 
yourself deceives the other part.  
The Intentionalist Account is broadly believed to give rise to a few paradoxes 
regarding how one can possibly convince oneself to believe something one knows to be false, 
and for this reason some philosophers have abandoned it in favor of a Motivationalist 
Account of self-deception. According to the Motivationalist, self-deception is the result of 
biased evidence-gathering and interpreting procedures. A self-deceived agent, Sally, wants p 
to be true, collects evidence about the truth-value of p, and then unintentionally interprets 
that evidence a way that supports her desire for p to be true. Sally thus ends up believing that 
p is true on the basis of her interpretation of that evidence, even though the full body of that 
evidence better supports the truth of ~P. I will discuss both accounts of self-deception in 
greater detail later in this chapter.  
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Section 2: What’s So Wrong With Self-Deception?  
What, if anything, is morally wrong about self-deception? One might first try to 
answer this question by considering the sorts of effects that self-deception can have on both 
the self-deceived agent and her moral community at large.   
The Autonomy Account 
To see what’s so wrong with self-deception, we might first consider the deleterious 
effect that interpersonal deception, broadly construed, is typically believed to have on an 
agent’s autonomy. When I deceive you about what your circumstances are like, I undermine 
your ability to make choices for yourself. If I falsely tell you that there’s no job opening at 
your dream department, you won’t know to apply. If I manipulate you into falsely believing 
that you have no talent as a singer, you may lose out on the chance to have a fruitful singing 
career. Similarly, self-deception often frustrates our ability to make informed choices. If 
Penny can’t see that she is out of shape, she also won’t be able to see herself as having reason 
to get into shape. In this way, Penny’s self-deceived beliefs serve to restrict the courses of 
actions that she is able to perceive as being available and desirable.   
We must question, however, whether this sort of infringement on autonomy is 
morally objectionable in the very same way that the infringement caused by interpersonal 
deception is objectionable. The problem with interpersonal deception, after all, is not simply 
that it restricts its target’s autonomy. Lots of things do that without being morally 
problematic: My decision to withhold information from you to which you are not strictly 
entitled may frustrate your ability to make informed choices about how to act, but it doesn’t 
follow from this that I have wronged you in any way. The problem with interpersonal 
deception is rather that it infringes upon an agent’s autonomy in a way to which she could 
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not possibly consent—if she were to consent to the infringement, after all, she would no 
longer be deceived. But self-deception does not have the same consent issue. If we assume 
that we are capable of intentionally deceiving ourselves, then the autonomy objection 
disappears. If self-deception is something that we intentionally cultivate, as the Intentionalist 
View suggests, then the affront that it may cause to our autonomy will presumably be 
morally on a par to the affront that willful ignorance can cause to our autonomy. Since there 
is nothing in principle wrong about willful ignorance—I can, for instance, permissibly 
choose not to look at the results of my genetic testing, even if these results would give me 
important insight into how my life will go—then presumably there is also nothing in 
principle wrong about self-deception. In both cases, after all, it is me—the autonomous 
agent—who is ultimately choosing to restrict the potential courses of action available to me 
in future.   
 Nor is the autonomy objection particularly strong if one accepts the Motivationalist 
Account of self-deception. We allow our desires to influence the courses of actions that we 
perceive as being available to us all the time. Your desire to only date people older than you, 
for instance, might cause you to overlook some younger, but otherwise promising, suitors. 
Even if you never realize the effect that this desire is having on your perception of the dating 
pool, it would be hard to say it is restricting your autonomy in a morally problematic way.  
 Still, there might be a slippery slope to be found here. Self-deception, as Marcia 
Baron has pointed out, is often habit forming.131 To maintain my self-deceived belief that I 
                                                     
131Marcia Baron, “What Is Wrong with Self-Deception?” in eds. B.P. McLaughlin and A.O. Rorty  Perspectives 
on Self-Deception (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 437–40. Baron ultimately denies that acts of 
self-deception are wrong as such, claiming instead that they are wrong either because they serve to shield an 
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can sing like a songbird, for instance, may require me to also deceive myself into thinking 
that my electric tuner is malfunctioning, that I didn’t get a part in the musical because the 
director was intimidated by me, and that the naysayers are all tone-deaf. Eventually, these 
self-deceptions may radically erode my ability to form reasonable beliefs about the world, 
and thus to act autonomously. If my view of myself and the world I occupy is too thoroughly 
warped, I simply won’t be able to make informed decisions about how to act within it. At 
some point in this process, I will be actively harming the very capacities of my personhood 
that I ought to be respecting.  
 Baron is right to categorize extreme cases of self-deception as affronts to an agent’s 
autonomy. But it would be a mistake to generalize here: most of the time, self-deceptive 
beliefs restrict our capacity for autonomous action only to an extent which is normally seen 
as morally permissible. Likewise, while self-deception is often habit-forming, this isn’t 
necessarily so. Some of our self-deceived beliefs can remain relatively self-contained and 
temporally isolated: we might adopt them while navigating our way through a period of 
crisis, and abandon them once the storm has cleared.132 And yet, even these sorts of cases can 
strike many of us as morally problematic. Dale’s self-deceived belief about his wife’s fidelity 
might not unduly restrict his autonomy, and it might not be part of a larger habit of self-
                                                     
agent from important responsibilities or because they corrode a person’s belief-formation process, and thus 
ultimately his agency. 
132 Sartre would deny this, insisting instead that self-deception is endemic to the human condition, and that self-
awareness consists not in the eradication of self-deception, but in the choice to acknowledge its intractability. It 
is clear that Sartre is labelling as ‘self-deception’ a phenomenon that is very different from the one that interests 
me at present. To quote Amélie Oksenberg Rorty on Sartrean self-deception: Sartre’s account “is well and good, 
or at any rate, it is whatever it is. What it cannot be, or purport to be, is an account of those beliefs about oneself 
that are more specifically self-deceptive than others. If everything one says about oneself is constitutive of a 
choice rather than a descriptive, questions of truth and validity cannot arise at all. Self-deception, in the 
narrower sense…disappears altogether.” “Belief and Self-Deception,” 398. 
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dissembling. And yet, I think most of us feel sorry for him both for the fact that his wife isn’t 
faithful and for the fact that he doesn’t know it. There’s something bad about being a Dale 
that transcends the effect that Dale’s self-deception can have on his capacity for autonomous 
action. If we want a general moral objection to self-deception, then, we will need to look 
elsewhere.  
The Moral Harm Account 
 Perhaps we can object to self-deception by demonstrating how it has the capacity to 
silence the voice of our conscience. This objection, which I will call the ‘Moral Harm’ 
objection was most famously developed by Bishop Joseph Butler. On Butler’s charge, self-
deception allows us to let ourselves off the hook from the pangs of conscience that typically 
accompany the performance of an immoral action.133  
 There are two ways to develop the Moral Harm Objection. The first draws a 
connection between self-deception and interpersonal harm: presumably, if you don’t feel 
guilty for past moral actions, you’re more likely to hurt more people in future. There is 
something quite plausible about this idea: the pangs of a guilty conscience, after all, often 
work as a deterrent to future immoral action. The fact that you’d feel terrible if you 
sabotaged your kind and competent colleague’s chances of promotion, for instance, should 
typically be enough to dissuade you from starting a slanderous rumor about what she does in 
the break room after hours. But if you are able to deceive yourself into thinking that such an 
action isn’t really wrong, you’ll have a much easier time starting the rumor. 
                                                     
133 Butler, Sermons, 113-125.  
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 Let’s call this version of the objection Moral Harm-1. While there is, as I have said, 
something plausible about it, we should be careful not to overstate the deleterious effect that 
self-deceivers can have on the world. One ironic feature of self-deception is that its presence 
is often apparent to everyone but the self-deceiver.134 Given that self-deception is sometimes 
so painfully obvious to everybody but the self-deceiver, it can at times actually frustrate the 
self-deceiver’s ability to cause harm to others. If I know that you’re self-deceived about how 
callous you really are, I’ll adjust my relationship to you in a way that minimizes the amount 
of moral harm that you can do to me.  
This last point seems to narrow the class of self-deceptions that are genuinely morally 
harmful: while subtle self-deception carries with an increased possibility of immoral action, 
overblown self-deception that is obvious to others does not. But if this is true, and if only 
subtle self-deception is condemnable according to Moral Harm-1, then it will turn out to be 
the case that self-deception actually has only a small role to play in the objection. Subtle self-
deceivers present a moral threat to others not because they’re self-deceived, but because their 
self-deception isn’t obvious to others. A lack of transparency can be morally threatening even 
when it isn’t accompanied by self-deception. The conniving politician who is adept at 
appearing sincere typically poses a greater threat than the conniving politician who isn’t.  
                                                     
134 As William Ruddick argues in “Social Self-Deception,” in Perspectives on Self-Deception, eds. B. P. 
McLauglin and A. O. Rorty, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) self-deceptions is often sustained 
through social interactions. Other people can, through concern for our well-being or mere politeness, support 
the fictions that we have come to believe about ourselves. As well, self-deception can be a joint effort:  
Self-deception is simpler when others are similarly engaged. If we have any scruples about our 
projects, joint action will suppress them, or at least discourage their expression. No one acting in 
concert has an interest in speaking, or producing evidence, against the false belief or questionable 
desire that each person wants to maintain. (383) 
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 We might be troubled by the ability that self-deception gives us to silence the voice of 
conscience for another reason. Conscience is not just valuable as a deterrent to future 
immoral action. Rather, it can also have a retributive value. The problem with the self-
deceiver, then, may not simply be that she is prone to future moral violations, but also that 
she has not been punished for her current violations. She was able to do the crime, in other 
words, without having to pay the fine of an angry conscience. Let’s call this Moral Harm-2. 
I think there’s something intuitive about Moral Harm-2. We all have uncomfortable 
truths about ourselves that we’d rather not reckon with, and we may resent self-deceivers for 
having found a means of not reckoning with them. But the criticism, as it stands, is 
underdeveloped. To illustrate its incompleteness, let us go back to one of the initial 
examples: Larry, the man who is self-deceived about the quality of his moral character. We 
can accuse Larry of ‘doing the crime without paying the fine’: he is, after all, able to pull off 
any number of moral misdeeds without having to reckon with the fact that he’s a horrible 
person. But self-deception isn’t the only way that one can avoid having to listen to the 
chastising voice of conscience. Recall that Percy, Larry’s non-self-deceived analogue, is also 
able to commit crimes without feeling guilty. But unlike Larry, who accomplishes this 
through self-deception, Percy avoids the fines simply by not caring about whether or not he’s 
immoral. If self-deception is wrong, then it isn’t distinctly wrong. Rather, it’s wrong in the 
very same way that moral apathy can be wrong, viz. that it provides a way for us to act 
immorally without experiencing any self-reproach.  
Note that both versions of the Moral Harm Objection assume a particular picture of 
the self-deceived agent. As Mike Martin notes, it vividly captures what’s wrong with 
characters like Albert Speer, Hitler’s minister of armaments and war productions. Speer, 
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Martin notes, was not a moral monster. Rather, he was a “talented architect and bureaucrat, a 
loving family man, and considerate to his circle of friends” who nevertheless “managed to 
remain blind to some of the most horrifying proceedings of the third Reich” and to the role 
that he played in those proceedings.135 But not all self-deceivers are like Speer. Often, we 
deceive ourselves about things that are morally neutral—our musicality or likeability, how 
successful we’ll probably be on the job market, or whether we really enjoy the activities we 
purport to take pleasure in. Sometimes, these morally innocuous self-deceptions might be 
habit-forming in the way that Baron discussed. And sometimes, they’ll eventually lead 
people to ignore the call of conscience. But often they won’t: for every one Speer, there are 
probably thousands of Penny’s who are self-deceived about their looks, habits, and 
relationships, but not about the morality of their actions.  
Given this, if we want either version of the objection to succeed, we’ll have to explain 
why self-deception can be morally condemnable even when it concerns non-moral matters. 
This, however, is easier said than done. To go back from another example in this chapter, we 
can certainly say that Penny, by being self-deceived, has managed to avoid the self-
chastisement that most of us perform when we realize how acutely our unhealthy habits have 
affected our bodies. But we might wonder whether this chastisement is moral chastisement, 
and also whether it’s chastisement that we really shouldn’t expect or demand that others feel. 
There might also be a feminist objection that can be raised to this variety of self-
chastisement: we might worry that we only expect Penny to chastise herself for being out of 
                                                     
135 Mike W. Martin, Self-Deception and Morality, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 38. 
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shape because we’ve internalized some morally objectionable social norms about how 
women should feel about their bodies. 
For Moral Harm-2 to work as a description of what is morally wrong with Penny, 
we’ll have to be able to show both that self-chastisement in situations such as hers is 
appropriate, and also that it’s distinctly moral self-chastisement. But even if we do this, we’ll 
run into the same problem that we found in the Larry and Percy case. There are, once again, 
many ways in which we can ignore the voice of our conscience. We might imagine a person, 
Margie, who is like Penny in a number of relevant ways, but who simply doesn’t care about 
being fit. She too gets all the pleasure that comes from never having to go to the gym. And 
she also gets to avoid grappling with the unpleasant realization that she’s out of shape simply 
by denying that this realization is in fact unpleasant. There might still be something wrong 
with avoiding the fines of one’s bad actions in the way described, but I think it’s different 
than what’s going on in the case of self-deception. At very least, Margie and Percy are 
admirable in a way that Larry and Penny are not. This asymmetry in evaluation, I think, is a 
fruitful place to start an account of the wrongness of self-deception. To understand why 
Penny’s case is worse than Margie’s, we must first figure out why valuing something about 
which one is self-deceived is, in some ways, worse than not valuing that thing at all.  
 Margie and Penny’s cases bring out something that is missing from both versions of 
the Moral Harm Account. While both versions may deal well enough with moralized cases of 
self-deception, they struggle to capture non-moralized forms of the phenomenon without 
appealing to some version of an improbable slippery slope argument. And neither can explain 
why self-deception seems like an especially morally unsavory way to restrict one’s autonomy 
or evade self-punishment. I want to suggest here that, when we condemn people like Penny 
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and Larry, we do so without having to think about the consequences that their self-deception 
will have on the world, their autonomy, or their moral characters. Their self-deception 
doesn’t need to lead to pernicious consequences, but is rather quite often in and of itself a 
moral failing. The question then is: what kind of failing is it?  
Section 3: Self-Deception, Self-Respect, Self-Love 
Perhaps we can capture the inherent moral wrongness of self-deception by 
understanding it as a failure of epistemic self-respect. Or perhaps we can say that the self-
deceiver has failed herself insofar as she has shown herself to be indifferent, and even 
hostile, to self-knowledge.  
Self-Deception as Epistemic Self-Disrespect 
Let us start by developing that first line of argument. As I have previously argued, the 
reasons that we have to respect ourselves as rational agents extend to our epistemic 
rationality. And so, just as we ought to care that we’re making sufficiently respectful 
decisions about how to live, so too should we care that we’re forming our beliefs in a way 
that is appropriately respectful of our epistemic capacities. If self-respect demands that I not 
stay in an abusive relationship just because I love the person with whom I share it, so too 
does it require that I not simply believe things because I want them to be true.  
 How exactly does the self-deceiver fail to treat herself with epistemic respect? The 
answer to this question depends on how you conceive of self-deception. I briefly alluded to 
the two leading theories: the Intentionalist Account and the Motivationalist Account, but I’ll 
pause now to describe both in greater detail. 
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The Motivationalist and the Intentionalist 
To understand what is going when we deceive ourselves, let us first pause to 
appreciate what is going when we deceive other people. To begin, interpersonal deception 
involves at least two people: one who does the deceiving, and one who is deceived. The 
deceiver in this equation has some belief, p, but intends to lead the deceived to believe ~p. 
He accomplishes, or tries to accomplish this goal by saying or doing something that he thinks 
will cause the deceived to believe ~p.  
 Interpersonal deception is not a philosophically mysterious phenomenon. We can 
quibble over the minutiae—by asking, for instance, whether it’s still interpersonal deception 
if the deceiver intends only to make the deceived doubt p, or whether we can deceive others 
through actions, rather than words—but the basic phenomenon is both familiar and 
straightforward. We understand why people sometimes want to convince others to believe 
propositions that they themselves believe to be false, and we know what sorts of actions we 
need to perform in order to get people to believe what we want them to believe.  
 But whereas interpersonal deception is philosophically straightforward, its 
intrapersonal counterpart is not. Consider what happens when we try to adapt the description 
of interpersonal deception given above to account for the phenomenon of self-deception. 
Suddenly, we have a single agent two both believes p, intends to believe ~p, and who acts 
and talks in such a way as to convince himself to believe ~p. This description of self-
deception seems paradoxical for two reasons.136 First, it requires a single agent to 
                                                     
136 For a more detailed discussion of these paradoxes, see Alfred Mele, Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-
Deception, and Self-Control (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) and “Recent Work on Self-
Deception,” American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): 1–17. 
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simultaneously believe two contradictory propositions. Such a mental state seems to be 
impossible, and yet it also seems to be required if we are to understand self-deception as 
analogous to interpersonal deception.137 Second, this model seems to require self-deceivers to 
perform an impossible task.138 If I intentionally undertake a project of deceiving myself, after 
all, my project would presumably be necessarily self-defeating. In the interpersonal case, my 
attempt to deceive you into believe ~p will fail if you find out about my plan. And yet, once 
again, if we model self-deception after interpersonal deception, then we seem to be forced to 
accept that this apparently-hopeless project is actually capable of succeeding.  
 The apparently contradictory nature of self-deception has led some philosophers to 
deny its very possibility.139 More commonly, however, the paradoxes of self-deception have 
spurred philosophers to action, motivating them to generate new, non-paradoxical accounts 
of the phenomenon. Roughly, we can partition these accounts into two camps. In the first 
camp, we will find accounts that seek to evade the paradoxes of self-deception by making it 
more strongly analogous to interpersonal deception (‘The Intentionalist Account’), while in 
the second, we will find accounts that seek to show that self-deception is disanalogous to 
interpersonal deception in some way that renders it non-paradoxical (‘The Motivationalist 
Account’).  
                                                     
137Mele, Irrationality, 121. Mele calls this paradox the ‘Paradox of Belief’.  
138 Ibid, 138. Mele calls this paradox the ‘Strategy Paradox.’  
139 For examples of this sort of account, see Stanley Paluch “Self-Deception,” Inquiry 10 (1967): 268–78, M.R. 
Haight A Study of Self-Deception (Sussex UK: Harvester Press, 1980) and David Kipp, “On Self-Deception,” 
Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1980): 305–317; Note however that Paluch does not deny that there is some 
phenomenon that we can reasonably call self-deception. Rather, he denies that it is possible to be self-deceived 
in precisely the same way that it is possible to be interpersonally deceived (276). In the end, Paluch endorses a 
model of self-deception that is quite close to the one that Mele outlines two decades later (Mele, Irrationality). 
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 Let’s look at the first type of account. Recall that there is nothing paradoxical about 
interpersonal deception: it is easy to see how two people could hold contradictory beliefs, 
and how one person, A, could trick another, B, into believing something that A believes or 
knows to be false. The paradoxes of self-deception both arise when a single agent plays the 
role of both the deceiver and the deceived. One way out to escape the paradoxes, then, is to 
strengthen the analogy between self- and interpersonal-deception by positing some sort of 
divided self. Once we do this, we will no longer have a single agent playing two 
contradictory roles. Rather, we will have two parts of an agent acting independent of each 
other to serve as both the deceiver and the deceived.  
 To evade the paradox requires Intentionalist to posit some internal division within a 
single self: but which division? Rorty posits a “deep division”, wherein subsections of a 
single agent are capable of autonomously forming beliefs, experiencing desires, and having 
intentions. Self-deception, she claims, is aimed at a sort of integration of these selves.140  
Herbert Fingarette posits an indeterminate number of primitive “selves” that exist within us 
through habituated behaviors.141 David Pears contends that there are separate spheres of 
agency within the self-deceived agent, while Donald Davidson contends that there are 
“boundaries between parts of the mind.”142  
                                                     
140 Rorty, “Belief and Self-Deception,” 405. 
141 Herbert Fingarette, “Performatives,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1967): 151-62.  
142 Pears Motivated Irrationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Donald Davidson, “Deception and 
Division” in Problems of Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 211.  
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Motivationalist accounts of self-deception have attempted to resolve the apparent 
paradoxes by weakening the analogy that philosophers have historically drawn between self- 
and interpersonal-deception. Most typically, philosophers have denied that we intentionally 
deceive ourselves in the same way that we often intentionally deceive others. This strategy 
has been the one preferred by Mele, 143 who has described the central cases of self-deception 
as satisfying four conditions. For an agent’s belief in p to be a self-deceived belief, it must be 
the case: 
1. The belief that p which S acquires is false.  
2. S’s desiring that p leads S to manipulate (i.e., to treat inappropriately) a datum or 
data relevant, or at least seemingly relevant, to the truth value of p.  
3. This manipulation is a cause of S’s acquiring the belief that p.  
4. If, in the causal chain between desire and manipulation or in that between 
manipulation and belief-acquisition, there are any accidental intermediaries 
(links), or intermediaries intentionally introduced by another agent, these 
intermediaries do not make S (significantly) less responsible for acquiring the 
belief that p than he would otherwise have been.144  
The ‘manipulation’ mentioned in Conditions 2 and 3 can occur in a variety of ways. Our 
desire that p may, for instance, lead us to misinterpret as not counting against p evidence that, 
                                                     
143 Mele, Irrationality is aware that some interpersonal deception is unintentional, and he leaves open the 
possibility that self-deception may in rare circumstances involve intentionality. His claim, rather, is that ‘garden 
variety’ cases of self-deception do not involve intention deceiving. He denies, further, that we ought to model 
self-deception off of unintentional interpersonal deception. “Unintentional deception,” he notes “may be quite 
accidental. But self-deception seems to be motivated by desires or fears of the agent-patient.” (123). 
144 Mele, Irrationality, 127.  
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absent our desire, would plainly appear to us as counting against p. It may also lead us to 
incorrectly interpret evidence that counts against p as evidence that actually supports p. And 
it may lead us to selectively focus our attention on evidence that supports p, while 
overlooking evidence that supports ~p.145 It is through this desire-driven process of selective 
evidence gathering and interpretation that we may come to believe that p. 
Although the Intentionalists and Motivationalists resolve the paradoxes of self-
deception in different ways, we must be careful not to overestimate the gap that exists 
between them. Both the Intentionalist and the Motivationalist agree that our desires can 
influence beliefs. But whereas the Motivationalist understands these desires to affect our 
belief-formation processes in roundabout ways, the Intentionalist contends that they can 
affect these processes directly. Our desire for p to be true can lead us to intentionally perform 
actions that will enable us to form a belief about ~p’s falsity.146  
Further, although the labels for both accounts suggest otherwise, both Intentionalists 
and Motivationalists agree that there is room for both intentional and unintentional action 
within self-deception. For the Intentionalist, the role that intentions play is obvious: when we 
deceive ourselves, we intentionally cultivate within ourselves a belief that we recognize, in 
some way, to be unsupported or under-supported by evidence. But once this initial action is 
created, our self-deceived belief may be maintained through carelessness, apathy, or sheer 
forgetfulness. For the Motivationalist, the role that intentions play is less direct. Mele, for 
instance, grants that most cases of self-deception, our desire for p will motivate us to form 
                                                     
145 Ibid, 125-126. 
146 Davidson, “Deception and Division,” 208.  
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intentions and perform actions related to preserving or acquiring a belief in p. What Mele 
denies, rather, is that an intention to deceive oneself play a role in all but a fringe subset of 
cases of self-deception.147 
Both accounts are subject to well-known criticisms. The Intentionalist can evade the 
paradoxes of self-deception only by endorsing a sharply-divided self that we may find 
phenomenologically counter-intuitive. But at the same time that we may raise questions 
about the plausibility of this picture, we might also see it as necessary to accurately capturing 
the experience of self-deception. The Motivationalist, we might worry, has made the 
phenomenon too clean, leaving little to no room for the psychological angst and 
indecisiveness that sometimes characterizes self-deception. These concerns, while important 
to the continued philosophical exploration of self-deception, are orthogonal to my project in 
this chapter. This is because, as I will later demonstrate, my account of the morality of self-
deception can be developed to fit either model of self-deception.  
The Epistemic Failings of Self-Deception 
Let us now return to the question of how self-deception may constitute a failure of 
self-respect. I think that both the Intentionalist and Motivationalist can provide an answer to 
this question. For the Intentionalist, the failure is direct: the self-deceiver chooses to believe 
what she wants to believe, rather than what she has most evidence to believe. For the 
Motivationalist, the failure is more subtle: the self-deceiver allows her desires to unduly 
impact her evidence-gathering process. In both cases, to maintain her self-deception, the self-
deceiver must lower her standards of evidence-gathering and interpretation with regard to the 
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subject matter of her self-deception. If she is to remain deceived, she can’t go looking too 
hard for new evidence, can’t ‘play Devil’s Advocate’, and can’t question too deeply the 
circumstances under which she originally formed the belief.  
Most of the time, epistemic negligence is pretty morally unremarkable. When I wake 
up with a scratchy throat, I may jump to the conclusion that I have a cold. This might turn out 
to be false—perhaps I have allergies or the flu. And my belief was formed hastily and 
without much evidence, but the degree of negligence was low, the matter at issue was 
unrelated to anything that really matters to me, and the false belief that I formed about myself 
was pretty insignificant.  Even willful, desire-directed epistemic negligence can at times 
seem morally innocuous. The undergraduate’s desire to finish an essay in a course that he 
loathes may motivate him to perform only the bare minimum amount of research necessary 
for completing the assignment, thus leading him to take up a position in his paper that he 
would have found misguided had he done more research. But while his essay writing strategy 
likely won’t lead him to the honor roll, I also don’t think that it suggests that he disrespects 
himself as an epistemically rational agent. Rather, it reflects that he, like everyone else, 
prioritizes certain epistemic projects over others. Just as we can’t be expected to be 
paradigms of practical reason in every decision that we make about what do so, so too can we 
not be expected to be epistemic saints when it comes to every belief that we form about 
ourselves and the world.  
If there is something epistemically disrespectful about the self-deceiver’s belief 
formation, then, we cannot locate it in the simple fact that she is negligent, or even in the fact 
that she is willfully negligent about forming beliefs. Rather, we must locate her epistemic 
disrespect in the reasons behind this negligence. One way in which we may uncover these 
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reasons is by looking at the sorts of desires that seem to motivate us towards self-deception. 
Mark Johnston has suggested that not all desires give rise to self-deception, but rather that we 
are motivated towards self-deception by our ‘anxious desires’. Self-deception, for Johnson, is 
the result of a mental process that aims at the reduction of anxiety, instead of the cultivation 
of justified true beliefs.148 Annette Barnes elaborates on this connection between anxiety and 
self-deception, defining ‘anxious desires’ as follows:  
A person has an anxious desire that q i.e., that it be the case that q, just in case the 
person both desires that q and is anxious that it is not the case that q.149  
There is, in another words, a bi-directionality in anxious desires: when we experience them, 
we simultaneously feel a desire that p obtains, and experience anxiety that ~p may end up 
obtaining. Not all desires have this bi-directionality. We can, Barnes observes, desire a cup of 
coffee without feeling anxious that we might not get to have it. Self-deception, for both 
Barnes and Johnston, acts as an analgesic against anxiety. When we deceive ourselves into 
believing p we are able, to a large degree at least, put to bed our anxieties over the possibility 
of ~p.  
We might say then that: the self-deceiver is not epistemically negligent towards just 
anything, but rather towards a specific class of topics that provoke her anxiety. When it 
comes to these topics, she is not simply invested in certain propositions being true of them—
rather, she is anxious about the possibility that those propositions might not be true. In this 
way, Barnes and Johnson contend, the self-deceiver can be charged with the vice of 
                                                     
148 Mark Johnston, “Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind”, in eds. B.P. McLaughlin and A.O. Rorty, 
Perspectives on Self-Deception. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 66. 
149 Annette Barnes, Seeing Through Self-Deception, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 38. 
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epistemic cowardice.150 The epistemic coward gives priority to safety and comfort over 
truth151 and in doing so exercises a morally objectionable level of partiality towards his 
feelings and desires.152  
I think that Johnston and Barnes are right to suggest that self-deception is a species of 
epistemic cowardice insofar as it involves prioritizing something—namely, one’s desires and 
comfort—over the truth. But this is not to say that all epistemic cowardice involves self-
deception. Rather, one can be a clear-eyed epistemic coward. Consider the person who can’t 
stand to watch the news because she hates to hear about all the atrocities that are going on 
around the world. Or consider the professor who never opens his teaching evaluations 
because he can’t stomach the idea of finding out what his students truly think of him. Both of 
these people can be fully aware that they are cowards when it comes to world news and 
student evaluations. They can freely admit that, in choosing not to find out specific facts 
about topics that cause them anxiety, they are privileging their comfort over the truth. And 
                                                     
150 Johnson, “Self-Deception,” 85.  
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152 Here, Barnes distinguishes prima facie objectionability from prima facie moral badness. There is always, she 
asserts, something prima facie objectionable about epistemic cowardice (and thus, about self-deception), but 
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coherently say that it would be better in some way if the self-deceiver wasn’t self-deceived, while still saying 
that nobody could reasonably blame him or find him objectionable for being self-deceived (Seeing Through 
Self-Deception, 163-166). 
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they can acknowledge that because of this, they’re not ideal epistemic agents. They go too 
easy on themselves; if they were more courageous, they would be more willing to face 
potentially hurtful truths about themselves and the world.  
Being aware about one’s cowardice does not insulate one from moral censure. We 
can look down on people who self-consciously shy away from uncomfortable truths in the 
same way that we look down on people who self-consciously shy away from difficult 
activities. And our reasons for this censure are manifold. Often, we find ourselves having to 
pick up the slack for cowards, by taking on tasks that we also dislike, but are nevertheless 
willing to do. If epistemic cowardice becomes too prevalent, it opens the door to all sorts of 
human rights abuses. And putting consequences aside, we can condemn cowards for going 
too easy on themselves, for privileging desires and comforts over rational agency.  
Despite this, I think that we have a certain begrudging respect for self-aware 
epistemic cowards that we do not have for self-deceivers. The self-aware coward is going too 
easy on herself as an epistemic agent, but unlike the self-deceiver, the self-aware coward is at 
least not going too easy on herself about the very fact that she’s going too easy on herself. 
Because of this, there seems to be a moral asymmetry between the self-aware and self-
deceived epistemic coward. The questions we must ask, then, are as follows: what does the 
self-aware coward have that the self-deceiver lacks? Is there something morally 
objectionable about lacking this thing, whatever it is? And finally, if there is something 
objectionable, in what way is it objectionable? I think we can make headway towards 
answering all three questions by exploring the connection between self-deception and self-
knowledge. 
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Section 4: Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge 
Not all failures of self-knowledge, as I have noted, involve self-deception. What 
about the reverse? Does self-deception always involve a failure of self-knowledge? In a 
trivial sense, the answer is clearly yes: the self-deceiver has by necessity failed to know at 
least one fact about himself, viz. that he is self-deceived. But the topics about which we are 
self-deceived vary wildly, and clearly go far beyond the domain of the self. To demonstrate, 
let us consider Stevens, the deeply self-deceived narrator in Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Remains of 
the Day. Stevens takes great pride in having been an exemplary butler to the powerful, 
proper, and morally upright Lord Darlington.153 And he takes pride in being the son of an 
equally exceptional butler. In fact, he considers his deceased father to have been a perfect 
butler.154 But his own recollection of his father’s last days tell a very different story of a man 
with severely deteriorated physical and mental stamina who had long ago ceased to be 
great.155 Likewise, although Stevens takes great pains to deny it, he recognizes at some level 
that his employer, Lord Darlington, was an anti-Semitic Nazi-sympathizer who deserved the 
public censure that he experienced in his later years.156  
 The facts about which he is self-deceived clearly have a close relationship to Stevens. 
He’s not, after all, self-deceived about the virtues of some other butler’s employer. But while 
                                                     
153 Kazuo Ishiguro, The Remains of the Day, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 14, 60–61, 126. 
154 Ishiguro, Remains, 35.  
155 Ibid, 58, 64.  
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Stevens has a close relation to these facts, it is not a relationship of identity: a fact about Lord 
Darlington is a fact that concerns Stevens, but it is intuitively not a fact about Stevens.157  
 In one sense, this intuition is right. Stevens is not Lord Darlington, and so facts about 
Lord Darlington are not in and of themselves facts about Stevens. But if we take a closer look 
at why Stevens is self-deceived about Lord Darlington, we’ll see that facts about Lord 
Darlington are, in one important respect, facts about Stevens.  
 Let’s start by surveying the sorts of explanations we could give as to why Stevens is 
self-deceived about Lord Darlington’s anti-Semitism. Perhaps Stevens just really hates 
acknowledging that there are anti-Semites in Britain: he’s proud that his country welcomed 
Jews fleeing Continental Europe during the Second World War, and the existence of a British 
anti-Semite frustrates his beliefs about his country’s moral superiority. Or perhaps Stevens 
just really hates anti-Semites—the very thought that he has met one gives him the chills. If 
either of these explanations were the right one, then we could say that Steven’s self-
deception, in one respect, has very little at all to do with Lord Darlington. If Stevens were to 
find out that it was some other Lord, and not Lord Darlington, who was an anti-Semite, then 
Stevens would be self-deceived about that Lord’s anti-Semitism. But these explanations are 
clearly not the right one, given the other facts that we know about Steven’s life history. It 
matters to explaining Steven’s self-deception that we recognize that he had a certain 
relationship with Lord Darlington, and that this relationship was not merely one of employer 
to employee. Rather, it was an identity-defining relationship with Stevens: his sense of self 
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was wrapped up with his status as Lord Darlington’s head butler.158 Or, to put it another way: 
the ends that Stevens set in relation to his employment as Lord Darlington’s Butler were 
identity-constituting ends. Because of this, facts about Lord Darlington were, from Stevens’ 
perspective at least, also facts about Stevens. In discovering that Lord Darlington was an 
anti-Semite, Stevens simultaneously learned that he, Stevens, had been employed by an anti-
Semite.  
 In the Introduction, I introduced a distinction between substantial and trivial self-
knowledge. I argued in Chapter 2 that we have non-instrumental moral reasons to seek the 
former, but not the latter sort of self-knowledge. As I have noted, substantial self-knowledge 
is most typically knowledge relating to the ends with which we, as individuals, most strongly 
identify. What particular types of facts constitute substantial self-knowledge will vary from 
person to person. If I identify as an artist, then facts about my artistic abilities will be 
substantial to me in a way that they would not be to someone who did not identify similarly. 
Likewise, while most people would not consider the fact that they were once employed by an 
anti-Semite to count as substantial self-knowledge, Stevens, who identified strongly with his 
status as Lord Darlington’s butler, would consider the information substantial. And so, when 
he ultimately realizes that Lord Darlington wasn’t the virtuous man he thought him to, 
Stevens is forced to grapple with the realization that he’s defined himself in terms of his 
service to an ignoble Lord.  
 By the same token, when a husband deceives himself about his wife’s infidelity, he is 
not only deceiving himself about what she is like, but also about what his life and his marital 
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relationship is like. He is, in other words, deceiving himself about facts about his substantial 
self. Were he to ever overcome his self-deception, he would be forced to reckon not only 
with the fact that he didn’t really know his wife in an important regard, but also that he didn’t 
really know certain key facts about himself, his marriage, and his life.  
 Rorty offers a more vivid and tragic example of the connection between other-
regarding self-deceived beliefs and our substantial selves. When King Lear oscillates 
between acknowledging his dear daughter’s tragic demise, and denying its occurrence, he is, 
of course, deceiving himself about his daughter. But he is simultaneously deceiving himself 
about himself: 
..of course his identity is at stake: if Cordelia is dead, and he and she cannot tell each 
other tales and forgive each other, he is a different Lear, a Lear who must bear an 
identity different from that which could be his, if he and Cordelia’s death were 
lovingly, playfully reconciled.159 
We cannot even understand why Lear is self-deceived about Cordelia’s death unless we 
appreciate the connection between his relationship with her and his sense of who he is and 
how his life is gone. Were this connection not to exist—were Lear to be self-deceived about 
the death of a complete stranger—then his self-deception would be unintelligible to us. And 
so, Rorty concludes, we employ our strategies of self-deception in the service of maintaining 
or changing our desired conception of ourselves.160 Or, as Richard Holton pithily put it, self-
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deception is “more concerned with the self’s deception about the self, than with the self’s 
deception by the self.”161 
 Insofar as we have moral reasons to know our substantial selves, we fail ourselves by 
being self-deceived. When we deceive ourselves, we privilege our comfort over a clear view 
of someone who is, to us at least, worth knowing for the sake of knowing. In this way, we 
can distinguish the self-aware coward from the self-deceiver.  The professor who can’t stand 
to read his teaching evaluations knows that he’s someone who cares a great deal about what 
others think of him: if he didn’t, he wouldn’t care if his teaching reviews were bad. And he 
knows further, that in this respect, he’s cowardly: he’s letting his fears of disapproval keep 
him from reading some teaching reviews that might actually make him happy, or at least 
might be helpfully instructive. We can say that he’s going too easy on himself, and that he 
shouldn’t care so much about what people think about him. But what we can’t say is that he 
doesn’t know himself. While he is cowardly when it comes to reading reviews, he isn’t 
cowardly when it comes to seeing himself and his flaws.  
The self-deceiver, in contrast, suffers from both first- and second-order cowardice. 
Like the self-aware coward, he shies away from evidence and situations that may cause him 
anxiety. But unlike the self-aware coward, he also shies away from his cowardice: he is a 
coward, in other words, not just about specific desires, but also about the nature of his 
substantial self. Now we must ask: what’s so bad about being a second-order coward?   
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Section 5: Self-Deception as a Perversion of Valuing 
Let us return to the second-order cowardice that the self-deceiver exhibits. This is a 
cowardice directed at the substantial self: it reveals an agent’s unwillingness to recognize 
herself for who she really is. I’ve already talked about some of the instrumental harms that 
can follow from this failure of self-recognition, as well as from the failure of epistemic self-
respect that it necessarily involves. I’ve argued that instrumental explanations don’t capture 
the sense in which self-deception can be condemnable for its own sake, while explanations 
that appeal to the epistemic vices associated with self-deception are unable to distinguish it 
from other, less condemnable epistemic failings.  
 In this section, I’ll consider how the self-deceiver wrongs herself through being self-
deceived. In doing so, I’ll make clear why it is that self-deception arouses not simply moral 
umbrage, but also pity. On my account, self-deception often represents a ‘perversion of 
valuing’ insofar as it both reveals to others what we most value and how we see our 
substantial selves in relation to those values, while at the same time frustrating our ability to 
ever actually engage appropriately with those values. In this way, self-deception is both 
crime and punishment: when we engage in it, we act epistemically carelessly towards the 
very parts of our lives that most demand our attention, and in doing so, cut ourselves off 
(often permanently) from those parts.    
Taking Our Ends Seriously 
To start, let’s recall that a requirement of self-respect is that we be willing to invest in 
ourselves as end-setters. This involves a willingness to be reasonably partial to the ends that 
we set, as well as a commitment to not going too easy on ourselves with regards to these 
ends. Of course, not all ends are created equal: some of the ends that we set matter very little 
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to us, while others matter a great deal. The ends that matter a great deal are, by and large, the 
ones that reflect our substantial selves: we set them because they accord with our values, 
reflect our talents, and shape our lives in the way we want our lives to be shaped. They are, in 
other words, identity-constituting ends. Information about these ends, and the way in which 
we are pursuing them, thus qualifies as substantial self-knowledge: if I really care about 
being an boxer, then I’ll have reason to know whether I won the match because the game was 
fixed not simply because such information will help me improve as a boxer, but also just 
because it will tell me something about my substantial self.    
What impact does self-deception have on these ends? To start answering both of these 
questions, let’s look at a famous case of self-deception—this is the case of Norma Desmond 
from Billy Wilder’s film Sunset Boulevard:  
The last film that Norma starred in may have been a silent film, but that hasn’t 
diminished her status as one of Hollywood’s greatest stars. Her adoring fans, whose 
letters she still receives daily, long for her return to the silver screen. And, after 
decades away, Norma is finally ready for her comeback—no, not her comeback—her 
return. She will be playing the heroine in a Hollywood epic that she wrote herself. 
Paramount loved her script, of course, and De Mille is all set to direct it.  
Or at least, that’s how Norma Desmond sees things. The reality of her situation looks 
rather different. Joe, the scriptwriter whom Norma has hired to ‘polish up’ her 
screenplay, can’t make heads or tails of her convoluted prose. Mr. De Mille won’t 
return her calls. And her fan letters—which are, in fact, dutifully written by her 
former husband-turned-butler—suspiciously all bear the same postmark. Norma may 
be a Hollywood idol in her own mind, but in the real world, she’s a washed-up has-
been with a fragile ego and a grip on reality that’s growing ever more tenuous.162   
Norma’s self-deception tells us something about what she values—but what? It isn’t the case 
that Norma simply values believing herself to be a famous Hollywood actress. And she 
certainly doesn’t value being deceived into thinking that she’s a famous Hollywood actress. 
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Rather, Norma’s self-deception reveals her to be someone who deeply values being a famous 
Hollywood actress. Her status as a member of the Hollywood elite, in other words, is an 
integral part of Norma’s substantial self.  
The problem, of course, is that Norma isn’t a member of the Hollywood elite: the 
person she is and the person she believes herself to be have come radically apart as a result of 
her self-deception. And because of this, she does not merely fail to value her actually self, 
but expressly disvalues it. Norma shows that she would rather engage in self-subterfuge than 
face herself as she truly is.   
 Norma’s self-deception also tells us something about how she has set ends for herself 
in relation to one of the things she most values. Here’s where my account diverges depending 
on whether one has Motivationalist or Intentionalist leanings. I’ll develop the Intentionalist 
reading first. Recall that Intentionalists think that self-deception is a willful act: to deceive 
myself requires that I somehow convince myself that p is true, even though I know that it is 
not. If you’re an Intentionalist, then you should treat Norma’s self-deception as a choice that 
she has made about how to deal with her loss of celebrity.   
But while self-deception might be one way in which we might accomplish (or at least, 
think ourselves to have accomplished) our ends, it is not the right way. Why not? Why can’t I 
accomplish my ends simply by thinking that I’ve accomplished them? Why can’t Norma 
pursue the end that she has set for herself simply by changing her perception of the world? 
After all, there are times when we can do just this. A depressed person might set ‘being 
happier’ as an end, and she may make progress towards this end by trying to convince herself 
that her mood has already improved. But the perceptual distortions of self-deception seem 
relevantly different than the perceptual distortions that the depressed person undertakes. This 
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is because we don’t get to choose what sorts of actions and behaviors constitute ‘proper 
engagement’ with our ends. Rather, the behaviors and actions required for ‘proper 
engagement’ are largely determined by background social norms that we can’t control. 
Norma can’t regain her fame by distorting her self-perception for the same reason that I can’t 
become a great baseball player by changing the norms that govern what it takes to play 
baseball well. The norms of being famous prevent us from achieving fame through self-
deception, and the norms associated with being a great baseball player prevent us from 
simply changing the rules of baseball to suit our talents or lack thereof.  
 So what would Norma have to do in order to properly pursue this particular identity-
constituting end? As a twenty-five year old, Norma knew the answer to this question. She 
had to accept mediocre roles, keep up her looks, and make nice with directors, producers and 
film crews. Fifty year old Norma is a different story. For one thing, she simply can’t do some 
of the things that it takes to make it in Hollywood. She can’t look twenty-five and her anti-
social tendencies make schmoozing difficult for her. For another thing, she’s simply 
unwilling to do some of the things that she’d need to do to make a comeback. She has an 
artistic objection to talkies and, while she’s too old to play a starlet, she’s unwilling to play a 
mother.  
 It seems likely, then, that there is no way for Norma to ever achieve the end that she 
wants most desperately to achieve. Given this, we might say that rationality demands that she 
give up that end.163 And indeed, I think properly valuing fame also requires her to give up 
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that end: if she really cares about being a Hollywood star, maybe she shouldn’t be content 
with playing mother roles and accepting a spot on the celebrity C-list. Maybe it’s best that 
she value fame by appreciating the celebrity she once had, and by acknowledging to herself 
that she no longer has it. But this is where self-deception serves as an impenetrable barrier to 
proper valuing. In her self-deceived state, Norma can’t see that she is not in fact Hollywood 
royalty. She can’t, in other words, see that she hasn’t in fact accomplished the end that she 
has set for herself. As such, she can never make meaningful progress towards that end: 
there’s no point of trying to return to Hollywood if you think you’re already there. But she 
also can’t rationally abandon her goal of returning to the silver screen. She can’t abandon a 
goal that she already sees herself as having achieved. This means that Norma truly is stuck 
between a rock and a hard place: her self-deception prevents her from ever properly pursuing 
her goal of reclaiming her fame, and it keeps her from ever revising the content of those ends 
to better reflect her values. Thus, Norma’s self-deception constitutes a failure to treat herself, 
her values, her ends and ultimately herself with the seriousness that they deserve.  
 That, at least, is the story that an Intentionalist could tell about Norma. Now let us 
consider how the Motivationalist might interpret Norma’s situation. To start, note that when 
it comes to our identity-constituting ends, I have argued that self-respect requires that we 
hold ourselves to especially stringent practical and epistemic standards. It’s one thing to care 
about forming a justified true belief about some political matter that doesn’t really concern 
you—you ought to, because as a rational agent, you should be generally committed to 
forming justified true beliefs. But it’s another thing to be committed to forming a justified 
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true belief about a topic that interests you greatly, or that concerns one of the ends that 
matters most to you. When it comes to these topics, you should care about forming 
reasonable beliefs not simply because you’re a rational agent, but also because you’re 
invested in properly engaging with those topics in particular. Holding yourself to particularly 
stringent epistemic standards is just another way of affirming that your identity-constituting 
ends are worth taking seriously.   
 But this is exactly what Norma doesn’t do. Despite wanting badly to regain her fame, 
she keeps herself from paying attention to her present circumstances in the way that her end 
would require her to. If fame is something that she really cares about, then she should be 
firmly committed to seeking out genuine criticism rather than empty praise, and to watching 
new movies to see where she might be able to find a place for herself. But Norma instead 
shies away from anything that might cause her emotional pain, and hides instead in 
reassuring self-delusion.  
Self-deception also represents a perversity of valuing in a second, higher-order sense. 
It is clear that Norma values knowing that she’s a successful Hollywood actress. We can see 
this in the fact that she demands constant reminders of her fame from those around her. She 
enjoys thinking about this ‘fact’ about herself, calling it to mind, and gathering additional 
evidence in support of its truth. And in this strange way, we can see that Norma values—in 
one sense at least—having true beliefs. She’s relevantly different than the washed-up actress 
who is content to simply daydream about what it would be like if she were still a member of 
the Hollywood Elite. Norma wouldn’t be content with this: she doesn’t want to imagine what 
it would be like if it were true that she was still be famous. Rather, she wants it to be true that 
she is still famous. We can’t make sense of Norma’s actions unless we accept that she is, in 
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some perverse way, committed to self-knowledge and dissatisfied with mere fantasy. But at 
the same time that her actions demonstrate her to have this commitment, they also constitute 
a failure to honor it. And this failure, once again, is particularly tragic insofar as it is the very 
thing that will prevent Norma from ever actually knowing herself or discovering the truth 
about the world.  
Section 6: Meeting the Desiderata of a Successful Account 
I have demonstrated at this point that self-deception is a species of epistemic self-
disrespect. Specifically, it is a failure that concerns the ends with which we most strongly 
identify. We are now in a position to see how my account can deal with the desiderata that I 
laid out at the beginning of my chapter. I’ve already talked about the sixth desiderata, which 
concerns the compatibility between a theory of self-deception’s epistemological structure and 
its moral wrongness, and so I won’t discuss it further.  
Let us instead start with the first desideratum. Why is self-deception so distinct from 
other failures of self-knowledge? It is distinct, I think, because it typically involves a failure 
to properly respond to one of the ends that ought to matter most to us. Because of this, self-
deception will typically involve a failure of substantial rather than trivial self-knowledge.  
This is not true of self-knowledge failures generally. Often, we fail to know very 
trivial facts about ourselves. If I am forgetful, I might fail to remember where I put my keys 
or whether I enjoyed watching Boardwalk Empire. But whatever false beliefs I have about 
myself as a result of this forgetfulness do not speak to my values—I don’t have them because 
I’ve failed to properly engage with something I really care about, but rather because I have a 
bad memory.  
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 Next, let’s consider why self-deception has the power to make a morally bad person 
seem morally worse. The person who is self-deceived about his moral viciousness, I 
suggested, is blameworthy for two reasons: he’s blameworthy first for having that character, 
and second for not knowing it. This double blameworthiness occurs because people who 
deceive themselves about how bad they really are often manage to wrong other people in 
addition to themselves. To go back to two characters from the beginning of this chapter, we 
might say that self-deceived Larry is condemnable for all the same reasons that self-aware 
Percy is—both are manipulative philanderers. But Larry, unlike Percy, has also failed 
himself. His self-deception is proof that he values, on some level, being a good guy. And it is 
also the very thing that prevents him from realizing that value. This explains why it is so easy 
to get angry at moral self-deceivers for ‘having their cake and eating it too’: they still care 
about being good, but their self-deception allows them to get out of doing all the work that 
the rest of us have to do in order to live up to our moral ideals. Percy, of course, is no moral 
saint: it would be much better if he actually cared about what he was like. But his failure to 
care about morality is still, I think, not a distinctly self-regarding failure.  
 These considerations help us to explain why self-deception can add moral content to 
otherwise non-moral situations. This is what happens in Norma’s case, when she deceives 
herself into believing that she is still a Hollywood starlet, and also in Penny’s, when she 
deceives herself about why she couldn’t complete the 10k race. Penny really cares about 
being fit—that’s part of the explanation of why she can’t admit to herself that her poor 
performance is proof that she’s out of shape. But her self-deception is also the very thing that 
is standing in her way of ever getting into shape. In this way, Penny fails herself insofar as 
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she fails to set the sorts of ends that she ought to set in order to properly engage with one of 
her values.  
 And so too are we are able meet the forth desideratum, which required us to account 
for the range of moral and non-moral reactive attitudes that self-deception regularly elicits. 
We feel blame and censure towards the self-deceiver because we think, quite reasonably, that 
they have done wrong by themselves, and that they’ve failed to treat themselves with the 
self-respect they deserve. But we also feel pity and empathy. This is because, while we can 
think that they’ve done something morally wrong by failing themselves in this way, we can 
also recognize that they have, through being self-deceived, already been punished for their 
failure. They have, after all, been denied the ability to ever properly engage with the ends 
with which they most strongly identify. Depending on the circumstances, we may feel as 
though their self-deception is punishment enough, and that any additional censure would be 
inappropriately punitive.  
 In some situations, we may actually go further than this. We may, in fact, feel 
motivated to help preserve the self-deceiver’s warped worldview. This is especially common 
in cases where the reality from which the self-deceiver endeavors to escape is particularly 
horrific. Consider the classic case of the mother who is self-deceived about her terminally ill 
child’s chances of recovery. Her self-deception reveals what she values: that is, her child’s 
well-being and continued existence. And it also reveals something about how she wishes to 
see herself: as the mother of a child who will eventually grow into an adult. Depending on 
the particular form that it takes, her self-deception may actually frustrate her ability to realize 
that value in the limited ways in which it is possible to realize it. She may, for instance, push 
doctors to try experimental therapies that cause her child unnecessary pain and suffering 
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instead of pursuing palliative therapies aimed at reducing pain and improving quality of life. 
But even if this is the case, the wretchedness of the situation might move others to help keep 
the mother’s self-deception alive. We are psychologically limited beings, and there is only so 
much mental agony that we can face head-on.  
This should not be taken to imply that self-deception, even in tragic cases, counts as a 
morally good thing. Rather, we should appreciate that, in certain situations, the behaviors that 
are typically morally obligatory become supererogatory. While there might be something 
especially admirable about the person who remains committed to seeing himself and the 
world clearly in even the most tragic of circumstances, we cannot reasonably expect or 
demand that people respond to tragic circumstances in this way.    
 In this way, my account can speak to the fifth desideratum, which concerned 
‘exceptional’ cases of self-deception that we do not consider condemnable. The mother’s 
case is one such exception, but there are other less tragic ones.  Through most of this chapter, 
I have talked about ‘extreme’ cases of self-deception—cases involving deceptions that persist 
over great lengths of time and that concern serious subjects. Not all self-deception is like this. 
Recall the novice comedian who deceives herself about how well her first performance went. 
Or imagine how a job candidate might console herself at the end of a lackluster interview by 
musing that she didn’t really want the job anyway, or by reassuring herself that the interview 
didn’t go that badly.    
 On my account, self-deception often both reveals to others what ends we value most, 
while at the same time frustrating our ability to ever realize those ends. But this isn’t always 
the case. Sometimes, self-deception can be a means that we can take to achieve our ends. The 
stand-up comic and the job candidate may need to deceive themselves about their respective 
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performances in order to maintain the mental fortitude that they need to keep pursuing their 
goals.  
These cases of innocuous self-deceptions are distinguishable from condemnable cases 
like Norma’s and Steven’s across at least four dimensions. First, as mentioned above, they 
are instrumentally valuable to the achievement of our ends in a way that more radical self-
deception is not. If the job candidate once read a study that demonstrated that people who 
underestimated their chances of getting the job had a higher chance of succeeding than those 
who overestimated their chances, then we can imagine that she would make an effort to focus 
on why she won’t likely get the job before she begins the interview.  
Second, these cases involve minor self-deceptions: the job candidate isn’t deceiving 
herself into thinking that she’s done well in every interview, but just that she’s done well in 
this one.164 Norma’s self-deception, in contrast, infects almost every aspect of her life. Third, 
innocuous self-deceptions are temporally limited: the teenager’s self-deception will end, one 
way or another, when his driving test is complete.165 Steven’s self-deception about the moral 
character of Lord Darlington persists long after Darlington is dead.  
Third, innocuous self-deceptions do not require a radical misuse of our epistemic 
powers. The job candidate doesn’t need to work hard to reinterpret evidence about her 
performance; she simply spends more time thinking about the questions that she answered 
                                                     
164 The exception, of course, is if the job candidate’s self-deception is merely a symptom of a larger self-
deceived belief about her competency in interviews, the attractiveness of her demeanor or so forth. In this case, 
it would not be apt to consider her self-deception minor. Rather, we can refer to it as a particular component of 
a larger self-deceived belief. And this larger belief, again, is a belief about the job candidate’s substantial self.  
165 Rorty, “Belief and Self-Deception,” 400.  
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well than the ones she answered poorly. Stevens, in contrast, has to radically lower his 
epistemic standards as they relate to topics like his father, Lord Darlington, and his 
relationship with Miss Keaton if he is to remain self-deceived.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, innocuous self-deceptions do not involve 
topics that are related to our substantial selves. The job candidate does not define herself by 
how well she did in the interview, but Norma does define herself by her status as a famous 
actress. And so, while the job candidate’s self-deception involves rather trivial beliefs about 
herself, Norma’s self-deception causes her to lose sight about the very parts of herself that 
self-love and self-respect demand she try to know.   
  
148 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: WHAT FLORENCE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN 
I have argued that a non-instrumental commitment to knowing oneself is not a sign of 
morally condemnatory narcissism, but rather of appropriate self-love. A willingness to take 
seriously that commitment, by holding oneself accountable to appropriately stringent 
epistemic standards, further, is part of what it takes to respect oneself as an epistemically 
rational agent.  
 In the process of establishing these claims, I have shown that self-respect does not 
frustrate self-love, as some might think, but actually compels us to love ourselves. This is 
because self-respect requires both that we exercise a reasonable partiality towards ourselves 
and the ends that we set, and also that we strive to act in ways that make us loveable to 
ourselves.  
 Finally, I have explained why we need not appeal to consequential considerations to 
explain our antipathy to self-deception. Rather, self-deception is in and of itself an 
undesirable state insofar as it constitutes an especially objectionable form of epistemic 
disrespect. The self-deceived agent does not simply fail to adequately scrutinize her beliefs. 
Rather, she fails to adequately scrutinize the very beliefs that are most deserving of her 
epistemic attention, viz. the beliefs that relate to the ends, values, and commitments with 
which she herself most intimately identifies. Self-deception thus often serves to reveal to 
others which of our ends we value most, while at the same time frustrating our ability to ever 
properly engage with those ends.  
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 Putting the pieces of this puzzle together, we can now explain what reason Florence 
would have had to learn about her lack of musicality. As I made clear in the Introduction, this 
reason could not be an instrumental one: Florence would not have been able to use this 
newfound self-knowledge to improve upon herself or her life, and would have no doubt 
found it to be painful. And yet, I think many of us still feel pulled towards the idea that 
Florence had some reason to want to know the truth about her singing abilities, and that she 
stood to gain something by acquiring this self-knowledge.  
The reason that Florence had to know herself is the same sort of reason that we have 
to discover unconvertible truths about our loved ones, even when those truths are likely to 
harm the relationship we share with them and cause us emotional pain. Our love for 
ourselves gives us reasons to know ourselves that don’t bottom out in considerations of well-
being, and our self-respect pushes us to act on those reasons. If Florence had wanted to 
discover this unpleasant truth about her musicality, then, we could say that she respected and 
loved herself enough to be committed to seeing herself clearly.  
This does not mean, however, that Florence’s self-discovery, as a matter of historical 
fact, was a net good for her. Nor does it imply that it was a good thing that the self-discovery 
occurred in the precise way that it did, namely after reading a review of her Carnegie Hall 
performance that her romantic partner had tried to keep hidden from her. Rather, we can say 
that it was a shame that Florence’s self-discovery came so late, insofar as St. Clair had for 
years struggled to deny Florence any opportunity to see herself clearly. And insofar as 
Florence herself also had a role to play in the ruse, we can say that it was a pity that she 
didn’t take one of her most identity-defining ends, and thus herself, more seriously. Finally, 
even if Florence was made happier by living a lie, we can still contend that she lost out on 
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something valuable. Specifically, she lost out on any opportunity she may have had to know 
the person with whom she shared her most intimate relationship.  
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